Volodymyr Fesenko: The Struggle Between Different "Kremlin Towers" Is Intensifying

• 24.03.2026, 17:25

"Moskovsky Komsomolets" is "trashing" Putin at the behest of Shoigu?

Russian propaganda newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets criticized Putin for his stance in negotiations with the United States. Earlier, Z-blogger Ilya Remeslo criticized the Kremlin, calling for the Russian dictator to be tried. What do these signals tell us?

For a commentary, Charter97.org turned to Vladimir Fesenko, a well-known Ukrainian political scientist and head of the Penta Center for Applied Political Research:

- It is very important now not to pass off wishful thinking, that supposedly the entire propaganda machine is beginning to collapse, even the Kremlin's supporters are beginning to speak out against it. In the case of Remeslo (who has a very mixed, even negative reputation), many were surprised. But they say that it was a peculiar maneuver for him, because he was under the threat of criminal prosecution for financial fraud, so he chose such a specific tactic of "protection". A very risky option, we don't know his motives for sure. Some believe that he really "went crazy" and ended up in a psychiatric hospital. There are also different versions: either this is a way to escape criminal prosecution, or he was punished in this way and showed that this character is not quite in his right mind. Therefore, the story of this character's demarche, of course, caused a great resonance, but it did not become a trend or a manifestation of some, let's say, fundamentally new political position, which rather caused bewilderment and different interpretations, and there was no continuation.

As for the publication in Moskovsky Komsomolets, from what I see in the comments and assessments of this situation, there are two versions: either a hacking of the site (this has happened many times), or a demarche of some of the journalists, which is also possible. Such precedents have also happened in some publications. Therefore, Moskovsky Komsomolets remains a newspaper loyal to the Kremlin, its editorial policy has not changed and is unlikely to change.

There is one nuance that must be taken into account in the current situation. This is the third version, which can be taken into account just in case. The fact is that the management of MK and some of its well-known journalists are close to Shoigu's team (former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu - Prim. Charter97.org).

In particular, to those deputies of Shoigu who are now under criminal prosecution, some are arrested, some are under house arrest. And there is cognitive dissonance here for MK. They not only supported Putin, they also played in favor of Shoigu, were his lobbyists. I think it was well paid. So, who knows, there may be, you know, some kind of mistake, some kind of hacking, but such a front, manifestations of discontent, that "our people are being beaten," "Shoigu is being persecuted," "we don't like it," and so on. This is such a theoretical version. We don't know whether it's true or not.

But so far we are not talking about a conscious opposition position or about Moskovsky Komsomolets going into opposition. But the fact that in Russia, even in the Z-patriot camp, there are more and more contradictions and growing internal tensions, this, perhaps, can really be considered a certain trend, but it is not yet very strongly manifested.

As, by the way, is the topic of U.S. negotiations. Putin's flirtation with Trump also causes a lot of contradictions and discontent in the camp of Z-patriots. But still, this is more of a tactical squabble than a serious internal conflict.

- Does this signal Putin's weakness?

- I think not yet. Putin has several other problems. First of all, age. And along with Putin, the regime is aging. Second, the struggle between the different "towers of the Kremlin" is intensifying. The persecution of Shoigu, the topic of corruption has once again become a very hot topic in Russia. And, to all appearances, the internal struggle is intensifying, before it goes beyond certain limits.

First there was Prigozhin, but eventually neutralized by Putin and Shoigu. True, Gerasimov remained, but we can say that there is still growing tension in the internal elite struggle. This is a struggle, rather, for the future. Another problem is the growing internal contradictions and social tension, which appears in a number of serious social problems.

In today's Russia, the two main problems are the shutdown of Telegram and mobile Internet. This causes a lot of discontent, especially in the Z-media. Criticism is often directed at Putin himself.

There is a tendency here: they blame not just the abstract Kremlin, individual officials, but Putin himself. There is also a purely social problem that has caused a sharp upsurge of tension in some regions, especially in Siberia - the slaughter of livestock. It seems to be a purely epidemiologic problem, but since it is quite massive and farmers suffer huge losses, it has caused a surge of public discontent. There are no riots yet, but tensions have risen sharply in these regions. Naturally, this also causes sharp discontent.

There we can speak not even about Putin's weakening, but about the fact that the Russian authorities are disconnected from public sentiment, disconnected from society, living in a parallel reality. Yes, unfortunately, the main consensus between the authorities and Russian society is support for the war against Ukraine. This problem, unfortunately, remains relevant, but even here, too, there are already breaking points emerging.

The first discussion began in January, when we passed such a sacred date - the war against Ukraine has lasted longer than the Great Patriotic War. And it became a reason for harsh criticism that "we are such weaklings and cannot win this war, what is the point of this war if it is dragging on and it is unknown when and how it will end". There is no direct manifestation of some kind of crisis here, but rather a manifestation of tension, internal tension and frustration, the growth and accumulation of internal contradictions.

So far, unfortunately, there are no grounds to speak of any serious crisis of Putin's regime, but the process of accumulation of contradictions and internal tension has probably accelerated. Including in connection with the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Russia at the end of last year, at the beginning of this year. Now, however, the Iranian war is helping Putin a lot, because it gives him additional income from oil sales.

But these trends that have emerged, and the prolongation of the war, of course, are causing more and more indirect, indirect, but still discontent.