Son Vs. Father: The Struggle For Power In Turkmenistan
- 18.10.2026, 14:49
There is discord in the Berdymukhamedov family.
There is once again unrest within Turkmenistan’s ruling duo—the father-son duo of the Berdymukhamedovs. Over the past four years in power, the son, President Serdar, has increasingly sidelined his father and predecessor, Gurbanguly, removing his father’s allies and relatives from their posts, writes Galiya Ibragimova on Carnegie Politika.
Publicly, both demonstrate unity, but it is evident that the father—who initially had no plans to transfer full power to his son—is not prepared to tolerate his son’s growing independence.
The intensifying rivalry between them could threaten the regime’s stability and call into question their ability to retain power—especially since they came to hold it largely by chance.
Velvet Revolution 2.0
Serdar inherited the presidency back in 2022, but he has only now begun the largest purge of officials during his presidency. In general, it is difficult to clearly divide Turkmen high-ranking officials into “father’s” and “son’s” factions—many of them began their careers under Gurbanguly and continued under Serdar.
But over the past few months, there have been enough indications that the main goal of the latest reshuffles is to get rid of the team his father left him to help him settle into power.
Serdar began the reshuffles with the security apparatus. Major General Nazar Atagaraev was dismissed from his post as Minister of National Security—the country’s top security agency and one of the most influential bodies in the power hierarchy. The official reason cited was corruption within his department.
Serdar appointed Dovletgeldy Meredov as the new Minister of National Security; Meredov had previously headed Serdar’s personal security detail and, in the past, had been responsible for the security of his father, the president. Meredov has always been considered a Gurbanguly loyalist, so many viewed his appointment as a sign that the father had advised his son to rely on him.
However, this more likely indicates that Serdar does not trust the head of his father’s security detail and prefers to have his own man in this key position for the Turkmen government.
Serdar also replaced the head of the border guard service. This is one of the key security agencies, responsible not only for protecting the state border but also for the security of the oil and gas infrastructure, on whose uninterrupted operation the country’s revenues depend.
The position previously held by the experienced security official, Yazgeldy Nuryev, who was appointed during Gurbanguly’s tenure, has been taken by Colonel Ilaman Ilamanov, a career border guard who has served in the border guard service for many years.
It is telling that the current personnel purge has not affected the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This is most likely due to the fact that back in 2022, immediately after taking office as president, Serdar appointed his own man—Muhammad Khidyrov—as minister. Over the past four years, he appears to have retained the president’s trust.
Shuffles also took place in the energy sector—the country’s main source of revenue. The long-serving deputy prime minister responsible for the development of the oil and gas sector, Batyr Amanov, was dismissed. He was replaced by the head of “Turkmenneft,” Guvanch Agajanov, who is considered a close associate of Serdar. At the same time, he retained his position as head of the concern.
The changes also affected regional elites. The heads of the country’s three largest velayats—Mary, Balkan, and Lebap—were replaced, and shortly before that, the leaders of three key cities: Turkmenbashi, Turkmenabat, and Mary. Although Serdar began replacing regional leaders as early as the first years of his presidency, he had never before carried out such a large-scale overhaul of regional leadership.
In addition, two more deputy prime ministers lost their posts: one oversaw science, education, healthcare, and sports, while the other was in charge of the transportation and communications sector. The ministers of health and culture, as well as a number of other officials, were also dismissed.
The purge of Gurbanguly’s relatives not directly connected to Serdar has also resumed. After dismissing his father’s sister, Gulnabat Dovletova, Serdar turned his attention to her son—his cousin Batyr Dovletov, the owner of large tracts of commercial real estate. In August, by the president’s personal order, a number of buildings belonging to Dovletov were demolished in one of Ashgabat’s districts.
A covert power struggle continues between Serdar and his biological sister, Oguljahan Atabayeva, whom their father is promoting as a politician.
Two years ago, Gurbanguly appointed her vice president of his charitable foundation. Since then, she has been actively meeting with foreign politicians and giving interviews to international media, gradually transforming into something of a first lady. Such public exposure stood in stark contrast to Serdar’s behavior—he avoids journalists—and has fueled rumors that his father is keeping his daughter in reserve in case his son becomes too independent.
In public, Serdar maintains a subordinate role: he follows his father’s orders and awards his sister with medals. But at the same time, he is promoting his protégée—the speaker of parliament, 36-year-old lawyer Dunyagozel Gulmanova. Like the president’s sister, she regularly appears in foreign media—and consistently promotes Serdar’s initiatives. It is she whom the president trusts to lead parliamentary delegations abroad and to accept ambassadors’ credentials.
Gulmanova’s rise is all the more significant given that the Speaker of the Mejlis is the third-highest-ranking official in the country’s formal hierarchy, after the president and the head of the Halk Maslahaty, a position held by the president’s father. In other words, while Gurbanguly is bringing his daughter to the forefront, Serdar is strengthening his own protégé, demonstrating that he, too, knows how to make strategic moves in the struggle for supremacy in power.
Serdar’s Rise
Initially, Serdar was perceived as a dependent politician—a man without experience, for whom his father made all the decisions. But already in the first months after taking office as president, he began cautiously reshuffling his own team and removing his father’s appointees.
