An Iranian Dilemma For Putin
- Dmitry Shulga
- 12.03.2026, 17:33
The Russian dictator will not stand a serious stress test.
From the point of view of Russian interests, the war in Iran has many dimensions; it presents Russia with several dilemmas.
There are obvious benefits and equally obvious risks. But importantly, the Iranian war demonstrates the vulnerability of the current political regime in Russia. Following Prigozhin's mutiny, it serves to confirm that Putin is unlikely to pass a serious stress test - despite a gigantic repressive apparatus and a second-ranked nuclear arsenal.
Much less an ally
The Kremlin's economic benefits are obvious. Oil prices and disruptions in the supply of reduced gas make Russia (or rather, its hydrocarbons) in demand again; the budget, skewed toward war, can receive serious infusions.
The Russian economy approached the Israeli and U.S. war in Iran in a difficult position indeed. The dynamics of Russian exports of oil and petroleum products in 2025 is worth a lot: the downward trend in supplies and especially in revenues, as well as sanctions, all pointed to Russia's gradual displacement from global energy markets. While exports amounted to 7.7 million barrels per day in the first quarter, by the fourth quarter they amounted to only 7.25 million barrels; oil revenues fell from $43.4 billion at the beginning of the year to $35.5 billion at the end of the year, depriving the Russian government of the necessary resource to finance its deficit budget.
The liquefied natural gas market, which the Kremlin had pinned high hopes on as an alternative to pipelines, did not fare as well: in 2025, Russia's LNG production fell 8% to 32.9 million tons, while exports fell 7% to 31.3 million tons. Supplies to EU countries, where Belgium, Spain and France (85% of European imports from Russia) remain the main importers, fell to 19.9 billion cubic meters, while the value of exports dropped to 7.4 billion euros, indicating a gradual decline in dependence even in those countries that were previously considered traditional partners for Russia.
The attempts to reorient LNG supplies to Asia brought Russia only quantitative growth without any real financial effect. Russian LNG deliveries to the PRC in 2025 grew by 18.2% to 9.79 million tons, and in value terms remained at $4.98 billion, almost unchanged from 2024. Russia was forced to give additional gas to China for next to nothing, just to maintain capacity utilization and simulate the availability of markets.
And then came the war in Iran.
Russian LNG is in demand again, and oil futures went down to almost $120 per barrel, but returned to $90. The question now is how long the fighting will last and how long Iran will be able to de facto block the Strait of Hormuz and attack its neighbors' oil and gas infrastructure.
But the benefits of war that Russia receives are not converted into benefits for other countries from alliance relations with Russia. The Iranian campaign of the U.S. and Israel has clearly shown that an alliance with Russia means nothing.
This can be easily confirmed by members of military-political organizations under the auspices of Moscow, such as Armenia. Recipients of direct military aid from the Kremlin, such as fugitive Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, can also confirm the same. Other allies can also attest to this - Venezuela and, in the near future, apparently Cuba.
Iran learned the strength of its allied ties with Moscow during the "twelve-day" war last summer. The lack of real help from the Kremlin should not have come as a surprise to Tehran. But it seems to have become.
Moscow could well help its ally not only militarily - but also politically and economically. For example, by drastically reducing oil supply at the very moment of the crisis. I have reason to believe that this is what Tehran asked Moscow to do.
Russia easily overcame a difficult moral dilemma - and instead of solidarity, the Kremlin greedily exploited Iran's plight to hastily improve its finances. From the first days of the war in the Middle East, Moscow has made it clear that budgetary needs are far more important than any Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between Russia and Iran.
Only Tehran has received intelligence information from Moscow - and that is not a fact.
Friends
The war in Iran presents Moscow with more complex dilemmas. Providing intelligence information to the Islamic Republic is clearly perceived by the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran's other neighbors as a hostile move. But these countries have played a crucial role in Moscow's adaptation to sanctions, both financial and restrictions on the supply of sensitive technologies, materials and goods, and they have also become a safe haven for its elites - a new "Azure. We should not forget that the Kremlin has repeatedly used the hospitality of the Gulf countries to hold various public and non-public negotiations with Ukraine and other Western countries. The Kremlin did not call the hospitable hosts of oil and gas any other way than friends.
The dilemma was resolved again in favor of Iran, or rather6 its own budgetary benefits: the oil and gas infrastructure of the hospitable Arab monarchies has been defeated, which further increases the demand for Russian energy carriers. But will the Gulf states now be as accommodating to Russia as they were before the Iranian war? Will they forgive Putin for choosing to side with the Iranian theocracy?
Much ado about Putin
The next dilemma faces the Russian elite. Two allies, equally hopelessly betrayed by the Kremlin, have proved themselves in different ways in confronting the American war machine.
The first of them, the Venezuelan regime, has provided an example highly attractive to the entourage of any dictator. Maduro was kidnapped in a clear betrayal of his entourage, and Washington was eager to cooperate with that entourage, without even insisting on the restoration of democratic procedures and similar human rights formalities.
The attempt to do the same in Iran failed. The assassination of the supreme leader did not lead to the collapse of the regime, nor to betrayal, nor to a willingness to negotiate with the Americans.
The Iranian civilian and moderate elite might be willing to engage with the Americans - but who will let them! The point is the institutional structure of the Islamic Republic, in which duplicative ways of governance are built; governance is based on religious, i.e. unquestionable principles, from which it is impossible (or so it is believed) to get off.
Of course, when Iranian President Pezeshkian makes a statement about de-escalation, and Iranian security forces immediately refute his words by shelling neighbors, it is a mess and machismo. The duplication of power is the Iranian regime's chance to survive this most difficult test in decades. Rahbar is dead - long live Rahbar! This is the fundamental difference between modern Russia and Iran. No Khamenei - there is always another Khamenei, even if not everyone agrees. Putin's regime lives by the well-known principle that no Putin, no Russia.
Putin's kudi regime is more like Maduro's than Khamenei's. And while Putin is also trying to build parallel governance structures, there is nothing in the Russian political system that resembles the Iranian religious framework. It is not even worth mentioning the Russian Orthodox Church in this regard - it is a completely dependent, non-self-governing organization.
Putin, of course, would like to have regime guards like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the very same parallel authority. But the FSB is not suited for this role, and most importantly, Putin is afraid to let go of the levers of power, especially now that war and sanctions have finally weakened Russia's economic capabilities.
The Kremlin has no democratic legitimacy (ha-ha), and the people's patience is beginning to wear thin, so we can expect Venezuelan-style treachery from the Russian elite. Putin's entourage can't help but worry that moles have already appeared in its ranks - and won't a competition begin between Putin's loyalists to see who can get there the fastest?
Dmitri Shulga, The Moscow Times