"Putin May Have Changed Planes Due To The Threat Of An Attack"
- 13.08.2026, 19:49
An SBU general assessed the Kremlin's unusual move.
During his visit to Novosibirsk Putin unexpectedly flew in on an old Il-96 (RA-96020), which had previously been used as a decoy aircraft and flown to conceal the president’s route.
Why might Putin have switched to an old decoy plane? What might be behind this decision? The website Charter97.org posed these questions to Major General (ret.) of the SBU Viktor Yagun:
— The very fact that RA-96020 was used deserves attention. But here it is important to distinguish between what has actually been confirmed and possible theories and interpretations.
Putin was indeed in the Novosibirsk region on August 10–11, 2026. Aviation monitoring data recorded the Il-96-300PU RA-96020 in Novosibirsk on August 10 and its departure from there on August 11. As reported by the media, this exact registration number was also visible in the published footage of the arrival.
However, it is not entirely accurate to refer to RA-96020 simply as an “old plane.” It was built in 2012 and was originally designed as an Il-96-300PU(M1), that is, a special presidential aircraft with airborne command post capabilities. It had previously been used to transport Putin and later served as a backup or escort aircraft.
Therefore, this is most likely not a random choice of an old aircraft, but rather the return of one of the previous-generation aircraft to active presidential service.
The most logical explanation is a change or increase in the complexity of security protocols.
First, the use of several Il-96s of the same type in different roles—primary, backup, and escort—creates additional uncertainty for external observers. This complicates the analysis of flight paths based on ADS-B data, photographs, airport activity, and previous flight histories. For the head of state’s security system, this is a perfectly logical way to counter OSINT intelligence and the planning of a potential attack. RA-96020 has already been used in this manner. For example, in December 2022, it departed from Vnukovo shortly after another presidential Il-96, on which Putin was heading to Minsk. At the time, this was also viewed as a possible element of route camouflage.
Second, a simpler explanation cannot be ruled out: the rotation of the presidential fleet, maintenance of other aircraft, and checks on the readiness of reserve crews and specialized equipment. Therefore, it would be unfounded to conclude—based solely on the tail number—that Putin received information about a planned assassination attempt and urgently switched planes.
Third, the “PU” code—“command post”—is of great significance. RA-96020 is equipped with special and secure communications systems for the country’s top leadership. In wartime, the ability to maintain continuous communication and command and control during a crisis is far more critical than during a routine presidential trip.
However, there is no publicly available and reliably confirmed data indicating that, during this specific flight, the aircraft was actually used for operational command and control of troops or nuclear forces. Therefore, the most reasonable conclusion is this: the theory that aircraft are deliberately rotated to complicate surveillance, OSINT analysis, and the preparation of a potential attack seems entirely plausible. But as of today, this remains an analytical theory rather than a proven fact.
— Could Putin’s aircraft, equipped as an airborne command post, be a legitimate military target for Ukraine?
— Under certain circumstances—yes. But not automatically just because Putin is on board.
Under international humanitarian law, an object may be considered a military objective if, by its nature, location, purpose, or actual use makes an effective contribution to military operations, and whose destruction, capture, or neutralization, under specific circumstances, provides a definite military advantage.
If the Il-96-300PU effectively functions as an airborne command post—providing combat control of the armed forces, transmitting orders, and maintaining secure communications with command structures—or is an element of the military command system, — then the arguments in favor of recognizing such an aircraft as a military object become very compelling.
In such a case, the decisive factor is not who owns the aircraft or whom it carries, but its functional role within the military command system. Moreover, the very design and purpose of an aircraft with the “PU” designation may be relevant to the legal assessment. If it is specifically designed and equipped to perform command-and-staff functions, its potential status as a military object may be determined not only by how it is being used at a given moment, but also by its intended purpose.
At the same time, prior to any strike, international humanitarian law requires the most thorough possible verification of the target, an assessment of the circumstances, and adherence to the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution.
There is another fundamentally important point here: the legal status of an aircraft and the legal status of Putin are not the same thing.
Under the Russian Constitution, the President of the Russian Federation is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. However, this title alone does not automatically mean that a person is always and under any circumstances a legitimate target for attack. Under international humanitarian law, a person’s membership in the armed forces, their function, and their specific participation in hostilities must be assessed separately.
Therefore, the question of Putin’s personal legal status in the context of a possible attack requires a separate legal assessment and cannot be determined solely on the basis of the office he holds.
The situation with the aircraft is somewhat different. For an aircraft to be recognized as a military objective, it is not necessary to prove that every person on board is a legitimate target. If the aircraft itself meets the criteria for a military objective, it may be such a target regardless of the status of individual passengers. At the same time, the presence of civilians on board must be taken into account when assessing proportionality and necessary precautions.
In other words, a standard presidential VIP aircraft does not automatically become a military target simply because Putin is flying in it.
However, a specialized Il-96-300PU—which has been precisely identified and is actually used as an airborne military command post—could potentially meet the criteria for a legitimate military target. This is precisely where a fundamental issue arises: the more deeply the presidential aircraft is integrated into the armed forces’ command and control system, and the more it functions as a command post and a secure communications hub, the weaker the argument that it is exclusively a civilian VIP transport.
The mere fact that such an aircraft is in Russian airspace does not automatically grant it immunity from the provisions of international humanitarian law. However, any specific operation must comply with the principles of distinction between military and civilian objects, military necessity, proportionality, and precaution.
To put it as succinctly as possible: “Putin’s plane” is not automatically a legitimate military target. But a precisely identified Russian military air command post that is actually used to command troops could potentially be a legitimate military target. What matters most is its actual function and purpose, not just the passenger’s last name.