"The Russians Themselves Framed Their Fleet For AFU Strikes"

• 30.04.2026, 15:59

The RF BSF is losing key capabilities.

Ukrainian naval drones hit Russian boats "Sobol" and "Grachonok" right near the Crimean Bridge.

What is known about this attack and why were these boats important for the protection of the bridge?

These questions Charter97.org asked Captain I rank of the Ukrainian Navy, head of military programs of the Center for Globalistics "Strategy XXI" Pavlo Lakiychuk.

- The defense system of the Crimean bridge is unique in its own way. Firstly, it is protected by the Black Sea Fleet's means: anti-submarine patrol, air defense. These include anti-submarine ships of the water area protection brigade, S-400 divisions, long-range and short-range surface-to-air missile systems. In addition, forces and means of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia, which are based in Temryuk, are involved there. One of their key tasks is to control navigation through the Kerch-Yenikal channel and to protect the Crimean bridge. More precisely, not just the bridge, but the entire Kerch crossing: there is a pipeline and a power pipeline. The hit boat "Sobol" is one of the boats of the FSB border service.

Direct protection of this object is also carried out by a brigade of the Rosgvardia, stationed in Kerch. This is the only brigade of this structure, which in addition to the usual means has a squad of combat boats. Why they need landing boats is a separate question, but the main tasks of direct protection of the bridge are assigned to the Rosgvardia. The "Grachonok" boat was hit by them.

- Can this strike be regarded as the beginning of a new operation to destroy the Crimean bridge? What means of defeat does Ukraine now have for such a task?

- In fact, deep strike and mid strike (deep and mid strikes - Prim. site Charter97.org) are elements of one operation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. They may differ in terms of strategic, operational and tactical goals, but the essence boils down to one thing: an air operation is being conducted in the south, a window is being broken in the enemy's air defense.

That is why we hear about the destruction of surveillance equipment, radar systems, air defense divisions. Somewhere on the western coast of Crimea, such a window is broken through, and further into it enter the means of various services of Ukraine - from the Unmanned Systems Force to the "Alpha" of the SBU and the GUR of the Defense Ministry. They work mainly on distant targets.

That is why at approximately the same time Gvardeyskoye, Sevastopol, Feodosia, Temryuk, Novorossiysk, and Tuapse begin to burn. Here we should not rigidly divide the means of defeat. The fact that it is possible to realize such combined strikes speaks of the growth of the tactical skills of the AFU. It is not only "iron". Means of defeat are good, but without the filigree work of various services, coordination and interaction, operations of this scale are extremely difficult to realize.

There are strikes on ports. On the one hand, this is Russian oil refining - our "kinetic sanctions", roughly speaking. This is the tanker fleet, terminals, refineries.

The terminals in Crimea are a slightly different story. After the strikes on Feodosia and the oil depots in Armyansk, the Russian military in the south is having serious problems with fuel and lubricants. This is already an applied application. There were strikes on the Iskander base in Crimea. Even earlier, there was the destruction of Bastion launchers, coastal missile systems, and Shahed launch sites. This is self-defense.

If, for example, we hit Novorossiysk, then there the Sheskharis terminal - Russia's main oil terminal - is 200-300 meters from the military port, the home base of the Novorossiysk Naval Base on the shore of Tsemesskaya Bay. Naturally, when drones fly there, some of them work on oil tanks and some of them work on Russian ships in the military port. The window is pierced, the window is open. They flew into this window and are working.

- Over the past two weeks, the AFU have carried out a number of strikes on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In particular, in the Sevastopol bay, the battleboats Yamal and Nikolai Filchenkov were attacked and, according to the GSD, disabled. What damage could these ships have sustained and how critical is their loss to Russia?

- If you look at the latest strikes, they were against six Russian large landing ships, plus one more unidentified ship. These are the Ukrainian ships "Slavutych" and "Konstantin Olshansky," which were seized by Russia after the occupation of Crimea. "Konstantin Olshansky" is identical to Russian large landing ships of Project 775.

The command of the Russian Black Sea Fleet has long had its eye on "Slavutich" and "Konstantin Olshansky". They are used as donors of structural elements, equipment - everything that can be removed for their ships. But as the main body of landing ships is being lost, including thanks to our Unmanned Systems Forces, the Russians see them as an opportunity to replenish the fleet.

All the other large landing ships that were in Sevastopol at that moment were under repair, either at the 13th shipyard or at other anchorages. They had already been hit last year and earlier. For the Russian occupiers, Sevastopol is the only full-fledged ship repair base.

The Russians themselves made a folly in 2014 by announcing that the Black Sea Fleet's main ship repair base would now be in Sevastopol. They have nowhere to spread out. Now they are hiding in Novorossiysk, but they still go to Sevastopol to be repaired - under the attacks of the AFU. This is the right approach for Ukraine.

Obviously, the command of the Ukrainian Navy or the Defense Ministry's GSD had information that the repair cycle of the ships was ending and they could be brought into the fleet. So, what should be done? To prolong this repair - for a month, for a year. That's why they were attacked.

This is similar to the situation with the Russian oil industry. One strike on oil refining may seem insignificant. But if you hit systematically, there is a cumulative effect. You hit an oil refinery and it stops. Instead of producing fuel, first people put out the fire, then two or three months or six months of repairs. Instead of bringing in money and gasoline, the refinery starts gobbling up resources.

It's the same thing with these ships. Instead of duplicating the Crimean Bridge, sailing between Novorossiysk, Feodosia and Sevastopol, carrying shells and other nasty stuff for the Russian occupiers in southern Ukraine, they will continue to stand in the factory. At best - for a few more months. At worst - permanently, until the end of their century.

- To what extent do all these losses bring the Russian Black Sea Fleet closer to complete liquidation? When it will no longer be able to fulfill its functions completely?

- Finally, I hear the right question from a journalist. More often they ask: how many percent of the Black Sea Fleet has been destroyed? How many percent of the ship's personnel have been lost? This is the wrong question.

Because one thing is the cruiser "Moskva", another - a large landing ship, another - the rescue ship "Kommuna", another - the boat "Grachonok". You can't count the total amount here.

The main thing is the fleet's ability to fulfill its tasks. In 2022, it had four main tasks. The first was the blockade of the Ukrainian coast and the sea landing. It is possible to separate these tasks, or they can be considered together as a sea landing operation.

The second - support of ground forces in the seaside direction and logistical operations. They can also be divided, or combined.

And the last one - participation in missile strikes on the territory of Ukraine.

Of these tasks, the Russians can now perform only one: to launch missile strikes on Ukraine from the waters of the Tsemesskaya Bay or from the central and eastern part of the Black Sea. These are the dynamics.