"Russian Officers Are Already Evacuating Their Families And Belongings From Crimea"
- 15.06.2026, 13:02
One of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar people spoke about the situation on the peninsula.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces are intensifying the logistical blockade of occupied Crimea: bridges, supply routes, and the routes Russia uses to transport fuel, ammunition, and food have come under attack. On the peninsula, there is already talk of fuel shortages and disruptions in the supply of goods.
What has the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) already achieved in the operation to blockade occupied Crimea? What consequences for the Russian forces and the occupying authorities are already visible?
Well-known civil activist and one of the leaders of the Crimean Tatar people, Erfan Kudusov, spoke to the website Charter97.org about this:
— Overall, the situation is developing positively. If this trend continues, if the number of Ukrainian Armed Forces strikes increases, along with their precision and accuracy, and if the intensity of the strikes grows, then, of course, the occupying army’s logistical problems will escalate. They are already escalating.
One of the consequences that has already been reported is the alleged withdrawal of occupation forces from the Kinburn Spit. The occupiers are also leaving some islands opposite Kherson, between Kherson and the occupied town of Oleshky. Unable to withstand the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ attacks, and lacking logistical support, food, and ammunition, they are also leaving some islands. This was reported by the commander of the 34th Marine Brigade Dmytro Pulinets. This is all the result of the systematic and escalating efforts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The situation in Crimea itself is, in principle, already known to everyone. There are chronic fuel shortages. There is not even enough for the occupying army, and clashes with the civilian population occur periodically. So far, this hasn’t escalated into anything, but the trend is not looking good for the Russian occupying army. Therefore, we expect the Ukrainian Armed Forces to only intensify their efforts; we expect long-range strikes. Unfortunately, there are still plenty of targets in Crimea.
The destruction of bridges from the side of Chongar, Henichesk, and Henicheskaya Gorka, plus the destruction of bridges in the area of Armyansk, Krasnoperekopsk, the turnoff from Kalanchak, and Chaplinka, has also worsened the situation for the occupying forces. But for now, transport to occupied Crimea is still moving. It has decreased by about 3-4 times, but cargo is still coming through.
— What awaits occupied Crimea if the Ukrainian Armed Forces cut off communications both through Chongar and across the Kerch Bridge, and the naval blockade of the peninsula is strengthened?
— From a military standpoint, this would create a problem with arms supplies for the Russian Federation’s forces, because the Ukrainian Armed Forces are taking out key air defense positions. The personnel of the occupying forces will have nowhere to flee; they will be trapped.
As for the civilian population, there certainly won’t be a famine. I don’t think there will be a famine because the reserves are quite large; there is food, a lot is grown in Crimea, and there are reserves there. But it is already evident that the selection is now shrinking significantly, especially for essential goods. When something like this happens, the population of the former Soviet Union, accustomed to such shortages, already understands that in some places there is no salt, pasta, canned goods, and so on.
Visitors and those who are not rooted in Crimea will face greater difficulties. Why? They have no ties there—neither family, nor friends, nor any other social connections. The local population, and especially the Crimean Tatar population, feels fine and is used to such problems. Ever since the 1990s, when Crimean Tatars moved to Crimea and there was no support, they had to rely on themselves. Many have vegetable gardens, so there will be no famine.
But if the blockade of Crimea continues at this pace from all sides, including by sea—because we know that supplies are still coming in by ferry, albeit in limited quantities—then Crimea as a whole will find itself in a trap for the Russian occupation army and the Russian authorities.
Then a mass exodus of the occupiers by ship, steamer, or motorboat is possible. Such cases are already known in the history of Crimea: when the party and nomenclature leadership of Crimea was the first to flee Sevastopol as the Germans advanced into Crimea during World War II, they abandoned the population and fled.
In principle, we are already seeing and hearing such signals right now from the top command of the Russian occupation forces stationed in Crimea. What this means is that mid- and high-ranking officers—and even some lower-ranking ones here and there—are already beginning to evacuate their families. Some have already left; they are moving their property and transferring funds to the mainland, realizing the risks involved.
But this is not yet on the immediate horizon. I think that if the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ escalating blockade of Crimea continues for more than 2–3 months, then we will see tangible results. I think it’s too early to talk about that right now.
— How is the Crimean population reacting to the fuel crisis and food shortages? Are protests against the occupying authorities possible?
— I don’t think any mass rallies or popular resistance are likely. There is some partisan resistance there, and it might rear its head a little. There is widespread discontent among the people, especially among those who lived there as permanent citizens of Ukraine before 2014. But it is unlikely that this will lead to any protests. Because Russia’s occupation security apparatus is quite strong.
Hundreds of thousands of law enforcement officers, special services personnel, and members of the occupying army’s armed forces are currently able to contain this. But that is for now. We are talking about the situation as it stands today.
Predicting what will happen in two months, given this escalation of events in a positive direction for Ukraine, is difficult and practically impossible. But we see the signs: there is discontent, although for now it is a muted discontent.
Nevertheless, Russian tourists, unfortunately, like guppy fish—which have no brains and don’t remember what happened five minutes ago—are heading to Crimea. There are two trends. Some realize that things are completely screwed up, and those who have already arrived are trying to leave, but they’re running into problems getting out. And those who don’t know what’s going on in Crimea are still going there.
The momentum of tourism is still continuing. It’s not that there are no tourists at all or very few—they are still coming. You can see this from the traffic entering and exiting the Crimean Bridge. But this stream is shrinking, and it’s noticeable.
By the height of the season—which is still two or three weeks away—it will be absolutely clear that the season in Crimea has not taken place and cannot take place under these conditions. The local population, which usually works on the beaches of Crimea, will be out of work and will now be on vacation because there will be no work.