Zelenskyy Raises The Stakes: What To Expect After Lukashenko’s Ultimatum Expires

• 22.06.2026, 15:28

The political analyst outlines three possible scenarios.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reiterated his ultimatum to Lukashenko and stated that the Belarusian dictator must remove the relay stations for Russian drones, or else the Ukrainians will do it themselves.

Why is Kyiv taking such a hard line with the Belarusian dictator right now, four years into the war?

The website Charter97.org discussed this and other issues with renowned Ukrainian political scientist and head of the “Penta” Center for Applied Political Studies Vladimir Fesenko:
— This is a demonstration of both the potential and the ability to negotiate from a position of strength. Zelenskyy is taking the same approach toward Russia. This has also been evident in recent months. Of course, this is linked to the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capabilities. It stems from the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ ability to wage an effective air war in response to Russia’s air attacks—and not just with drones.

Today’s attack on a military plant in Voronezh showed that missile strikes are also possible. This is the key factor. Ukraine is not acting as a supplicant. Ukraine can firmly defend its interests.

That said, I am absolutely certain that Zelenskyy—and certainly the Ukrainian people—do not want to go to war with Belarus.

Ukrainians dislike Lukashenko’s regime, which supports Russia, but they do not want a second front. They do not want a war with Belarus. I think that the very form of the ultimatum itself may be raising the stakes. It would have been possible to do without the ultimatum. Simply make firm demands that Lukashenko’s regime must resolve this issue. Ukraine perceives this as participation in a war against us, but without setting temporary ultimatums. That would be, in my view, the more appropriate approach. But it’s quite likely that Zelenskyy is deliberately raising the stakes.

— To what end?

— I think, first and foremost, to pressure the Lukashenko regime and some of our Western partners into starting negotiations on this issue. The best way to resolve this problem is not through military means. Even a preemptive strike by Ukraine would have many negative consequences, including for us. Not in terms of military consequences. Rather, it’s the risk of dragging Belarus into a war.

This could be viewed negatively by some of our international partners. Therefore, there would be more downsides than upsides if we resorted to military force. However, this approach could encourage both the Lukashenko regime and some of our partners—perhaps not only Western ones (such as China)—to engage in negotiations that would help resolve this issue with the Lukashenko regime.

This could set a good precedent for initiating similar negotiations with Russia as well. These could be closed-door negotiations. But it is precisely the diplomatic path—the path of negotiation—that is the optimal way to resolve this problem.

— How might events unfold after the deadline of Zelenskyy’s ultimatum expires?

— Events could unfold in various ways. The ultimatum might hang in the air. In other words, it could all end with just a rhetorical escalation.

That’s why I say that the very form of an ultimatum with a deadline is a mistake. Here, Zelensky is following Trump’s lead. And we’ve already seen from Trump’s example that, in most cases, ultimatums simply don’t work. A warning—yes, pressure—yes, that might work, but without an ultimatum. The format itself, in my view, wasn’t ideal in this case.

But it seems to me that Zelensky most likely did this intentionally to speed up the process—to push the various parties toward negotiations on this issue. So a stalemate is a possible outcome.

Yes, this isn’t the best option for Zelenskyy, because he’ll be reminded of it. Another option, which I’ve already mentioned, is to begin negotiations behind closed doors. Zelenskyy could say that there has been a response and that negotiations on this issue have begun—without going into detail or providing specifics. These could be closed-door negotiations, as is often the case, or consultations on the matter. The negotiations could drag on. This is the most optimal scenario for how events will unfold.

The third option is if Lukashenko’s regime responds harshly—refusing to discuss the topic and resorting to aggressive rhetoric. In that case, there could be, for example, a scenario in which these drones are attacked by so-called Belarusian partisans.
Something similar has already happened—and not just once. In other words, Ukraine is not involved in this. The idea would be: “Yes, we issued such an ultimatum, but Ukraine’s friends in Belarus stepped in to resolve the issue, and Ukraine does not take responsibility for the fact that these repeaters have ceased operations.” This is also one possible solution to the problem. Of course, there are risks involved, but in this case, they are minimal. Ukraine will not be formally implicated in this kind of incident.