"We Had Too Many Illusions."

• 30.04.2026, 13:39

German expert tells why Europe needs Ukraine so much.

Germany is becoming the leader in defense spending in Europe, but outdated bureaucracy still blocks rapid arms deliveries. The time for illusions about Russia has passed, and now Berlin is looking for ways to act independently of Washington's support.

Whether Europe can defend itself without Trump and why Ukraine has become key to its security - in an interview "RBC-Ukraine" told Nico Lange, former chief of staff of the German Defense Ministry.

"Ukraine's European partners have no ideas other than 'let's do the same thing, let's give more support and hope that somehow everything will resolve itself.' Therefore, in my opinion, it is Ukraine that should develop certain ideas," says Nico Lange, founder and director of the Institute for Risk Analysis and International Security (IRIS).

As one of Germany's leading security experts, he was chief of staff of the German Defense Ministry during the time of Angela Merkel and admits that the German political leadership had many illusions about Russia.

Now Germany must learn from these lessons. In this context, he said, the key is cooperation with Ukraine, which has turned from a passive object into a full-fledged subject that influences the whole of Europe with its own policies.

- Today we are witnessing the actual failure of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. My first question is: do European countries, and Germany in particular, have a clear idea of what to do in the face of continued Russian aggression in this situation?"

- I believe this is also true, at least in part, for both Ukraine and the Europeans. We have to recognize that these attempts to please Trump, to do everything not to offend him, and to play by his rules in negotiations have not yielded any results and are not expected to do so.

So from this point of view, the fact that this "theater of negotiations" is coming to an end is not a tragedy, because it did not lead to anything. But the question is what comes next, and what the Europeans are doing now. If you look at the practical support for Ukraine, only a small group of European countries actually support Ukraine, and they don't have a clear idea of how to move forward.

That's why I think it's important now for Ukraine to help them think strategically so that they have some ideas, because there will be no ideas from the U.S., and if they do, they will be bad.

Ukraine's European partners have no ideas other than "let's do the same thing, let's give more support and hope that somehow everything will resolve itself." Therefore, in my opinion, it is up to Ukraine to develop certain ideas. I wouldn't expect big ideas from partners, it would be better if we would offer good Ukrainian solutions ourselves.

- You mentioned the US. Should the EU, Europe in a broader sense, prepare scenarios in case the US leaves Europe alone with Russia? We need to spend money and resources with our European partners and NATO to get the military capabilities that only the US has provided so far. I think we need to have our own ability to act.

I think that in that sense Ukraine is part of the solution, and this is the new development that Ukraine needs to use in its favor.

Ukraine is not an object. Ukraine is a subject, and we see this in the new partnerships that Ukraine is forging in the Gulf region. And I believe that in that spirit, Ukraine should offer ideas for European security where the Americans are no longer providing security, and that Ukraine is part of the solution to that problem.

I believe that the strategic partnership with Germany that was discussed just a few weeks ago is already pointing in the right direction, and I think that is the path we should be on.

- Russia is sending a lot of signals about a possible attack on the Baltic States. To what extent is NATO prepared for such a scenario and capable of countering Russian attacks?

- There are several aspects here. In my opinion, one of them is that we know that when Russia gets into a predicament or when there is really a situation in which it decides that it can't move forward in Ukraine, it will certainly immediately create another theater of war.

- Just as they created Donbass to secure Crimea, they will do something else to secure their gains and victories in Ukraine. And I think the Baltic Sea region and the Black Sea region are potentially dangerous in that regard, and Russia will be looking for opportunities there.

The question of how ready NATO is is not easy to answer, because on the one hand, I think the Nordic countries and the Baltic countries are absolutely ready. On the other hand, many other countries in Europe do not want it. Without the U.S., we cannot realize our plans, relying on U.S. support if the U.S. is not a reliable partner.

