Russia's Black Sea Fleet Is Trapped In Novorossiysk Bay
- 22.08.2026, 19:36
Ukraine is launching attacks from the air and sea.
The relocation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from annexed Sevastopol to Novorossiysk in the fall of 2023 was intended to protect it from attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, recent strikes on two frigates, the Admiral Makarov and the Admiral Essen, right at the pier in the port of Novorossiysk demonstrated the vulnerability of this military base and the ships stationed there. Two possible scenarios are being discussed: taking refuge in Tsemesskaya Bay while strengthening its defenses, or seeking a new naval base on the Black or Azov Seas. Neither path seems straightforward.
The Russian Service of the BBC tried to figure out how Russia might attempt to preserve its Black Sea Fleet.
Judging by satellite images, on August 12, a strike by Ukrainian drones hit the area of the “Kalibr” missile launchers at the bow of two Russian frigates. The Russian fleet uses these missiles to strike targets on Ukrainian territory.
The Ukrainian OSINT channel Exilenova, after analyzing satellite imagery of the ships following the strike, claims that both frigates sustained damage that prevents them from launching “Kalibr” missiles.
The Russian channel “Voenny Osvedomitel” reports that “in the worst-case scenario, the ships will require extensive dry-dock repairs, which means the Black Sea Fleet will lose two modern frigates—each capable of firing 16 cruise missiles in a single salvo—for an indefinite period.”
The photo shows traces of soot near the missile launchers in the bow of the ships, but it is difficult to determine the exact extent of the damage based on their nature.
Commenting on this strike, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that it involved the use of cruise missiles, drones, and unmanned boats.
The fact that Ukrainian drones or missiles did not merely reach the ships, but also struck the hatch covers of the missile launchers, clearly demonstrates that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are capable of planning a highly complex operation and carrying out a strike against the most heavily defended military base in the Black Sea.
The Last Line of Defense?
Russia had two main naval bases in the Black Sea: Sevastopol—the primary one—and Novorossiysk—the secondary one.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia leased the Sevastopol base from Ukraine. In 2014, Moscow annexed it, using, among other things, troops that had been stationed in Crimea under an agreement with Kyiv.
The Sevastopol base is located in several bays and includes ship repair facilities, warehouses, and port infrastructure. In addition to the base in Sevastopol, Crimea is also home to other Navy facilities—airfields, air defense positions, radar stations, other bases, and ship repair and shipbuilding yards.
However, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was forced to abandon this convenient anchorage. It was located too close to mainland Ukraine.
The Ukrainian Air Force acquired high-precision cruise missiles capable of destroying ships trapped in narrow bays and docks; if those ships ventured out to sea, they became targets for unmanned boats. In addition, the Ukrainians have expanded their capabilities to launch strikes with drones.
The Russians have not yet been able to find a way to reliably defend against these threats.
The decision to shelter the fleet in Novorossiysk, far from Ukraine, seemed reasonable. The distance provided protection from both unmanned surface vessel attacks and drone strikes—it gave them a chance to spot them in advance and prepare.
However, as Ukraine’s strike capabilities evolve, Tsemesskaya Bay is clearly becoming just as much of a trap as Sevastopol’s harbors: ships at their berths are easy targets for airstrikes, and if they’re moved out to sea, they can be hit by UAVs there.
There is nowhere else to move the fleet. On the Black Sea, Russia has a maintenance base under construction in Ochamchira, Abkhazia; on the Sea of Azov, it has ports in Temryuk and Taganrog.
However, there is no infrastructure there for basing a naval fleet comparable to that in Crimea or Novorossiysk, and building such infrastructure would be a long and costly process.
Many commentators in Russia have long considered the fleet’s situation, if not desperate, then very difficult.
“The enemy is finishing off the Black Sea Fleet in Novorossiysk”—an article with this headline appeared back in May on the website of the “Tsargrad” TV channel. “While as recently as 2023 it [the fleet] was inspecting ships bound for so-called Ukraine, it is now confined to Novorossiysk,” wrote the Telegram channel “Rybary” in July.
Can a fleet be prepared for modern warfare?
A Russian military expert, who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons, said in an interview with the BBC that it is theoretically possible to prepare the fleet to confront unmanned surface vessels, but to do so, every ship would have to be placed in a dry dock at a shipyard.
