U.S. General Ben Hodges: The Kremlin’s Real Weaknesses Have Been Exposed

• 15.04.2026, 15:19

Ben Hodges

In an exclusive interview with Charter97.org, retired U.S. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe and a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, shared his assessment of the U.S. and Israeli operation against Iran. He also discussed NATO’s capabilities, evaluated the level of the Russian threat to Europe, and addressed the question of how to defeat Putin’s empire.

— Which lessons can we draw from the Iranian campaign about modern warfare?

— There are two or three things that come to mind. Number one, the importance of truly understanding your enemy. This goes back to Sun Tzu. This is not a new thing, but it's still very true. I think, the United States, perhaps, miscalculated or did not truly understand the power structure in Tehran — or at least the President didn't. The military probably did but I think the President probably believed that if you just kill the Ayatollah and decapitate the regime, that everything would collapse. Obviously, that's not the case. So, I think there was a misunderstanding, and also an assumption that if you just destroy all of the Iranian Navy vessels and thousands of launchers, they will collapse. Obviously, that's not the case. I think Iran has been preparing for this possibility for decades. I don't know that we did a good job of fully understanding the adversary and their resilience.

The second thing is the United States — whether in traditional or modern warfare — does not have enough capacity to do everything alone. We need allies, and you cannot start a war of choice and then assume that all of your allies are just going to follow along with you. You've got to make sure that you have your allies and your infrastructure in place first.

And then finally, I was a little bit surprised that in the opening days we still did not seem prepared for Iran to launch hundreds of drones against targets all over the Gulf region. I think we had not internalized everything that the Ukrainians had done. We had still not internalized that but, I think, we are getting there. The US is typically a very fast learner, but I think we were maybe not fully prepared for what the Iranians were able to do.

— So, in terms of technology, Shahed drones were the biggest surprise?

— It's not one thing. I think it was the combination of how many drones and missiles they still had and that they were willing to use them immediately against other countries' infrastructure throughout the region, even though it looked like the leadership had been killed. Obviously there was still a very resilient leadership structure in place that could direct those kinds of counter-strikes — drones, missiles, and other weapon systems. I personally don't know what's still out there. I think, probably, quite a bit.

— Is NATO frayed beyond repair?

— No. It's been damaged because of uncertainty about American commitment under President Trump. But this is an alliance of 32 nations, not one. The industrial capacity, the military capability, the intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities of all the other nations is enormous. It's a matter of political will. So, I think that the combined economies and capacities of all the other members of NATO dwarfs Russia. I think we'll get through this.

— Is it theoretically possible — such a thing as NATO without the US?

— Yes, of course it is. But it would take nations committing to each other to continue the pledge to not only live up to their collective defense obligations but also to live up to their obligations for their own defense, for preparation (that is Article Three of the Washington Treaty, the founding treaty of NATO). It will require political leaders talking to their populations as if they are adults, explaining the risks, explaining what's going on. Then, I think, usually populations will respond to that sort of leadership. Imagine the EU does not have the US or Canada or even UK but yet they have a defense clause and defense structure. I think, the US is the one that's going to suffer the most because other nations are losing confidence in us.

— In terms of capabilities, are there some things which the US does have which are irreplaceable for the others?

— Yes, of course. The US Navy, for example, or the ability of the Air Force to strike targets all around the globe. But those things are not necessarily needed for the defense of Europe. It's not about trying to replace everything the US has — the percentage of US defense spending that's focused on Europe is actually a very small number. So, I think, that would not be a useful way to think about things, "How do you replace the 1 trillion dollar defense budget and 11 aircraft carriers and all that?" — that's not what's required. Certainly European countries are going to have to increase their maritime capabilities, their long-range strike capabilities, logistics but that's focused on Europe, not global.

— Let's talk about Russia. In his recent interview, the highest-ranking soldier in Germany, the Chief of Defense General Breuer, has warned that "Russia is building up their military to a strength which is nearly doubling in size from what they had before the war against Ukraine" and that "all those structures are directing West." In your view, do Europe's actions correspond to the reality of modern warfare and to the urgency of the threat from Russia?

— I think, it's not a simple yes or no answer. In some areas they are. Germany for sure has increased defense spending, they're growing the defense industry, they're working to grow the size of the Bundeswehr, putting a lot of effort to improve capabilities that are needed for modern warfare. But the procurement process still seems slow. Transportation infrastructure is still not up to where it needs to be. I don't think there is enough air and missile defense — but this is a common shortfall throughout Europe: inadequate air and missile defense capabilities to protect all of the airports, the seaports, the power grid, transportation nodes, etc.

And of course it varies from country to country. In Finland and in the Baltic countries, I think, they're in pretty good shape. Poland — too. But in others, societal resilience is still not there. I think if you go to the UK, the average person can't even believe that there's a possibility that they could be in a conflict with Russia — even though you've got Russian submarines out there off the coast of England looking at cables and pipelines. Norway is, I think, finally realizing that Russian gray zone operations around Svalbard, for example, are a real threat. The Baltic countries seem to be strengthening their will to deal with shadow fleet vessels passing through the Baltic Sea. But I think they're going to continue to be tested in the coming months.