So perhaps the solution to this problem would be to say to the Russians: you know, it makes no difference whether you attack in Ukraine or in the Baltics - it's the same thing. Maybe we should say, "Look, Ukraine and the Baltic states will make a treaty that will keep them safe."

- You mean bilateral treaties?"

- Yes, I think the way out does not lie within NATO or the EU. I think withdrawal is a coming together of countries that act together.

- But how then would it be consistent with NATO's Article 5?"

- It would not interfere. You see, it can be done additionally. Yes, and I mean, the message to the Russians should be that no matter what you do in Ukraine or in the Baltic states, you will be defeated. You can't win this war. And I think Ukraine is part of that message.

And I mean everybody. I mean also myself as a German, but also everybody in the Baltic States. If you ask yourself the question: if you are attacked by Russia, do you want Ukrainians to fight on your side or not?"

I think everyone should answer, "I want Ukrainians to fight on my side for that. I'm sure the Baltic States want that, so let's take advantage of that.

- This scenario of Ukraine providing our drone interceptors to Middle Eastern countries is also being considered for the Baltic States, and there may already be some informal moves in that direction. But how could this be implemented at the official level?"

- I think that having bilateral agreements on security assistance, I mean Ukraine already has a lot of such agreements under the Kyiv Security Compact (ed.), then perhaps they can be used as a basis for increased cooperation to get more than just knowledge transfer.

I mean, you can also have joint exercises, you can even send troops for exercises or to work together. So, I think there are steps that can be taken.

With regard to drone interception capabilities, I think we should all push for the integration of missile defense and air defense systems in Ukraine and on the eastern flank of NATO and the EU.

It should be a unified system, and it will be better for everybody. Ukraine will help NATO's eastern flank, and NATO countries, through their capabilities, will help Ukraine. This should be integrated into a unified air defense system.

- Let's talk more specifically about Germany. You worked in the Defense Ministry even before the full-scale Russian invasion, but at that time defense was not a top priority for the German government.

- Well, I belong to a group of people who tried to make it a priority. It is still felt to this day. There was a reluctance on the part of the German political elite to recognize reality.

There were a lot of illusions about security, about Russia. The awakening to reality in Germany is always accompanied by the risk that the country will return to old illusions. And that's one of the big mistakes that Germany should learn from, because I think we would have had opportunities to focus more on defense and deter Russia from a full-scale invasion.

So at least Germany should not repeat the same mistakes and should be much more proactive on defense. On the one hand, it can be said that Germany is now one of the leading supporters of Ukraine. Germany has come a long way, but is still very reluctant to have a European military presence in Ukraine, a coalition of the willing.

It can be said that in financial and industrial areas Germany is very advanced, but in political decision-making it is somewhat behind, but now Germany is a very important country in this matter.

- So has there been a dramatic change with the Scholz government and with the arrival of Merz?"

- The changes are in the right direction, but I think Germany needs to change more, and it needs to take a more progressive stance on defense issues.

-I am fighting for Germany to get closer to the mentality of the countries of North and Central Eastern Europe. Because if Germany becomes more "Nordic" or "Central European" in this sense, then the countries of Europe that are hesitant - Spain, Italy, France - will no longer be able to hide behind Germany.

Germany doesn't even need to lead in a strategic sense, it just needs to catch up with the Scandinavians and the people of Central-Eastern Europe.

- But if we talk about Europe as a whole, as you mentioned, things are happening too slowly from Ukraine's point of view. Is that so?"

- Yes. I think it is a positive development that Germany, particularly in its official military strategy, recognizes very clearly what Russia is and what kind of threat it poses. For a long time Germany turned a blind eye to this.

-That Germany now sees this clearly is an achievement. But in terms of consequences, Germany has been too slow to act. And now, with such financial resources, being the country that spends the most on defense in Europe, Germany should spend that money differently and should act much faster. In this respect, the German leadership is not effective enough.

