"Putin's System Is Beginning To Devour Its Own"
- 29.07.2026, 15:18
An SBU general spoke about the financial problems facing the "Kremlin's cash cows."
Putin’s inner circle has begun to face serious financial problems. The companies owned by the Rotenberg brothers and Gennady Timchenko, who are referred to as the “Kremlin’s cash cows,” are reportedly no longer able to service their debts and are on the brink of massive bankruptcy.
Are Russian oligarchs really facing serious problems, and why? The website Charter97.org discussed this with Major General (ret.) of the SBU Viktor Yagun:
— Problems for major Russian businesses are indeed mounting. However, it is important here to distinguish between confirmed trends and information that remains, for now, at the level of insider reports.
Reports that the companies owned by the Rotenberg brothers and Gennady Timchenko have allegedly stopped servicing their debts and are on the verge of bankruptcy initially appeared with reference to anonymous sources from the Russian website “VChK-OGPU.” There is currently no independent confirmation of this information, nor are there any official statements from banks or ongoing bankruptcy proceedings. Therefore, it is premature to say that these business empires have effectively gone bankrupt.
However, the very possibility of serious financial problems is quite real. The Bank of Russia officially acknowledges the growing risks associated with the excessive indebtedness of the largest companies and is tightening requirements for banks that continue to lend to them. This means that even the Russian regulator considers lending to the most heavily indebted corporations to be potentially dangerous for the banking system.
The reasons are obvious: high borrowing costs, cuts in civilian budget spending, sanctions, technological constraints, falling profitability, and the constant reallocation of state resources toward the war effort. Companies that have relied on government contracts for years are now facing a situation where the government either delays payments or requires them to finance ever-new military and infrastructure projects.
In other words, Putin’s system is gradually beginning to devour even those who have been its main financial beneficiaries for decades.
— How does the bankruptcy of the Wildberries marketplace and “Putin’s wallet” companies threaten the Russian economy?
— The financial difficulties surrounding Wildberries are very real. After several warehouses were damaged, Russian authorities began discussing possible measures of state support for the company and its affiliated entrepreneurs. Wildberries’ financial statements show hundreds of billions of rubles in liabilities, although the company itself claims that its debt burden remains manageable. Thus, having a large amount of debt does not automatically mean bankruptcy.
But if this major marketplace does indeed become insolvent, the consequences will be severe. Hundreds of thousands of sellers, pickup point owners, logistics companies, banks, and suppliers will be affected. Chains of non-payment will emerge, tax revenues will decline, and the government will have to bail out the company through loans from state-owned banks, tax breaks, or budget subsidies.
This would not necessarily lead to the immediate collapse of Russia’s entire banking system, but it could create a major source of financial instability and shift private losses onto the state and Russian taxpayers.
A similar situation is possible with the Rotenbergs’ or Timchenko’s entities. Their companies are involved in major government and infrastructure projects, so the Kremlin will most likely seek to prevent their uncontrolled bankruptcy. The most likely outcomes include debt restructuring, new state guarantees, the transfer of some assets to state-owned banks, or the de facto nationalization of troubled enterprises.
— How will Russian oligarchs respond if Putin continues to seize their money and assets to fund the war?
— Most Russian oligarchs will not openly resist. They will try to negotiate with the Kremlin, secure new government contracts, preferential loans, and guarantees, and prove their usefulness to the war economy.
At the same time, they will salvage what can still be saved: transferring ownership to relatives and trusted associates, moving capital through third countries, setting up backup structures outside Russia, and preparing personal evacuation plans.
Some large businesses will attempt to integrate even more deeply into the military-industrial complex. In the current Russian system, the surest way to preserve assets is to become indispensable to the regime. Therefore, the oligarchs will demonstrate loyalty, finance state projects, and at the same time try to protect at least part of their wealth.
However, this strategy has its limits. The longer the war continues, the fewer resources remain to be distributed among groups close to Putin. Within the elite, the struggle for state funds, contracts, and control over assets will inevitably intensify.
— Can Russian oligarchs openly oppose Putin or attempt to remove him from power?
— On their own—practically not. Russian oligarchs have long since ceased to be an independent political force. Today, they do not control the state; rather, the state, the intelligence services, and the security forces control their property, freedom, and personal safety.
An open conflict with Putin almost inevitably means the loss of their businesses, criminal prosecution, emigration, or physical danger. Therefore, a public revolt by the oligarchs is unlikely.
The situation could change only in the event of a deep rift within Russia’s security and political leadership—for example, following a severe military defeat, a massive budget crisis, or Putin’s apparent loss of control over the apparatus of power.
In that case, individual businessmen might finance one of the rival Kremlin factions, providing it with their connections, information resources, or foreign support. But the initiators of Putin’s possible removal will not be the oligarchs. They could be representatives of the security services, the military, the top bureaucracy, or the dictator’s own inner circle.
Russian big business is capable of joining a palace coup once it becomes clear that Putin is already losing. But it will not be the first to turn against him.