Why The Abu Dhabi Talks Haven't Yet Brought Us Closer To Peace

• Petr Oleshchuk
• 13.11.2026, 16:11

Nevertheless, the American side is clearly in a hurry.

A new round of talks between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States in Abu Dhabi has not yet yielded a breakthrough. The process continues, and following visit by American negotiators Steve Whitcoff and Jared Kushner to Moscow and their talks with Putin, the final step in this phase should be discussions with the President of Ukraine. However, there is little reason to expect that this current round will lead to a final agreement in the near future. There remains a significant gap between the U.S. administration’s desire to announce results as soon as possible and the parties’ willingness to reach an agreement.

The American side is clearly in a hurry. Its political horizon is limited to January, when the new Democratic majority in Congress will take office. Therefore, the Trump administration is trying to reach a formal agreement in the remaining month and a half that can be presented as an end to the war.

Moreover, there is already talk of presenting it not merely as an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, but as an agreement on the security of all of Europe and the guarantees for ensuring it. These plans appear extremely ambitious, although the mechanism for their implementation remains unclear.

At the same time, time is no longer working in Putin’s favor as unequivocally as was previously claimed. Ukraine has stabilized the front lines and increased Russian troop casualties. Russia continues to deal painful blows to Ukraine’s energy sector, but in response, Ukraine is striking Russian oil refineries with increasing effectiveness.

The situation is becoming increasingly deadlocked, and the expectation that continuing the war will automatically improve Moscow’s position is becoming less and less justified. An additional factor could be the new Democratic majority in Congress, which could, as early as January, once again raise the issue of a military aid package for Ukraine and the expansion of support for the country.

Under these circumstances, Russia should objectively have an interest in reaching an agreement. Nevertheless, Putin continues to count on having his demands met and on imposing what are effectively capitulation terms on Ukraine. In pursuing this scenario, he relies heavily on the support of the Trump administration. This is precisely why the continuation of negotiations does not in itself mean that the Kremlin is ready to reconsider its goals or acknowledge the need for compromise.

It is telling that almost immediately after the conclusion of the latest round of negotiations, the Ukrainian president announced a new block on Starlink access for Ukrainian troops on the front lines. In the context of the negotiation process, this appears to be a return to previous methods of exerting pressure on Kyiv.

The calculation, it seems, is that restricting these critically important capabilities will force Ukraine to agree to the demands being made—primarily territorial ones. However, this logic is based on the assumption that Ukrainian concessions alone are capable of ending the war.

Judging by the U.S. administration’s approach, a territorial agreement is supposed to pave the way for a cessation of hostilities, after which it will be possible to move on to trade with Russia and lucrative economic projects. Trump, in turn, will have the opportunity to declare that he has fulfilled his promise to end the war.

But Ukraine has not yet shown any willingness to accept any demands on any terms. Therefore, the negotiation process will most likely remain difficult, and attempts to speed it up by putting pressure on one side will not resolve the main contradictions.

The most obvious outcome of the current negotiations so far appears to be an agreement on a large-scale prisoner exchange, which could be the largest in recent years. Other humanitarian initiatives are also being discussed. These are important areas that can yield concrete results even in the absence of a political agreement.

However, on the issue of peace itself, the parties continue to have serious differences, and humanitarian progress does not yet mean a convergence of their positions regarding the terms for ending the war.

Negotiations could move forward more quickly if the United States were to exert pressure not only on Ukraine but also on Russia. However, the Trump administration apparently does not consider it necessary to increase pressure on Putin, as it hopes to actively develop trade relations with him in the future.

The desire to preserve the prospect of such cooperation at any cost is, in fact, slowing down the negotiation process. Moscow has reason to believe that Washington is so interested in restoring relations that it will seek concessions primarily from Kyiv.

In this context, the diesel agreement between Trump and Putin could have given the Kremlin additional arguments in favor of prolonging the war. If continuing the aggression does not prevent negotiations on mutually beneficial economic cooperation, the Russian leadership retains hope of achieving more without changing its policy.

Putin has an incentive to wait for new concessions and count on an outcome favorable to him. Therefore, the U.S. administration’s desire to improve relations with Moscow currently serves to bolster Russian expectations rather than prompt it to end the war.

There are few serious grounds for optimism at this stage. The mere continuation of negotiations and possible humanitarian agreements are important, but they do not yet indicate Russia’s willingness to abandon demands that are incompatible with Ukrainian sovereignty.

At the same time, the assumption that Ukraine will ultimately accept any conditions is also unfounded. Sooner or later, Russia will have to acknowledge the reality of a sovereign Ukrainian state, learn to live with this fact, and take it into account in all its future geopolitical plans.

Petro Oleshchuk, Ph.D. in Political Science, Professor at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, exclusively for Charter97.org