Yuri Felshtinsky: We'll Soon See Changes In Belarus

• 19.08.2026, 15:12

At the decisive moment, no one will save Lukashenko.

The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense stated that, in the event of a new wave of mobilization, Russia could form a strike force as early as this winter and once again attempt to launch an offensive in northern Ukraine, including from Belarusian territory.

How likely is a mass mobilization in Russia in the coming months? Could Moscow really attack Ukraine again from the north, including from Belarus, following such a mobilization? The website Charter97.org posed these questions to the renowned historian and journalist Yuri Felshtinsky:

“Mobilizing a second army is quite difficult”

— Let’s think this through. I believe that mobilizing and forming a second ground army is a somewhat more complex task for Russia today than simply mobilizing a certain number of people. In Russia, as we know, hundreds of thousands of soldiers are drafted into the army twice a year, and the Russian Federation is deploying roughly the same number in Ukraine. Mobilizing a second army is quite difficult. It needs to be equipped and trained; people need to be drawn from the Russian economy, and this may affect territories not previously touched by the war, such as Moscow. With open borders, this would undoubtedly lead to a new wave of migration, which would negatively impact the success of the mobilization campaign. That’s the first point. In other words, mobilizing and forming a second army is not as simple a task as it would be if one simply had to mobilize a few hundred thousand people.

The second point is the concentration of the army in Belarus. As we know, to launch an offensive against Ukraine and Kyiv, this army must be redeployed. To invade Europe, this army must also be redeployed into your country. There is simply no other way to carry out preparatory operations for an offensive.

Drawing on the experience of 2022, and already being at war with Russia, Ukraine, in my opinion, would in this case would launch a preemptive strike. This will be absolutely necessary because, otherwise, either Ukraine or Europe will be placed in a situation where an attack occurs rapidly, as it did in February 2022. I believe that the Russian General Staff must assume that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will launch a preemptive strike against Belarus if a concentration of Russian troops in Belarus is detected. This is the second critical point.

“Russia Did Not Risk Deploying Nuclear Weapons to Belarus”

The third serious point: perhaps to prevent a preemptive strike against Belarus—as the Russian leadership would perceive it—tactical nuclear weapons will be deployed there. As we know, all preparatory measures for this have already been carried out by the Russian and Belarusian have already been completed. However, despite numerous discussions, threats, and articles—such as the one by Sergey Karaganov on the need to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against Eastern and Central Europe, there are currently no Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus.

In other words, Russia did not risk transferring nuclear weapons to Belarus. There are probably valid reasons for this as well. One of them is the general risks associated with transferring nuclear weapons across borders. The second reason is a certain distrust of Lukashenko, because all these people are predators and do not trust one another—neither Putin trusts Lukashenko, nor does Lukashenko trust Putin. And the third is, again, the threat of a preemptive strike by Ukraine against Belarus if the transfer of nuclear weapons—or even the theft of such weapons—is detected. Ukraine certainly has the capability to carry out such operations. We saw this both in the Kursk operation and in operations like “Pautina.”

Even the transfer of nuclear weapons by Russia undoubtedly presents difficulties. Not to mention that it violates signed international treaties. Let’s assume that Russia doesn’t care about that.

“Moscow Is Russia’s Only Achilles’ Heel”

The only cause for concern today is Russia’s air superiority. We see Ukraine lacks ballistic missiles and the Ukrainian Armed Forces lack the capability to deliver devastating and massive strikes against Moscow. Because Moscow is the only thing that matters to Russia—its sole Achilles’ heel and its weakest point. Therefore, this war can, in fact, only be won by striking Moscow.

Moscow understands this as well, which is why it is closely monitoring Ukraine’s ability to either develop ballistic missiles or obtain them from its allies. The allies are in no hurry to supply these missiles to the Ukrainian Armed Forces because they fear threats from the Russian leadership. All the talk about a cornered rat that might launch a nuclear strike are taken quite seriously in Europe. It is clear that European leaders are in no hurry to go to war with a nuclear power. But for this reason, they are not providing Ukraine with long-range missiles. Consequently, Ukraine cannot strike at vulnerable targets such as Moscow and cannot end this war. Otherwise, I think Ukraine would have already ended this war with Russia.

