So Who Did It?
- 30.07.2026, 15:05
It is not the people who are corrupt, but the system of government.
Let's talk about corruption. How is it that 32 years after a self-proclaimed anti-corruption crusader came to power, it has only increased? Why has Belarus’s international corruption ranking deteriorated so drastically in recent years?
Recently, Belarusian law enforcement agencies detained 44 officials from enterprises in various sectors: the agro-industrial and fuel-energy complexes, housing and utilities, construction, transportation, education, and other sectors.
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ press service, for years they had been accepting bribes from bidders in exchange for guaranteeing the advancement of their commercial interests: the officials ensured that the desired organizations were selected as suppliers, facilitated the unimpeded acceptance of goods, and oversaw timely payment for deliveries.
Naturally, a logical question arises: how is this possible in a country that has been led for 32 years by a man who came to power specifically on the platform of fighting corruption?
Let us recall that Lukashenko became famous throughout Belarus in December 1993, immediately after his so-called anti-corruption report, which was in fact the launch of his presidential election campaign.
And so it turned out that Lukashenko made the fight against corruption a perpetual motion machine—the driving force behind his politics—traditionally returning to this topic several times a year to expose yet another set of shocking facts.
One moment they’ll imprison Igor Brylo, an aide to the head of state and former minister of agriculture; the next, they’ll open a case against medical professionals; then they’ll expose kickbacks to middlemen across the entire industrial sector; and then Lukashenko himself will admit that police officers are “providing protection” gangsters, just like in the “wild ’90s.”
It makes you want to ask: Who was behind all this? What kind of aliens have been running the country all these years? How did it happen that, after 32 years of fighting corruption, there’s only more of it now?
The fact that corruption in Belarus has increased is not just a journalist’s opinion piece—it’s a fact attested to by international organizations.
If we look at the most authoritative international ranking—the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International—Belarus ranked 114th out of 180 countries in 2025. Let’s compare this with its neighbors: Poland ranked 53rd, Lithuania 32nd, Latvia 38th, and Ukraine 105th. And Russia came in at 154th. At least one of its neighbors is worse off.
Incidentally—and this is quite telling—in 2017–2019, during a period of relative political and economic liberalization, Belarus ranked significantly higher, placing around 60th–70th. However, since 2021, our country’s ranking has gradually declined. This is due not only to corruption itself, but also to a general deterioration in the state of government institutions, judicial independence, media freedom, and government transparency—factors taken into account in the calculation.
International organizations point to structural problems that foster corruption: undemocratic and opaque government decision-making, a lack of public oversight, the dependence of the judicial system, and the high share of the public sector in the economy.
It is precisely these factors that contribute to Belarus’s low ranking in the global corruption index.
Belarusian authorities often emphasize that the country does not have the same level of widespread “everyday” corruption as some other post-Soviet states. And this is true, because we Belarusians are by no means a corrupt people. For the most part, we value order in everything, respect proper accounting practices, generally do not evade taxes, and have long since almost stopped giving bribes to traffic police officers.
It is not the people who are corrupt, but the system of government. This is the strategic answer to the question of why corruption thrives.
Government agencies and officials in Belarus have too much power. If the state provides financial support to enterprises, then whoever distributes that money will have both the temptation and the opportunity to engage in corruption.
If an official decides who to award a government contract to, who to appoint as director, who to grant a preferential loan to, and who to sell state property to—and if, at the same time, he earns a rather modest salary (compared to businesspeople)— – then, of course, there is a great temptation to use that power for personal gain.
At the same time, officials—especially regional ones—probably feel like the masters of their own lives, like feudal lords in their districts—and that’s exactly what they are, but only for the time being. Until the top feudal lord sends them… well, at least to the army.
The point is that none of these officials are accountable to the people or to voters—in Belarus, no one is elected. They are accountable only to their superiors; the fate and prospects of every cog in the power structure depend solely on them.
To reduce corruption in the long term, what matters most are not only harsh penalties but also democratic institutions: independent courts, a free press, transparent public procurement, political competition, and transparency in public administration.
So the conclusion sounds rather trite, but that doesn’t make it any less convincing: as long as authoritarian rule, a vertical power structure, a lack of transparency, and a large state role in the economy persist, this entire so-called fight against corruption resembles a battle with the mythological Hydra—for every head cut off, two new ones grow back.
Vitaly Tsygankov, “Belsat”