Reforms in the system must be more radical and Germany must also act more offensively. It is not just about defense and resilience, it is about defeating the enemy. That is how security is ensured.

We need to restore the feeling that we want to win, we need to restore the feeling that we are deterring the enemy, that we are letting him know: we will defeat him.

- What could speed up the process of rearmament and the implementation of Germany's defense policy? What's getting in the way? Is it bureaucracy, or a lack of political will, or perhaps a reluctance to spend money on defense at the expense of social spending or something else?"

- Money is no longer an issue. But, you know, if you have a system that's not working well and you say, "Okay, we'll keep the same system, the same structures, the same procedures, the same people, we'll just have more money and expect a better result," that's not going to work.

-I've been proposing for quite some time now a quota from the defense budget, where we would create an accelerated mechanism where money would be spent outside of the normal military planning and procurement system to stimulate the development of certain important technologies, and to fund strategic means that And, unfortunately, I have to say that you also need infrastructure, you need other people. You in Ukraine know very well one of our generals, General Freuding. And I mean that this man himself is making a difference.

It's not about optimizing procedures or building structures differently, it's about giving the right people the freedom to make decisions and move forward. The German system lacks this, and it is a definite urgent need.

The money from the 2025 budget has already been spent and the 2026 budget has been planned. If we don't do it right, we will not be able to build the capacity to deter Russia and provide Europe with the ability to act. You can spend a lot of money on the wrong things, and therein lies the danger.

- How prepared is Germany for a new kind of warfare? I don't mean few expensive tanks or artillery, but thousands and thousands of cheap drones?"

- That's why we need this quota - to direct more money to defense innovation and to new kinds of military operations. The German military, like many Western militaries, is too arrogant.

Many people still believe, "Oh, if we have to fight the Russians, we'll do it differently than the Ukrainians." And I think that's an illusion. We have to be very humble.

I have been on the battlefield very often in recent years and I know that a lot of what I see is beyond the capabilities of the Bundeswehr. I am quite familiar with the Bundeswehr and this gives me respect as well as concern. Why aren't we adapting these lessons more radically?

I think it's starting now with bringing Ukrainian instructors into the ground forces, with a more experimental approach, with creating bird units in the armed forces, where we're essentially copying successful ideas from Ukraine. But Germany is still far from where it needs to be when it comes to this kind of warfare.

And then there are elements that are very often ignored: warfare in the electromagnetic spectrum, data integration, sensor integration - the kind of things that make warfare possible.

Ukraine has a lot of practical experience in this, while we in Germany rely on ideas and systems that won't work. Also regarding our survivability: if you are talking about the infantry fighting vehicles, tanks and mechanized formations we have, in my opinion their survivability in the kill zone will be very low. So yes, in this issue we are not at the level we need to be.

At the same time, I believe that there are problems that we can solve together. I think Germany and Ukraine have a common problem. We need to improve the expansion of the kill zone, have unmanned and satellite-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, have our own battlefield communications network, interconnection network, all those things, because we can't rely on American support assets forever.

There are wonderful areas for cooperation, and anything related to missiles and missile defense is something that I think we need to work on even more urgently than we are now.

- In this context, what would be the best path for Germany? Importing finished Ukrainian-made drones, establishing joint ventures or something else? After all, Kirill Budanov recently warned at an export forum that Ukraine should be very careful about transferring the technology itself, so as not to lose its unique advantage.

- I believe that Mr. Budanov is right. Ukraine should be careful with its intellectual property and data. It is very valuable. And certainly in this world Ukraine should not give it away for free. Why should you do that?

I think there is value in partnerships between industries. I think there may be potential in using Ukrainian technology and Ukrainian data to co-create products. In my opinion, the goal should be for Ukraine to have the confidence to succeed not only in a war on Ukrainian territory, but also in promoting products in the European public procurement market.

As I said, Ukraine is not an object. You are not subordinate to anyone. Therefore, you can be very confident in this.