And here’s another very important point—one related to the calendar. January 20, 2029, marks the end of Donald Trump’s presidency. Let’s hope he leaves the White House. U.S. foreign policy toward Ukraine, Europe, and Russia will undoubtedly change, because today Trump is Putin’s most important and most loyal ally, who is sabotaging all of Ukraine’s military efforts and Europe’s economic efforts to help Ukraine in this matter. Putin knows this, too. On the one hand, he still has time until January 20, 2029. On the other hand, that isn’t much time. Can we assume that 2026–2027 will be the last period during which Putin can make any strategic decisions? If we’re talking about something like the start of a winter campaign, mobilization would be necessary. Although offensive operations are more difficult to conduct in winter, in a certain sense. In February 2022, Russia started a war, but the Russian Federation had not planned to go to war. That’s also an important point. In February 2022, Russia planned to seize Ukraine in a very short time, without fighting and without casualties. The fact is, however, that the war turned out to be protracted and bloody. But it began in the winter, so our fears that Russia might launch another military offensive in the winter are probably well-founded as well.

“If Russia loses control over Belarus, Russia loses this war”

Having said all this, we must acknowledge that Belarus undoubtedly remains a springboard for the Russian leadership to launch an offensive into Europe and Ukraine, and for a second offensive against Kyiv. Will Russia use this springboard again? That’s a difficult question. But, as I have already have said repeatedly, I believe there are two components to Ukraine’s victory and Russia’s defeat in this war—which, in essence, are one and the same. The first is strikes against Moscow; the second is the liberation of Belarus from Lukashenko.

I believe this is the key to victory. If Russia loses control over Belarus, Russia loses this war. Because the invasion of Ukraine did not begin as an isolated operation to seize Ukraine either. Putin never planned to stop there. He planned to move further. And moving further was only possible from Belarus. If you look at a map, it’s clear that an advance into Europe by land forces is only possible from Belarus. The moment Lukashenko loses power, Putin loses control over Belarus, and your country ceases to be his springboard for an attack on Europe, Putin loses this war. One way or another, the regime in Belarus will have to change, because otherwise it will be impossible to rebuild the European security system. And I think Europe already understands this quite well today.

The European security system will not consist of us joining forces to overthrow the regime in Russia. We will most likely not succeed in doing that. But we can build a security system by ensuring that Belarus becomes a democratic country, joins the European Union, and joins NATO after Trump leaves the White House—because right now, NATO, in fact, does not exist. And a bulwark will be created stretching from Finland to Ukraine, encompassing Sweden, the Baltic states, Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine. Russia will never be able to pass through this “mountain range” again.

“Russia is a country of one city”

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces’ strikes on Wildberries warehouses and oil refineries exposed the vulnerability of Russia’s rear—the facilities were effectively burning right outside Moscow. What consequences has this already had for Russia, and what can we expect next?

— It seems to me that when the Kapotna oil refinery was struck, everyone in Moscow got nervous because they didn’t understand whether this was an operation against the refinery or the start of a wave of strikes on Moscow. But then it became clear that the target was specifically the oil refinery, not other facilities in Moscow, and everything fell into place.

You see, Russia is one huge city, and there’s nothing you can do about that. From a tactical standpoint, everything is correct. Strikes on oil refineries are the right move; strikes on businesses are the right tactic, but a very long-term one. If this campaign continues long enough, at some point Russia will feel the force of these strikes. But we need to understand that Russia is a fairly large, rich, and amorphous country in this sense. And anyway, there’s no life outside of Moscow, and nobody cares about any of this. It seems to me that we should focus on Moscow anyway. Although, I emphasize, the tactic is the right one. Strikes on oil refineries are the right kind of strikes because, first, they involve fuel; second, it’s highly flammable, burns well, is difficult to extinguish, produces thick smoke, and allows for photos to be taken and posted online. The same applies to huge warehouses. Goods and boxes catch fire easily, are hard to put out, and cause serious damage to the economy. All of this is certainly correct. But can this bring Russia’s war to an end? If this campaign is long-term or endless, then yes, of course. The question is whether there’s a way to speed this up. I would certainly argue that, to hasten Russia’s defeat, we need to focus on Moscow as well. There are specific targets there that must be destroyed. And perhaps this, combined with strikes on oil refineries and on Russia’s “Amazon,” will force the Russian leadership to stop.

Again, I don’t believe this will force the Russian leadership to change the regime and become all nice and innocent. Nor do I believe that Russia will become the “wonderful Russia of the future.” But it might force the Russian leadership to remove Putin and begin negotiations to end hostilities.

“Putin is already going all in”

— Amid falling approval ratings, the Kremlin authorities barred the anti-war Yabloko party from the elections, and this incident itself sparked a noticeable resurgence of anti-war sentiment. Could discontent in Russia escalate into mass protests?

