Did Russia Lose?

• Valery Zaluzhny
• 8.07.2026, 13:27

The paradigm of war has changed completely.

I am not among those who are loyal to Russia. However, I believe that disregarding common sense due to a lack of critical thinking has already brought Ukraine suffering unprecedented in the 21st century—suffering that could spread throughout Europe.

And Europe, in fact, remains Ukraine’s only hope—both for its survival and for its future.

More and more, we are seeing opinions from analysts in the media—including those from Europe and now even the U.S.—that Russia has lost the war.

Of course, the reason for this is the straightforward interpretation of the war’s events by Ukrainian and European media, which feature numerous references to successes on the battlefield and strikes against logistics and critical infrastructure.

However, is this trend permanent, and can we assume that the end of the war is already near? Or is the situation actually different and subject to change?

To understand all this, of course, one needs to be closer not to the source of information, but to the main military command, which today is the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Only it knows the connection between individual tactical actions, high-profile strikes, their cost, and how they depend on the capabilities of partners and the achievement of strategic and political goals.

And even if we assume that in the wars of the early 21st century the boundaries between tactics, operational art, strategy, and even politics—and that, on the one hand, political objectives could be achieved either by attaining tactical goals or by temporarily disabling specific elements of logistics or critical infrastructure—for example, as in Ukraine—none of this fits the description of modern warfare, where, precisely because of scientific and technological progress, it is virtually impossible to carry out tactical missions on the ground.

And such tangible and significant achievements in striking logistics routes and critical infrastructure are merely a temporary success, which—depending on the adequacy of the Russian military leadership—will inevitably return with the same or even greater impact on our side.

How logistics operate between major frontline cities and how they function under conditions of drone terror is very clearly demonstrated not only by the M14 highway but also, for example, by Kherson. The fate of other cities is only a matter of time.

This is precisely what a war of attrition is. In such a conflict, every success or failure inevitably comes at a cost that will always be exorbitantly high relative to the actual capacity to achieve that success. And it is precisely this threshold of tolerance for that cost that determines survival.

Consequently, talking about achieving a political objective, winning the war through tactical actions on the battlefield, or even through effective strikes against logistics and critical infrastructure—clearly goes beyond the bounds of common sense.

It is therefore clear that reports of isolated tactical successes on the battlefield and painful blows to logistics and infrastructure should in no way fuel fantasies of a swift end to the war.

So what is happening on the battlefield? It is clear that the situation on the front lines has indeed remained at the stalemate I described at the end of 2023.

The saturation of the battlefield with various types of unmanned systems and their constant modernization is leading to continuous improvements in the tactics for their use.

As of now, the question is not even how to hold a particular position, but how to reach it or carry out a rotation or evacuation. Achieving any tactical objective comes at the cost of enormous losses, disproportionate to the results obtained.

For Russia, however, this option remains available and, as a result, allows the Russians to focus on carrying out relatively significant tactical objectives—as is currently the case with Konstantinovka, and as was previously the case with Pokrovsk and Mirnograd.

Carrying out similar tasks on our side is becoming increasingly impossible due to the lack of defenses against new weapons and, consequently, the inability to sustain heavy casualties on an ongoing basis. Consequently, the current situation on the battlefield is such that it is impossible to achieve operational objectives, let alone strategic ones, and the resolution of tactical tasks is carried out outside the framework of an overall strategy and, as a result, has no impact on the overall situation.

At the same time, even maintaining the current stalemate requires not only significant resources but also personnel—for example, UAV operators and support units, not to mention the infantry tasked with holding a particular territory.

As a result, neither Russia nor Ukraine can claim victory on the battlefield. This is because, on the one hand, Russia cannot even theoretically occupy Ukraine by military means, while Ukraine is not yet able to de-occupy the seized territory by military means either.

Everything described here—what is happening on the front lines—is entirely consistent with the situation involving the destruction of logistics and the depletion of critical infrastructure. It is clear that, despite the tangible effectiveness of such strikes, their cost and technological dependence on, for example, space-based capabilities, prevent this effect from being used as a long-term strategic advantage.

This is merely a temporary seizure of the initiative, which could become decisive only if a whole range of problems—both financial and technological—are overcome, a process that would require sufficient time to implement.

At the same time, however—due, for example, to the instability of the situation in the West and the lack of consistency in managing these processes—such steps are unlikely.

But then again, if it is clear that the approaches used in 2022–2023 cannot be applied under the new conditions, are there any such approaches available for assessing the current situation?

Despite the absence of such a methodology in a mathematical sense, is it still possible to answer the question: Has Russia lost?

First and foremost, with regard to the political goals Russia has stated, it can be concluded that Russia has not achieved them, and therefore has not won. Nevertheless, this conclusion will only be valid if Russia agrees to end the war. Of course, that will not happen.

Did Ukraine win? In the sense that Russia did not achieve its goals, yes. But first, Russia has not withdrawn from the war or acknowledged defeat. Second, Russia has occupied large swaths of territory that Ukraine will not yet be able to reclaim. And any peace treaty will be painful when it comes to territorial issues. That is obvious.

Third, even while dealing devastating blows to the Russian economy, Ukraine remains dependent on financial and technological support and is accumulating numerous internal problems that are becoming increasingly difficult to manage as time goes on.

Fourth, Russia fully understands this and is counting on wearing Ukraine down both morally and physically. Furthermore, Russia has greater reserves of resources of all kinds, its own space capabilities, and is ahead in the production of, for example, ballistic missiles. For it is simply impossible to manufacture enough air defense systems to counter this.