Thus, Gulnabat Dovletova—Gurbanguly’s sister, who had headed the National Red Crescent Society—was removed from her post. Gurbanguly’s nephews—Khadzhimurat and Shamurat Redzhepo, who had previously controlled entire sectors of the economy—also lost their influence.
The second wave of resignations occurred in 2024. At that time, Serdar replaced the ministers of agriculture, education, health, and construction, and also carried out partial reshuffles in regional government. The entire current year has seen the third—and most extensive—wave of personnel reshuffles.
Its main feature is that many of those appointed are Serdar’s peers or people slightly older than him. It appears that the president is seeking to form a new generation of elites—people who owe their positions to him, rather than to his father. Furthermore, by getting rid of the old team, he gains greater freedom from Gurbanguly’s influence.
At the same time, Serdar is strengthening his authority on the international stage. He is becoming increasingly confident in negotiations with foreign leaders in various formats—whether at the SCO, consultative meetings of Central Asian heads of state, or contacts with world leaders, including Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and others. Indeed, even abroad, Serdar is already viewed as an independent politician, rather than as the son of the former president.
This international recognition strengthens his position domestically as well—among the elites and the general public. While in the early years after coming to power he was referred to as “Arkadağly Serdar” (“Serdar, supported by Arkadağ”—the latter being his father’s official title), Serdar is now striving to shed this image.
For example, portraits of the former president in Ashgabat have been moved to the outskirts of the city, while the central districts of the capital are now mostly adorned with images of Serdar. Foreign tourists are prohibited from photographing portraits of Gurbanguly and are allowed to take pictures only of the current president.
It is becoming increasingly difficult for Gurbanguly to influence Serdar’s decisions. Of course, the father bestowed upon himself the title of Arkadag—protector of all Turkmen—and appointed himself chairman of the Halk Maslahaty, a council established in 2023 out of concern that his son would overhaul the entire system of government. But the president is the president, and few people—even within the country, let alone abroad—understand the functions of the Halk Maslahaty and its head.
It is the president, as the central figure in the government, whom both foreign partners and domestic elites look to for guidance. In the four years since its creation, the Halk Maslahaty has never become a particularly influential body, remaining instead a largely ceremonial structure that allowed Gurbanguly to formally retain his position of power after stepping down as president.
Further confirmation of this came at a recent meeting of the council: formally, his father presided over it, but Serdar was the main speaker. He also outlined the main areas of focus.
His Father’s Shadow
Judging by the fact that Gurbanguly continues to try to maintain his influence, it is not easy for him to accept that his son is increasingly managing without him. Just as during his presidency, his father remains in the public eye: in front of television cameras, he holds instructive conversations with officials, young people, athletes, musicians, and artists—and, most importantly, with his son, the president. They, in turn, show him every sign of respect.
Foreign partners also do not neglect him: if Gurbanguly travels to an international event in place of his son, he is received there with the highest honors. But, by all accounts, it still stings him that most of the international attention now goes to Serdar.
It may have been particularly painful for him that Serdar met with Donald Trump as part of the “Central Asia + U.S.” format, whereas Gurbanguly himself is not personally acquainted with the American president. A couple of months later, he, too, set out for the United States.
The visit was presented as a working trip, but it coincided with the first World Summit—an initiative by Trump that he promoted as an alternative to the UN. Turkmenistan was not invited to the summit, but, by all accounts, Gurbanguly hoped to attend in person. Efforts to convince the American side of the need for Trump to meet specifically with the former president—even though sitting heads of state were represented at the summit—were unsuccessful.
Gurbanguly’s status as chairman of the Halk Maslahaty apparently meant little to Trump’s inner circle and the summit organizers.
Gurbanguly’s trip to the United Kingdom went somewhat better. In May 2026, he attended the Windsor Horse Show and met with King Charles III. The British side emphasized the importance of cultural and diplomatic ties, while Gurbanguly himself once again spoke not merely as a former president, but as the “National Leader of the Turkmen People” and Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty.
Nothing is known about the content of the meeting with the king, but for Gurbanguly, it seems the very fact that it took place was important. Interacting with the British monarch allowed him to demonstrate to both his son and his new inner circle that the former president remains influential and respected abroad—and therefore, it is too early to count him out.
Nevertheless, these efforts seem strange, since Gurbanguly himself chose to transfer power to his son, even though neither his age, nor his health, nor any other circumstances prevented him from continuing to rule. He apparently retains an interest in politics, but Serdar, having assumed the presidency, is increasingly demonstrating administrative independence and a desire to distance himself from his father’s legacy.
Therefore, their hidden rivalry will most likely only intensify, though it is unlikely to escalate into an open conflict. After all, they are united by a common interest—to keep power, resources, and influence in the hands of the Berdymukhamedov family.
If the tension building between father and son spills over, both risk losing power. No matter how much people say that the Turkmen regime has eliminated all dissidents, those eager to undermine the Berdymukhamedov family will quickly emerge if the system shows any cracks. Therefore, for now, demonstrating unity is their main trump card in retaining power.