— Let’s start with the slogans. I lived in the Soviet Union, and there were several main slogans in the USSR: “We Are for Peace” and “We Are Against War.” And yet the Soviet Union was the most aggressive power in the entire world. As for Yabloko’s political platform, with a war already raging in Europe, this is, of course, insufficient. It’s not a radical enough stance in the fifth year of the war. Furthermore, as we know, if the Kremlin had allowed the Yabloko party to participate in the elections, it would have had the opportunity to ensure the party received a low percentage of the vote and still prevent it from entering the Duma. In fact, the Russian leadership is already going all-in in this regard. They don’t care about public opinion. Let’s be frank: there is no freedom of speech in Russia, no freedom of elections, and elections are easily manipulated through remote voting. The law on remote voting was passed a number of years ago. It allows people to vote remotely and enter any number of votes into the computer at the expense of those who did not show up at the polling stations, making it look like remote voting. None of us have any illusions about this.

The fact that they decided to remove “Yabloko” from the election, on the one hand, shows that someone decided to curry favor with Putin. I am absolutely convinced that, of course, the decision to remove them was made personally by Putin, given that he has known Grigory Yavlinsky personally for many years. But I don’t think any of this will undermine voters’ faith in anything or even affect Putin’s approval rating.

Moreover, I am absolutely certain that Putin doesn’t care about his approval rating. After all, he relies not on the will of the voters or the opinion of the people, but on state security—which brought him to power and keeps him in power. In other words, he relies, one way or another, on the force of arms, and not at all on public opinion, which supports him by one percentage point or another. And we don’t even know for certain what percentage of the population actually supports Putin. But that doesn’t matter, just as it didn’t matter what percentage of the population actually supported Stalin or Brezhnev. The system of power was structured in such a way that it didn’t matter. Moreover, Russia today exists without the death penalty and with open borders, which means that any serious discontent among the population is most likely expressed by the dissatisfied leaving the country, rather than by them taking to the streets to protest. In other words, we saw a certain number of brave souls who came out to defend “Yabloko.” But we need to try to understand what will happen to these brave souls next. All in all, this isn’t a high enough level of protest.

During the protests on Bolotnaya Square , Dmitry Medvedev was told that a million people had taken to the streets. He replied: “Well, hold on. There are 10 million people living in Moscow. So, 10% came out to protest. They have the right to do so—we’re a democratic country—but that’s only 10%.” You see, no protest movement ever reaches a percentage high enough to claim that the majority of the population is against it. Even during the most active months of protest, that percentage never amounted to a majority of the population. That’s never the case. Simply because the population—including infants—cannot take to the streets to protest.

I don’t think Putin is all that concerned about any of this. Let’s be honest: he doesn’t believe in any of it at all. Putin has been in power for more than a quarter of a century; he has established a stable regime, and no one can really do anything to him. Now he’s waging a series of unsuccessful wars. The 2014 campaign—if you don’t count the annexation of Crimea—was a failure. And the 2022 campaign, which is still ongoing, is in fact an absolute failure. You can’t say he’s losing these wars right now, but he’s certainly not winning them anymore. Nevertheless, the regime exists, the country exists, and there’s no visible opposition. But all of this is partly because Moscow alone dictates the situation. And if you talk to Muscovites, until the recent strike on the oil refinery and the lines for gasoline, they didn’t feel the war at all. In fact, they were living it up off the war, because all government contracts mean serious money, and all that money is concentrated in Moscow. All the businesses in Moscow, all the commercial activity in the Russian capital, all the leadership, all the accounts—everything is in Moscow. And just as the capital prospered off the hardships of the provinces in peacetime, so too now—or perhaps especially now, during wartime—does it continue to prosper from this.

Therefore, as long as this Moscow calm and prosperity—against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and the rest of Russia—remains undisturbed, I don’t think it will be possible to bring about any turning point in what is happening in the state called “Russia”—which is, in reality, the state called “Moscow”.

“Russia couldn’t care less how many people it loses on the battlefield”

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces are carrying out successful counterattacks, while the Russian army is experiencing serious logistical problems. Is a crisis in Putin’s war machine possible in the near future, when it will no longer be able to hold the front lines?

— We probably have to agree that a war of position is being waged on land. Although the initiative now seems to have shifted to Ukraine, Russia nevertheless had, has, and continues to have one very important advantage that Kyiv does not and cannot have. Russia couldn’t care less about how many people it loses on the battlefield. It’s not even a factor in the discussion. Take note: we very often hear statements from Russian political leaders, economists, and military commanders. There is absolutely no objective to reduce military casualties. This topic is not discussed at all. And it is not discussed precisely because Russia—as a state and as a country—and Russian citizens simply do not care how many people die on the battlefield.