Fifth, one can assess whether Ukraine is winning and Russia is losing by evaluating the level of international support. And that support is showing signs of serious weakening due to the U.S. withdrawal from Ukraine and existing disagreements within the European Union.

Photo ops and various forums have the effect of rallying support around Ukraine, but they do not unite Europe in the fight against Russia at all. And the growing demands our neighbors are placing on us indicate that all is not well with the future of European security.

Sixth, this is a war of attrition. There will be no winners in it, only losers. So far, this list includes Russia and Ukraine, which—despite their desire to pass off wishful thinking as reality—have lost more than they have gained. This list will grow.

Consequently, despite the stalemate on the front lines, the war continues, expanding both the tools used to wage it and constantly adjusting the parties’ political objectives.

Today, the war of attrition has extended far beyond the front lines and has shifted, on the one hand, toward the destruction of logistics routes and the testing of air defense systems, and on the other, toward a contest over the vulnerability of critical infrastructure.

All of this has completely shifted the paradigm of war from the total defeat of the enemy or surrender to a rise in internal threats due to the high cost of airstrikes, attempts to defend against them, and the resulting social tensions. It is society itself that must determine the fate of the war.

Therefore, war is not confined to the battlefield and has, in fact, completely erased the boundary between it and the rest of the country. This could lead to a so-called strategic effect, which might bring about the long-awaited end to the war. However, the prospect of achieving this today remains unlikely for a number of reasons. The main one is the current unpredictability of financial resources and, as a result, the inability to accumulate and maintain reserves for a decisive strike.

Missile, anti-missile, and drone stockpiles currently remain the main political argument, while technological capabilities and space capabilities serve as geopolitical tools to influence such arguments.

The front line remains an important theater of war, but approaches to assessing it have long since changed. The movement of the line of contact remains informationally and strategically important precisely from a territorial perspective; however, it is likely no longer decisive for ending the war, but rather serves as just one of several arguments. Therefore, securing and stabilizing this line is of the utmost importance.

Moreover, even territorial gains that appeared strategic—such as the land corridor to Crimea from Mariupol—have, due to advances in science and technology, not only rendered its use impossible but have also become a compelling political argument.

A burned-out truck on the Russian “land corridor” to Crimea, June 2026. Photo: TASS

The same fate befell Crimea, which, due to its inherent vulnerability, became not an achievement but a reservation of past hopes and victories.

The peninsula finds itself in growing logistical isolation caused by the de facto cessation of the land corridor along the northern coast of the Sea of Azov due to attacks by our drones. As a result, the strategic importance of the land corridor—which was created with immense effort—is now being seriously called into question.

A fuel crisis is escalating in Crimea, and there are disruptions in food supplies, among other issues.

Will the occupiers face the same fate as the occupied villages in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions? Probably yes. This is a case where, if you can’t take what you’ve stolen with you, it’s better to leave it behind.

All of this is merely a bargaining chip in potential negotiations; however, unfortunately, this is not the final argument. All of this also awaits our major cities and their infrastructure, the protection of which must be addressed immediately.

A war of attrition is not defined by the amount of territory captured or liberated. Even less so is it defined by individual technological solutions and their immediate results.

A war of attrition is about people’s ability to endure its continuation and international support aimed not only at providing aid but also at physically containing Russia and shaping the future security environment.

It is a complex system of coordination and management of all processes within the state under extremely challenging conditions. Only this can yield tangible results and provide a glimpse of the war’s impending end. It’s a shame that analysts fail to see this. However, that doesn’t make things any easier for us.

In search of a way out, we keep coming back to something that will make our lives easier—and, inevitably, without our involvement. Looking only at the outward form and failing to delve into the essence, we turn to NATO. This magical military organization alternately inspires hope and spurs development, yet it remains virtually the only international military-political alliance.

Some are surprised that, over the course of 13 years of war in the heart of Europe, NATO has never participated in a single combat operation and has not responded to repeated provocations directed both at the alliance itself and at the countries it protects. For some, this is a source of surprise; for others, irony; and for the majority—the usual concern.

We Ukrainians, who have received and continue to receive assistance, naturally respect an institution with nearly 80 years of history. A history not only of service, but also of development, expansion, and adherence to principles that, under any circumstances, have a human face and seem utterly unattainable precisely because of that.

Today, amid rapid scientific and technological progress and, as a result, the evolution of forms and methods of armed conflict, NATO is facing very challenging times.

The NATO summit in Ankara. Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the third row alongside Polish President Karol Nawrocki. Ukrainian-Polish relations are currently going through a rough patch. Photo: Press Office of the Ukrainian President

In fact, the world’s largest military-political organization remains poised for a war of the past, still offering hope while testing the fortunes of its member states. But, unfortunately, this is not the alliance’s main problem.

The main problem is that this organization was created at the height of the “Cold War”—a war during which the goal was to avoid a nuclear conflict with the USSR. All of this was clearly evident throughout 2023, when the main priority was not to cross a certain “red line” drawn by history itself. The Cold War ended long ago. The only thing that remains unchanged is NATO, built on a strategy of conflict avoidance.

This is precisely why Ukraine is still not a member of the alliance, despite the obvious advantages of its membership. And this is precisely why we see unity around Ukraine, but not unity against Russia. This is why the war continues.

With this approach, NATO has no future, neither technically nor politically. Not because NATO is bad, but because it is an alliance of an old world that no longer exists.

The security system of the new world depends on those who are saving an entire country in the heart of Europe and those who are ready to unite everyone on this path. And if the former are us, the Ukrainians, then I hope we’ll soon see who is ready to be the latter.

Valery Zaluzhny, “Interfax-Ukraine”