Xi Jinping Carried Out The Largest Purge Of The Chinese Communist Party In Half A Century

• 6.11.2026, 19:01

More than half a million people were sent to prison.

The country has not seen such large-scale purges of party officials as those under the current President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping since the time of Mao Zedong. Moreover, the longer Xi remains in power, the more extensive the purges become. Under the pretext of fighting corruption and disciplinary violations, 14 times as many criminal cases were initiated during Xi’s third term, which began in 2023, than during his second five-year term, according to the Financial Times. Experts warn that due to the fear spreading among the ranks of the ruling elite, the country’s leadership is losing its ability to assess the situation adequately.

During 11 of the 13 years of Xi’s rule for which data is available, approximately 628,000 party officials were prosecuted and likely received prison sentences, according to estimates by Minxin Pei, a professor of public administration at Claremont McKenna College in California. As of 2024, there were 1.69 million inmates in Chinese prisons. This means that the victims of Xi’s purges account for a very significant proportion of those behind bars.

According to Pei’s estimates, approximately 7.2 million members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have been subjected to various forms of political, administrative, or judicial punishment. Among them are at least 632 “tigers”—a term used to describe high-ranking officials holding positions from deputy minister or deputy provincial governor and above.

Zhang Fuhai, deputy secretary of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection—which is responsible for internal investigations within the party—and deputy head of the National Supervisory Commission of the People’s Republic of China, cited even higher figures, according to Xinhua. Since the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012, when Xi was confirmed as leader, disciplinary and supervisory bodies across the country have initiated 8.105 million cases and brought 7.922 million people to account. Among them were 963 officials under the supervision of the CPC Central Committee, Zhang reported a week ago following the 5th Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee.

Xi is a representative of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders; this generation also turned out to be the last. After Mao’s death, it was decided to rotate the leadership of the CPC and the country every 10 years—after two five-year terms. However, Xi did not choose successors for himself and secured his own reelection for a third term. In the fall of 2027, the next party congress will take place, at which Xi is expected to be reelected for a fourth term.

At a recent plenum, where roughly a quarter of the delegates were absent (the number of participants subjected to persecution reached a record high), Xi passed a resolution to strengthen Party control. It is by no means a coincidence that he did this a year before the next CPC Congress, which is set to confirm him as the country’s leader for another five years, says Pei.
The number of individuals subjected to disciplinary action has also risen sharply. During the second term of Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, an average of 145,800 party officials per year were subject to disciplinary action, and about 5,460 were prosecuted.

During Xi’s third term, an average of more than 800,000 people per year have faced disciplinary sanctions, and in 2025, that figure reached a record high of 983,000. Meanwhile, an average of about 75,000 members of the ruling elite are now subject to criminal prosecution each year.

Nothing of the sort has been observed since Mao’s reign. At the same time, in China, as a rule, more than 99% of criminal cases result in a guilty verdict.

Xi explains the tightening of oversight as part of the fight against corruption and “serious hidden threats within the Party, the state, and the armed forces,” as stated in the communiqué following the plenum. In it, party officials were also told that they have only one choice: complete submission to the leadership or expulsion from the CPC—at the very least.

The anti-corruption campaign was a “crushing victory,” Zhang Fuhai declared following the plenum. He praised the successes in “rooting out evil” and “resolutely eliminating the viruses corroding the healthy body of the Party,” and called for zero tolerance in the fight against corruption.

However, experts at Transparency International do not see any significant progress in this fight. Since 2012, China has risen by only 4 points in the organization’s Corruption Perceptions Index—from 39th to 43rd place. A score below 50 indicates serious problems in this area.

At the plenum, it was proposed to reform institutions with the aim of removing undisciplined personnel, but such a step was already taken five years ago, notes Victor Shi, a specialist in Chinese political economy and professor at the University of California, San Diego: “Apparently, it didn’t work, since more and more officials are being accused of corruption and removed from office.”

Furthermore, mass purges threaten to have various negative consequences for the governance system, Shi adds: “If a zero-tolerance policy is declared, officials—competing fiercely with one another—will begin providing evidence of misconduct by their colleagues in order to eliminate rivals in the race for higher positions.

Local authorities may also be paralyzed by fear, and officials will be afraid to carry out major projects. “Whenever you try to do something big… you’ll have to bring in a multitude of contractors, billions of yuan will change hands, and you’ll become vulnerable to accusations of corruption,” says Shi.

According to Shaina Yue , a senior economist at Oxford Economics , the threat of prosecution could conflict with Beijing’s economic goals, which risks further worsening the economic situation. China’s economy is already effectively stagnating, driven by significant overcapacity, weak consumer demand, and a real estate crisis that has persisted for five years. The country is also unable to overcome deflation, which is detrimental to economic development.

“Local officials may prioritize political loyalty over [economic] experimentation,” Yue writes.

By pursuing such policies, Xi and the government are creating and reinforcing an “echo chamber” effect—where subordinates report only what they want to hear, concealing real social and economic problems. The country’s top leadership already lives in such an echo chamber, according to Steve Tsang, director of the China Institute at SOAS University of London.

Xi’s iron grip will only grow stronger, he is certain: “The plenum was, in essence, entirely devoted to issues of loyalty, discipline, and control.”