Why Ukraine Will Defeat Russia
- 27.05.2026, 18:42
Brigadier General Denis "Redis" Prokopenko has published an essay.
Brigadier General Denis "Redis" Prokopenko, commander of the 1st Corps of Ukraine's Azov National Guard, has published a essay on why many Western analysts have overestimated the Russian army in 2022, how the Ukrainian army differs from the Russian army, and why Russia will ultimately lose the war. Here are the main points.
On the eve of a full-scale invasion in 2022, Western analysts and intelligence agencies seriously overestimated the Russian army. They assessed it mostly by numbers - an army of millions, thousands of tanks, airplanes and artillery systems. That's why many predicted the fall of Kiev in a few days.
But, according to Denis "Redis" Prokopenko, commander of the 1st Corps of the Azov NSU, such assessments ignored the main thing - morale, management culture, internal cohesion and the army's ability to adapt to modern warfare.
Even now, many in the West continue to perceive the war solely as a war of attrition, where the one with more men and resources wins. Prokopenko calls this a mistake.
The general argues that the war between Ukraine and Russia is not just a clash of armies, but a confrontation between two opposing systems that were formed in the post-Soviet space.
The Ukrainian system, he says, is a network model built on trust that unleashes human potential. Much of the change is initiated and developed here by ordinary citizens, soldiers, sergeants and junior officers. As an example, he cites the Ukrainian Defense Forces' transition to a corps system, which Azov actively promoted.
Redis writes that the Ukrainian Defense Forces, especially in units that grew out of the volunteer movement, have cultivated a command philosophy based on the principles of decentralization and empowerment. This model is a modern interpretation of the German concept of Auftragstaktik (Mission Command), developed for combat operations on a dynamic, non-linear battlefield.
The essence is that the high command determines the purpose and general idea of the operation, and the commanders in the field decide how to achieve the task, based on the real situation on the battlefield. This requires a high level of trust between all links of command and creates an environment where initiative becomes the basis of combat effectiveness.
The unit becomes a single organism, a "family" or "team" where everyone feels involved and responsible for the fulfillment of the task.
Prokopenko emphasizes that this principle is not an informal practice, it is embedded in the basis of the combat manuals that recognize the determination, surprise and initiative to accomplish the combat mission in difficult conditions.
Prokopenko emphasizes that this principle is not an informal practice, it is embedded in the basis of the combat manuals that recognize the determination, suddenness of action and initiative to fulfill the combat mission in difficult conditions.
Prokopenko emphasizes that this principle is not an informal practice There, Ukrainian troops actually rethought the concept of mobile defense: they used large "gray zones," mixed combat orders, ambushes, search-and-attack actions, fire raids, and point surgical counterattacks. The result was the encirclement of Russian units and hundreds of enemy prisoners.
The Russian system, according to Prokopenko, is the exact opposite. It is built like a rigid Soviet vertical, where everything is controlled from above, and the main criterion is not competence, but loyalty to the regime. Such a model, in his opinion, inevitably leads to paralysis on the modern battlefield.
It is especially clear in the weakness of junior command staff and in the behavior of senior officers, who are ready to sacrifice a huge number of soldiers to carry out the order, even if it is doomed to failure.
Separately in his essay Prokopenko analyzes the results of the 1st Corps of the NSU "Azov", which celebrated its first anniversary. He notes that in a short time it was possible to form the corps management and headquarters from officers who back in 2014-2015 fought as privates and sergeants and passed all stages of military management.
He says that the corps received a full complement of troops, which made it possible to conduct a full-fledged defensive operation. The problems of interaction between brigades, which previously allowed Russian troops to look for weaknesses at defense junctions, have been solved. Training according to "Azov standards" increased the level of training of personnel, and regular exercises for sergeants and officers improved the management of troops.
Prokopenko also notes that the units of the armed forces, national guard, border guards and police, which were attached to the corps, have actually become part of it: they receive support, combat experience and participate in joint training.
The corps created new units: the 8th Garmash Artillery Brigade, the 41st Pilum Unmanned Systems Regiment, the Fog unit, and a number of support structures. Several more regiments and a medical battalion are in the process of formation.
Prokopenko claims that the corps has managed to close the tactical and operational depth of the front - reconnaissance, strikes and mines now make it possible to destroy Russian equipment, warehouses and logistics at a distance of up to 250 kilometers.
Separately, Redis talks about the development of the medical service: the delivery of blood by drones to the front line, evacuation of the wounded with the help of ground-based robotic systems, cooperation with Ukraine's leading clinics and programs to support the liberation of the wounded. Special emphasis is placed on intelligence, international cooperation, training centers and the school of khorunzhykh. According to Prokopenko, all this should scale Azov's values and strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities.
The general said that Western partners are already studying Ukrainian combat experience and willingly adopt it. At the same time, the battle for Donbas continues, and Ukrainian troops will continue to fight against the Russian army and seek the return of prisoners.