— In sum, has Europe woken up to the threat in your assessment, or is it still in the process of waking up?

— I think they're awake, but it's a matter of finding the will to do something about it. Prime ministers and defense ministers and interior ministers have got to speak to their populations about the reality of the situation. And also to recognize that the best way to make sure that Russia never attacks Europe is to help Ukraine defeat Russia. That is the absolute best way to do this. And to make sure that Ukraine has what it needs to destroy Russia's oil and gas export capabilities and to stop these shadow fleet vessels. These are all things that Europe can be doing that would contribute to Europe's defense.

— During the recent Munich Security Conference, Martin Jaeger, head of the BND, Germany's foreign intelligence service, has stated that in 2025 only in Germany there were 321 acts of sabotage, many of which were likely to be linked to Russia. Do you see adequate reaction to the unprecedented levels of Russian hybrid activity?

— Absolutely not. I'm glad that the head of the BND recognizes this, but they still haven't changed all the laws necessary to come up with adequate responses — to drones over airports, for example, or shadow fleet vessels. Germany is a nation on the Baltic Sea. It could be doing more to stop shadow fleet vessels carrying Russian oil out through the Danish Straits. I think, it really boils down to leaders speaking to their population, explaining what's at stake. It's better than it was one, two, three years ago, but I don't see a noticeable change here in Germany.

— There are some speculations that Putin might do something like a hybrid attack against the Baltic States in the near future. How should the Baltic States prepare?

— Well, of course he already has done that — they already do things like airspace violations, ripping up infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. All of these are elements of — I prefer the term "gray zone operations" instead of "hybrid," because I think "hybrid" doesn't really capture the need for intensity. But nonetheless, what Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have got to do — obviously they have to work closely together because all three of them have small populations and not too much depth. Cooperation between the three of them is important. They need a very good rapid mobilization of their reserves. You have to practice this. Estonia is probably the best of the three. But you have to have the equipment, and every single man and woman in the reserves or the territorial forces has to know exactly where they go. The population has to be prepared for the possibility that it might be one or two weeks before additional NATO forces could arrive there. You've got a German Brigade in Lithuania, Americans in Lithuania and Latvia, Brits in Estonia, Canadians in Latvia, Spanish. They're there. But if there was no warning, it might take one or two weeks for more forces to get there. The population needs to be prepared for that.

— There are also speculations that while Putin is perhaps not in a position to launch a full-scale attack against NATO today, but in the places like Daugavpils with its predominantly Russian-speaking population, or Narva — Russia could deploy a small contingent there to hold the place, similar to what they did in Crimea. Do you see this as a real possibility?

— I would certainly agree that that is a possibility. But, of course, the Estonians, the Latvians, the Lithuanians are aware of that. This is what I mean about the awareness of society: the territorial troops, and reserves being prepared to mobilize immediately. I would expect that the governments would have practiced this, would have war-gamed what to do if that scenario actually happens and how to respond. My own personal experience talking with some leaders in the area is that they don't want to give the Russians a chance to establish any kind of foothold there. That is how they would have to address this: take the threat seriously and be prepared to immediately push back — don't allow the Russians to get that foothold.

— What gives us a pause, in Belarus, is that if Russia's build-up against the West eventually leads to something serious, Belarus — not Russia — might become the first target for retaliation. What is your take on that?

— I would not assume that any Russian forces inside Belarus would not be hit immediately if it looked like an attack was imminent or if an attack did start. Of course, any Russian forces inside Belarus — including the infrastructure they're using — would be a legitimate target. I would certainly assume that the alliance, or even individual nations, would be prepared to do that. You don't defend your territory by just standing on the border and waiting for everybody to show up. We'd want to hit the headquarters, the logistics, etc. So it's not so much retaliation — it's just part of a defense: to hit any targets that are contributing to the Russian attack. I would certainly expect that.

— Putin is an imperialist, how to defeat the empire?

— I think the Ukrainians have identified a path to victory, which is destroying Russia's oil and gas export capability. If Russia cannot export oil and gas, they will have a difficult time not only maintaining the war against Ukraine but even keeping the economy going and keeping the oligarchs happy. I think this is a real problem for the Kremlin right now — what Ukraine is doing to their oil and gas infrastructure.

Then you can see that Russian influence is already waning. They tried to interfere in elections in Moldova — it did not work. Hungary — did not work. Georgia is one place where they have had some success at slowing the westernization efforts. Their support for Lukashenka obviously helped him in Belarus.

But it just feels like Russia's weaknesses and vulnerabilities have been exposed over the last few years. I've never been able to fully understand the Russian mentality: there is no tradition of liberal democracy there, and that's why you don't see people in the streets. Putin has spent a long time and a lot of money making sure that the internal security forces were very, very strong. I don't know how that's going to turn out, but for sure, when the oligarchs begin to really suffer, I think the pressure on Putin will increase.