As for the sale of Ukrainian products, everything depends on the direction in which the market will move. After all, this is an oversaturated space. Everywhere you look, you can meet someone in Ukraine with small drones or unmanned ground vehicles.

I believe that another wave of small drones or unmanned ground vehicles will not solve this issue - neither for Ukraine nor for Europe. So, the future technologies that I've already mentioned - missiles, missile defense, electronic warfare and things like that - are extremely important.

Briefly, in my opinion, the greatest prospects are in partnerships between industries as equals, and in the creation of joint products that can be exported or that can eventually compete successfully in the government procurement market.

I mean, the goal is still for the Ukrainian market and the European market to come together. So, these are products for the common market. But I wouldn't give anything away if I were in Ukraine's shoes.

- At the same time there is the problem of political risks, because the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has become the most popular party in the FRG. Why and do you see risks here in the context of defense policy and generally in the context of German foreign policy?

- I think one of the risks is obvious. The pro-Ukraine front is shrinking. The US is no longer involved. Only a few European countries actually support Ukraine. Germany is one of them.

- For Russia, Germany has always been a primary target. So now, in my opinion, from a security perspective, we should see the AdG and other forces in Germany as an entry point for Russian attempts to thwart European aid to Ukraine.

Russia has not had much success recently, if you look at the Republic of Moldova or Hungary. At the same time, there is now some momentum in Bulgaria, where Russia has more opportunities.

There is no doubt, therefore, that Russia will do everything possible to slow down decisions in Germany, to block them, to influence public opinion, and it will use the AdG as the Kremlin's mouthpiece. There is no doubt about that.

And we must realize that there may be a trial of a Ukrainian citizen who is accused of involvement in the undermining of Nord Stream. There is an energy debate in Germany where Russia is trying to convey that Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure are somehow harmful to German interests.

So, in my opinion, we have to take a sober view of things and fight this from the beginning.

There are reasons why populist parties are popular in Europe. I have been working in Ukraine for 25 years. At a certain time in Ukraine there were also crazy people in power. It happens everywhere. I think it comes and goes. But we must not let our enemies take advantage of it.

- In general, are there any precautions in Europe to avoid blocking rearmament projects, for example, in case of a worst-case scenario in France? There's a presidential election there next year, and your skeptical president will try to stop all these initiatives.

- Well, first of all, if you look at the actual support that Ukraine receives from France, it probably won't make much difference, because France doesn't really do much to help Ukraine.

- Yes, but France is very important to the Coalition of the willing and to the European defense sector in general.

- That's what they think, but I'm not disagreeing with that, I'm just saying that the largest defense IPO in Europe in general a few weeks ago was the Czechoslovak Group.

- So it seems that to think that the core of the European defense industrial base is France is perhaps an outdated view. It isn't. There are very strong Scandinavian companies. German companies are very active here in Ukraine.

As for the risks associated with the elections, yes. I think there are such risks in many European countries. Some of them already have experience of right-wing populist governments. Now they are moving in a different direction.

I think the biggest risk we face in European countries, especially the big ones, is indecision. You get election results where nobody really has a majority, and it's going to be difficult to form a government.

Look at France. I mean Macron is in power there, but has had trouble passing a budget for several years in a row. Spain, I think, hasn't had an approved budget for three years now. So the real problem is not which party is in power.

The real problem is that Europeans are no longer able to make decisions, they are politically fragmented. And I think that risk is also a hidden risk for Ukraine.

We can talk about France, we can talk about Germany, but I think that Russia's lack of advancement on the front lines will also force Russia to go back to its good old approach of trying to divide Ukraine from within and playing on the fissures in Ukraine's political spectrum.

I think the biggest risk of this year and next year will be Russia trying to take advantage of internal contradictions. I think, as we see from the spring offensive, that Ukraine will be able to deal with that. But the political risks are not only in France, they are here in Ukraine as well.