What's Happening Around Lukashenko

• 1.07.2026, 11:10

It feels like there's something we don't understand.

The gasoline shortage has become such a problem that even Putin has now officially acknowledged it in an interview with Zarubin. He says that yes, there are some difficulties, but they are being overcome. He adopted this line of reasoning a few days ago.

What Putin is saying is that he won’t agree to any negotiations; his demands haven’t changed—he wants exactly the same things and even a little more. He does not agree to a freeze along the front lines; he demands that Donbas be handed over to him, and then, perhaps, he might consider what to do with Kherson and Zaporizhzhia—but he’ll have to think that over. That’s roughly how he put it.

What justifies such a categorical and stubborn position—that’s a good question, and, in fact, not as simple as it seems.

On the one hand, we hear what Putin says about the state of affairs on the front lines. Just the other day, he spoke about this in detail once again, even naming specific towns and villages, the thousands of houses that have been captured, and how many remain uncaptured. He goes into such detail that it’s as if he’s literally sitting there with a microscope.

At the same time, I got the distinct impression that when he was saying all this—specifically about the situation on the front lines—he was simply reading from a teleprompter. Even though it was an interview, he wasn’t looking at Pavel Zarubin, but at the screen, and was simply reading this report aloud. That’s how I perceived it.

And he obviously believes in this entire picture he’s presenting to us. This picture lands on his desk in the form of reports from generals who state that Konstantinovka is 96% captured (a staggering figure), or Kupyansk, and so on.

And he also processes this in his own mind and presents it in the form we hear it. He has a distorted filter in his mind that works in his favor, because he wants to interpret everything that comes his way to his own advantage. This effect is further amplified. That’s why we end up with a picture that’s completely detached from reality—one in which the Donbas will literally be captured tomorrow.

On the other hand, he understands that, in reality, the Russian army has reached a dead end one way or another, and he needs to explain this somehow. Because if everything is going so well and the Russian army is advancing so brilliantly, as he claims, then why are we even discussing this? Great, let’s just wait a couple more days and that’s it. But no, he feels the need to explain himself on this matter. This means there’s an understanding that something is going wrong. And this isn’t just due to Ukraine’s successful long-strike campaign against Russian territory and Russia’s fuel, energy, and military infrastructure within Russia. But also, more broadly, with the growing realization within the country that something is amiss on the front lines as well.

He understands that he has certain options for escalation and, obviously, does not want to use them because they all carry significant risks for him. Neither a nuclear option nor mobilization—and now Alexander Lukashenko has been added to the equation—any of these look like a solution to the problem; on the contrary, they pose major threats to him personally.

Withdraw from the war? He doesn’t know how, so he doesn’t see the need. He’s bogged down in it; withdrawing from the war now and freezing the front lines would rightly be perceived as a defeat, given that Putin has so publicly and loudly staked his claim in this war. Only a capitulation of this magnitude would be sufficient for him. Therefore, he believes that if he stops now, he will be signaling his defeat. And this, too, poses major internal problems for him.

He doesn’t see how he could sell the current state of affairs and a freeze in its current form as a victory. He believes this is impossible, and it would also hit him hard. Thus, he simply finds himself in his own political dead end. And for him, the war is turning into a suitcase without a handle—one that’s hard to carry any further, but impossible to abandon, because that would be terrifying too, and who knows what might happen.

Putin even revealed some details that hadn’t been disclosed before. He said: “Look, Kyiv is offering us this, but we won’t go along with it. They’re proposing to limit the war to these four regions—we won’t go along with that. They’re proposing we stop bombing each other—we won’t go along with that either.” This is how he explains to Russian citizens why drones will continue to fly in.

And it’s quite obvious that he still hasn’t lost hope in Trump; he’s eagerly awaiting Whitcoff and Kushner in Moscow, and he’s spoken about it. He still believes there’s a chance to turn the situation in his favor through Trump.

We don’t really understand what’s going on with Lukashenko. Not with the threats that Zelenskyy made against Lukashenko and then withdrew, claiming that the problem had been resolved and he had done everything as requested. Lukashenko wasn’t under any pressure from Moscow either.

There were reports in the press. The Wall Street Journal wrote about this, but I’d say it was rather vague. There was no clear A, B, C outlining that Putin has a specific plan regarding Lukashenko—how to use him and how to escalate the situation across the border between Belarus and Ukraine—that wasn’t described there either. But apparently, there is some kind of pressure.

On the other hand, we still don’t understand what such an escalation—involving Belarus even more deeply—might actually entail. Because we’re starting from the premise that Moscow won’t rely on the Belarusian army itself, and Lukashenko certainly won’t do so either.

Simply because, first of all, deploying the Belarusian army as such would not be a very significant contribution in military terms. Furthermore, it is simply dangerous and risky. Lukashenko himself will do everything to prevent this from happening, because he has absolutely no idea how the Belarusian military would behave in that situation—where they would start firing, at whom, and at what moment. None of this is clear. The Belarusian Armed Forces themselves are not a factor in this war.

Deploying an additional Russian force to Belarus does not seem possible at this time, because Moscow simply does not have enough soldiers to redeploy there and launch a new offensive from that location. So that is not being considered either.

What is likely being considered is some kind of infrastructure that could be used for drone and missile attacks from Belarus.

But, on the other hand, as soon as—and if—Lukashenko begins to assist Russia even more actively in this regard, Belarus itself will become a target for attacks similar to those Ukraine is carrying out on Russian territory. And that’s definitely not what Lukashenko wants, but it’s not what Moscow wants either. Because, for one thing, the gasoline that Russia is so short of is currently coming from Belarus as well. Fuel is being supplied to Russia from the refineries operating in Belarus. It’s clear that the next move will be to destroy them.

And since Russia lacks its own air defense capabilities, how exactly will they also defend the Belarusian refineries?

So, to be honest, it’s not very clear what this escalation might look like in principle. I suppose it’s possible in some way, but won’t it immediately backfire and make things much worse? That’s a very big question.

Maybe there’s something we’re missing or don’t understand. And there’s a sense that we don’t understand something, because something is being discussed. But looking at it from the outside, it’s not very clear how this escalation would significantly improve Moscow’s position. And once again: we don’t see any desire on Lukashenko’s part to participate in this in any way.

Mikhail Fishman, New Voice