This is a very significant advantage. With such an advantage, with a formidable military machine that produces weapons, and with allies—China is helping, North Korea is helping—I don’t think we should count on the collapse of the Russian military machine. I don’t think that’s a realistic scenario that could lead to the end of the war.

Moreover, Russia has another obvious advantage. Since the U.S. is not assisting the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Ukraine is, consequently, deprived of the ability to rely on the American Patriot system and has found itself vulnerable to air attacks. That is, it is protected to the extent possible by Ukrainian air defense, the Ukrainian army, and the Ukrainian population, but unfortunately, Ukraine is not truly protected against ballistic missiles. And Russia is taking advantage of this and will undoubtedly continue to do so. Russia is ramping up its production of ballistic missiles as much as possible, because this has proven to be the weak spot in Ukraine’s defense.

How quickly Ukraine will be able to develop its own ballistic missiles—and in sufficient numbers at that—is a complex question. Because even if individual missiles become available very quickly, it may still not be possible to secure a sufficient number of them quickly.

“Changes in Belarus will happen right before our eyes”

— Could the weakening of Russia and Putin open a window of opportunity for Belarus? Recently, we’ve seen how Armenia and Moldova have stood their ground against pressure from Russia and how there was a change of power in Hungary. How realistic are the chances that Belarusians will be able to rid themselves of the Lukashenko regime in the near future?

— You know, I think it will definitely happen. And it will happen relatively quickly. Let’s put it this way: while I would consider the prospects for regime change in Russia a very-very long-term, that’s definitely not the case with Belarus.

But right now, this can undoubtedly only happen in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war. It probably won’t happen any other way, because, unfortunately, the Belarusian opposition has very little chance of overthrowing Lukashenko’s regime on its own. Let’s be honest: to fight military juntas and dictatorships, you have to take up arms. We shouldn’t be naive enough to think that people like Lukashenko will lose their nerve and give up power on their own. No, they won’t give up power on their own.

At the same time, we need to understand that Belarus is a classic dictatorship. Unlike the situation in Russia, where the state security apparatus holds power—a very important, large, numerous, and ramified structure—in Belarus, it is a very simple tyranny.

“Regime change in Belarus is a one-week operation”

From the perspective of Ukraine’s military capabilities, regime change in Belarus is a one-week operation. It is solely a political decision by Ukraine and its European allies. As soon as that decision is made, the regime change in Belarus itself would be a one-week operation, at most.

Will this happen? I think it will. Or, as we’ve already discussed, if Ukraine realizes that Russian troops are beginning to concentrate on Belarusian territory, or if Ukraine realizes that tactical nuclear weapons are being deployed to Belarus. And it’s quite difficult to do either of these things in secret—both the first and the second. So everything will become clear. And in 2022, it was clear that Russia was concentrating troops in Belarus. As early as the end of 2021, it was clear that this posed a potential threat. We were all hoping back then: maybe it’s a bluff, maybe it’s a political campaign rather than a military operation, and we’ll get through it.

It didn’t blow over. This time, everyone already knows it won’t blow over. So this time, as soon as signs of an actual arms transfer to Belarus are detected, I think Ukraine will be forced to launch a preemptive strike.

There’s no doubt that Russia continues to view Belarus as its most important bridgehead in Europe. Whether Russia will risk using this bridgehead again—we’ll see. But if it does, that will be the moment when Lukashenko’s reign comes to an end. No one will help him in that case—not Putin, not Trump, and not China.

Changes in Belarus will come fairly soon. We will all witness these changes; it will all unfold before our very eyes. And then Belarus will have to join the European Union; after Trump leaves office, it will have to join NATO and thus return to Europe.

***

Renowned American historian and journalist Yuri Felshtinsky is the author of the book *Natallia Radzina’s Belarus: A Journalist Against a Dictator*. “Natallia Radzina’s Belarus” is the story of modern Belarus as told through the life of one person. At the center of the book is Belarusian journalist Natallia Radzina, editor-in-chief of the country’s most famous opposition website, “Charta ’97.”

The book "Natallia Radzina’s Belarus" is available for purchase at:

Belarusian edition — the "Andrei Yanushkevich Publishing" platform “Knihauka”, the “Knihauka” bookstore at ul. Kłopotowskiego 4, 03-717.

The Russian edition is available on the publisher’s website “ISIA Media”, Amazon and Babook

Ukrainian edition — “Oleh Fedorov's Printing Yard” and Yakaboo.