ISW: Ukraine Has Its Best Chance Since 2022
- 14.10.2026, 17:29
The Ukrainian Armed Forces have regained the operational initiative in key sectors of the front.
Ukraine finds itself in its most favorable position since December 2022 position to seize the strategic initiative in the war. However, it risks losing the momentum it has gained. The U.S. and Europe may miss this opportunity if they allow the Kremlin to force them to merely react to its moves. According to analysts, Russia’s summer offensive failed. The fall offensive is also unlikely to yield results for Moscow, writes the U.S. Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in a special report.
The ISW notes that Ukraine has regained the operational initiative on most key sectors of the front and has been fighting for the strategic initiative since late 2025. This year, the Russian army’s rate of advance has slowed to that of a pedestrian: the daily net gain does not even reach one square kilometer. Ukrainian counteroffensives have liberated at least 1,046 square kilometers. Consequently, the net increase in territory under Russian control since the beginning of the year amounts to only about 100 square kilometers.
Putin has yet to achieve any of his stated objectives. He has not forced Ukraine to surrender, has not destroyed its army, and is far from capturing the rest of the Donetsk region along with the “fortress belt.”
Ukraine’s long-range strikes have caused a fuel shortage in Russia and reduced its oil refining capacity by at least 30%. Now Moscow is forced to choose which facilities to protect with its air defense systems.
Analysts note that Ukraine’s successes in 2026 are no accident. It has significantly increased its weapons production and the scale of its medium- and long-range strikes, and is also working on its own ballistic missiles. If this program continues to develop, key Russian defense enterprises and military infrastructure will come under attack.
The pressure has already taken a toll on Russia’s finances. The Kremlin has begun purchasing ready-to-use fuel from India, which increases expenses. Russia’s Ministry of Finance has also announced its intention to increase its purchases of foreign currency and gold from October 7 through November 6 amid a decline in export revenues from energy resources.
Since 2022, Russia has intensified its strategic bombing of Ukraine every fall and winter, but has so far failed to break Ukraine’s will and ability to fight. According to ISW, the current campaign exploits a weakness in Ukraine’s defenses: a lack of capabilities to counter jet drones and ballistic missiles.
Moscow seeks to render major cities uninhabitable by attacking civilian infrastructure around the clock, particularly postal sorting centers and bridges. Russia also wants to sow distrust in the Ukrainian authorities and drive a wedge between the front lines and the home front. Another objective is to force the Ukrainian Armed Forces to choose between striking targets that support Russian bombing campaigns and meeting the needs of the front lines. In addition, Russia is increasingly attacking logistics routes and transportation links used to deliver aid to Ukraine and transport goods out of the country. In this way, Moscow is attempting to cut Ukraine off from European support.
The increase in Russian attacks on NATO countries—particularly drone and missile incursions, sabotage, arson, and assassinations—is intended to force the alliance to react to Moscow’s actions. These attacks also present the European defense industry with a false choice between aiding Ukraine and preparing for a possible Russian escalation. Such tactics align with Putin’s long-standing goal: to render NATO an ineffective alliance.
The ISW describes the Kremlin’s proposal to supply diesel fuel to global markets as an operation of cognitive warfare—that is, an attempt to influence the decisions of Ukraine’s partners. According to analysts, Moscow is prepared to export negligible amounts of fuel in exchange for an easing of sanctions. This indicates that pressure on the Russian energy sector is having an effect.
Unlike the U.S. and Ukraine’s other partners, the Kremlin recognizes Russia’s critical vulnerability to initiative, pace, and sustained pressure. In the fall of 2022, Moscow had already resorted to nuclear blackmail during Ukrainian counteroffensives in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. This influenced the partners’ decision regarding military equipment deliveries, prevented the Ukrainian Armed Forces from inflicting further defeats on the Russians, and prolonged the war.
Therefore, analysts advise Ukraine’s partners to take preemptive action. First and foremost, it is necessary to accelerate the deployment of countermeasures against jet drones. These drones make bombing runs particularly dangerous, as they are effective against moving targets, especially in the rear.
The European Union must disburse the loan to Ukraine without delay to avoid repeating the situation with gradual arms deliveries, which previously allowed Russia to drag out the war. European funding should enable the Ukrainian command to plan simultaneous and sequential operations looking well into next year.
The U.S. and Europe must also strengthen sanctions against the Russian energy sector and help Ukraine ramp up long-range strikes against Russia’s defense industry and energy infrastructure. According to the ISW, it is time for Europe to finally develop measures to deter Russian attacks on its territory, primarily sabotage and drone incursions. Moscow is taking greater risks because it does not view the response from Europe and NATO as a significant deterrent.