"A Resolution Will Come In The Next Six To Nine Months"

• Vladimir Pastukhov
• 18.10.2026, 15:27

Something's bound to "blow up" somewhere.

Everything that reaches me from that circle commonly referred to as “European politics” sounds, paradoxically, cheerful and optimistic.

Underlying this optimism is the European bureaucracy’s conviction—which I do not fully understand—that the war will be a long one and that somewhere in the middle of this “long” period Putin will “get tired” and agree to a freeze on the conflict without any preconditions (the so-called “Korean option”).

In short, everything will turn out just as the poet wrote: “He struck once, twice, three times—and then ran out of strength himself. The referee raised my hand—the one I hadn’t even used to strike”…


When you ask what “a long time” means, they explain: it’s another year, maybe two, or even three. That is, exactly as many years as the Europeans need to calmly, “at their own pace,” prepare for a full-scale military confrontation with Russia. The assumption is that all this time, Putin, without distraction, will selflessly torment Ukraine, recapturing the Donbas meter by meter.

At the same time, a consensus has emerged around several assumptions underpinning this positive forecast.

First, Russia will patiently wait all this time until its resources for waging war run dry, and will not engage in open confrontation with NATO, let alone a nuclear one (that is, the Kremlin will continue to behave like a bunch of spineless idiots resigned to their fate).

Second, Ukraine will not only withstand the systematic destruction of its economy over the course of two to three years, but will also find the mobilization resources (manpower) to sustain the front in a stable condition (that is, Ukrainians will continue to churn out heroism on an assembly-line basis, turning it into their trademark).

Third, political forces capable of shaping public opinion in favor of allocating 100–150 billion euros per year to Ukraine to continue the war (the amount needed to offset Russian expenditures) will remain in power in Europe throughout this period.

Fourth, after the election, Trump will calm down and return to “normal” support for Ukraine—that is, sharing intelligence, selling weapons at least in the minimum necessary quantities, and applying sanctions pressure on Putin.

During my numerous discussions with proponents of the scenario described above, I often found myself thinking that I had nothing to counter their arguments as long as our conversation remained within a positivist framework, following the rules of “evidence-based politics.” On each of the points listed, my interlocutors put forward numerous arguments that were factually sound, structured according to the logic of “rational choice theory”—a theory I am particularly fond of, especially when it comes to Russia.

The problem is that, while conceding on each point individually, I continue, on an intuitive level, to harbor doubts that a way out of the current situation will, in principle, be rational. While each of the listed assumptions, taken one by one, still seems acceptable to me, I find it very difficult to accept that all four of these conditions will be consistently present in our lives over a long period of time.

My life experience—unsupported by any scientific calculations—teaches me that when there are so many assumptions, something is bound to go wrong. This is by no means a prediction—I reiterate that I have no rational arguments to back this up—but merely an intuitive premonition that Europe has no one and a half years, let alone two or three years, to spare. Everything could start to shift (in any direction) very quickly—much faster than anyone is prepared to imagine today. And in any case, the next six to nine months will be truly dramatic. Most likely, the outcome will be decided within this timeframe.

Vladimir Pastukhov, “Telegram”