"This Is The Main Threat To The Kremlin"

• 29.07.2026, 10:15

What risks does a possible mobilization pose for Putin?

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Ukrainian intelligence has information that the Kremlin is preparing a new phase of mobilization, which could begin as early as the coming months.

Will Putin ultimately decide on a new escalation? The website Charter97.org discussed this and other topics with renowned Ukrainian political analyst and head of the “Penta” Center for Applied Political Studies Vladimir Fesenko:
— The probability is quite high; various sources, including Russian ones, are reporting this. I consider the figure cited by Zelenskyy—300,000 to 500,000 people—to be realistic. I myself spoke about this a month or two ago, when discussions on this topic were just beginning.
In Russia, for various reasons—including organizational, resource-related, and technical ones—they are prepared to mobilize, for example, a million or more people. For example, 300,000 in the fall, then another 300,000 in the winter—this is quite realistic, unfortunately. This would allow them to replenish losses on the front lines and gain certain advantages over Ukrainian forces in specific sectors of the front.

In addition, this could provide an opportunity, for example, to launch military operations from Belarusian territory. Because right now, Russia lacks the reserves to launch military operations against Ukraine from Belarusian territory, or, for example, to attack neighboring NATO and EU countries—something that’s also been widely discussed.
If, however, they build up additional military reserves, then such a risk would arise. Another issue is that carrying out a mass mobilization will, of course, pose problems. These include the risks of social and political tension.
There is already a great deal of discontent and frustration in Russia over the current problems related to the war. And that could increase even further in the event of a mass mobilization. We see that mobilization will not be carried out across all of Russia, but rather in regions where the risks of social and political protests are lower. These are Russia’s remote regions, where the local population is more dependent on the authorities and economically weaker. In the Penza region, they actually conducted such an experiment in targeted mobilization, where people were rounded up, forced to sign contracts, and sent to the front. Something similar could happen in other regions of Russia.

If Putin decides in the next month or two to escalate the war, then such a limited mass mobilization would be entirely possible.

— Is Ukraine ready for this?

— Since President Zelenskyy is talking about this, I think Ukraine is preparing in terms of tactics and adjustments to operational actions in specific sectors of the front. It’s preparing for the possibility that Russia may build up numerical superiority in personnel in certain sectors of the front. And, perhaps, we’ll also have to increase the scale and pace of our mobilization, since this war isn’t fought with drones alone.

Therefore, if Russia carries out a massive mobilization, Ukraine will also have to increase the scale of its mobilization. This, of course, will be very difficult. Ukraine already has problems with mobilization, and these problems may become even more severe.

This will be a very difficult and serious challenge for both the new commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the new defense minister. Although the defense minister isn’t directly involved in mobilization, for the new leaders of the military sector, this will perhaps be the most difficult problem.

— What potential risks exist for Putin?

— It depends on how the population reacts. But this marks a continuation of the decline in Putin’s trust and popularity. The process is already underway. Perhaps it isn’t very noticeable and doesn’t have immediate consequences, but it’s already happening and could intensify. However, other factors are more significant. When Russia carried out a mass mobilization in October 1922, it caused panic. About a million people fled Russia.

Something similar could happen now. If, in certain regions, the scale and nature of the mobilization are sufficiently drastic and extensive, it could trigger a sharp rise in social tension. Conflict situations could arise in these regions. Which is dangerous in and of itself. From a purely economic standpoint, mobilization—even if carried out in phases of 300,000 people at a time—will create quite serious problems in the labor market. Plus, panic—people will start fleeing, seeking refuge abroad or in other regions to save themselves. This could lead to a chaotic and crisis-ridden situation in the labor market in those regions where mass mobilization takes place. This could also affect the economic situation in Russia.

Overall, there will be a rise in discontent and conflict-related tensions. The main danger is if this leads to conflict situations where there could be outbreaks of violence or resistance. Whether this will happen or not, no one can say at this point.

For now, this is not the most likely scenario. But the risk lies in the possibility that discontent could build up. For now, this is passive discontent linked to the internet, the situation on the fuel market, and the numerous problems arising from this war. If mobilization is added to the mix, there is a risk of a chain reaction that could undermine the so-called social contract between Putin and the majority of Russian society.