Public Sentiment In Russia Regarding The War In Ukraine Has Shifted
- 10.07.2026, 13:17
In 2026, there was increasing talk of the risks of a recession.
The economic consequences of the war are being felt more and more acutely in Russia, but it is still too early to speak of a repeat of the scenario that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. This view was expressed in an article for The Independent by columnist Alexander Titov.
According to him, Ukrainian drone strikes on oil infrastructure have led to a fuel shortage, which has become the first noticeable consequence of the war for most Russians. However, the economic downturn began even earlier.
The author notes that public sentiment has changed significantly during this time. While in 2022 the main concern for the country’s residents was adapting to sanctions and new conditions, by 2026 people were increasingly talking about the risks of a recession.
According to Titov, the Russian authorities continue to increase military spending while simultaneously restricting the civilian economy. In 2026, the country raised the VAT rate from 20% to 22% and increased the tax burden on small and medium-sized businesses. During the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, many participants already acknowledged that the difficult period for the economy could last at least three years.
At the same time, the expert believes that the current situation differs significantly from the circumstances that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. He points out that the Soviet Union collapsed not only due to economic problems but also as a result of the political reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev, which weakened central authority. Modern Russia, on the other hand, is built on a rigid vertical power structure that has been consistently strengthened since the early 2000s.
Since the start of full-scale war, the author estimates, state control over society has become even tighter. The opposition was virtually eliminated, and big business became more dependent on the state.
Despite fuel shortages and lines at gas stations, Titov does not believe that Russia is facing a systemic crisis. In his view, the Kremlin still has the tools to stabilize the economy, including further cuts to the key interest rate and a possible devaluation of the ruble to boost export revenues.
The author also notes that the war continues to pose serious economic challenges for Ukraine as well. The country remains dependent on financial support from its Western partners, and mutual strikes on energy infrastructure are heightening risks ahead of the winter season.
Ultimately, Titov concludes that economic difficulties alone are unlikely to force the Kremlin to change course. In his view, Russia’s leadership is not prepared to make significant concessions, and since both sides expect to achieve their goals, the likelihood of a swift end to the war remains low.