“The problem is that the major shipbuilding industry present in the Black Sea is vulnerable, since it’s located in Kerch and Feodosia, which are under attack by drones. And the Sevastopol ship repair yard is also, accordingly, under attack. “Therefore, anything that needs to be done—anything requiring major shipyard repairs—is dangerous,” he said.
“You have to install a number of new systems [on the ships] there, then test them somewhere in a more or less calm environment. And only after that can you take them into battle and see how much stronger you’ve become. Consequently, it’s difficult to do this in a region where your shipbuilding and ship repair capabilities are under threat of attack,” the expert explained.
At the same time, the straits closed by Turkey prevent ships from leaving the Black Sea to be modernized at other Russian shipyards, he added. It is also impossible to move ships from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea through the straits, thereby reinforcing the fleet.
In the case of BEKs, as with drones and cruise missiles, the main problem is the timely detection of strike forces. This is easier to do in Novorossiysk, since the distance to the coast controlled by Ukraine is greater.
However, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are consistently striking targets in Crimea, including air defense radars that help track drones and cruise missiles. Crimean airfields with naval aviation are also within the range of Ukrainian drones, which complicates control over the maritime area.
Therefore, it is also very difficult to defend the fleet in Tsemesskaya Bay.
Under Siege
However, even if it were possible to prepare the fleet for war on the open sea—where ships could use maneuverability and speed to their advantage—it would be necessary to overcome administrative resistance to do so.
As a Russian military expert explained, no one would want to take responsibility for people’s lives and the safety of military assets.
“Who is willing to take on the risk of handling this matter, since a strike and casualties are inevitable one way or another? It’s one thing for us to strike ships off the coast, where we can generally get by without any losses. If no one is killed directly in the strike, the fire will be put out afterward, and people will be saved. But if the ship is—excuse me—out at sea, then there’s a risk of heavy losses, with dozens of people dying. It’s fraught with danger. “No one wants to put themselves in that line of fire,” he said.
It’s difficult to defend against drone and cruise missile strikes in Tsemesskaya Bay. First, Ukraine has already demonstrated during raids on various targets on Russian territory that even a city as strategically important as Moscow cannot be completely shielded from air attacks.
Second, weapon systems are constantly being modernized. Ukraine is already capable of launching strikes using such diverse weapons as drones, cruise missiles, and unmanned boats.
Nevertheless, taking out a ship is not so simple, as Andriy Ryzhenko, a captain first rank in the Ukrainian Navy (reserve) and now an expert at the American company Sonata , explained in an interview with the BBC: “You’d need to fire two or three cruise missiles at a frigate like that—anti-ship missiles. We don’t have too many of those missiles. The first time we targeted the ‘Makarov,’ we used the [Ukrainian unmanned boat] ‘Magura’ with a 70-kilogram warhead. That’s not much. To destroy the ‘Makarov,’ you’d need two or three ‘Maguras’ with a 300–400-kilogram warhead to take it down.”
“Now, first, there was the ‘Magura’ with a small warhead, and then we know there were strikes by mid-range drones, which can damage certain parts of the ship, but it’s impossible to destroy it that way. Only a cruise missile or a ballistic missile can destroy such a ship—one like the ATACMS,” the expert said.
Threat
Despite the difficult situation, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is by no means defeated; it poses a serious threat to Ukraine.
Originally, it served many major purposes. First, it allowed Russia to project power throughout the Black Sea, as well as into the Mediterranean Sea and even the Atlantic Ocean.
Russia’s military operation in Syria relied on the so-called “Syrian Express”—maritime shipments of essential supplies through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Warships also passed through the straits into the Mediterranean Sea.
Several ships of the Black Sea Fleet, including the frigate “Grigorovich” and the submarines “Novorossiysk” and “Krasnodar,” found themselves “stranded” when Turkey closed the straits in 2022 following the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine.
Second, it allowed for control over maritime routes in the Black Sea. The fleet continues to do this to this day, maintaining control over the sea lanes to Odessa.
Third, like any naval fleet, the Black Sea Fleet prepared for active combat operations—amphibious landings, naval battles with other ships, and shelling of ground targets. Carrying out this task remains virtually the primary mission of the Black Sea Fleet’s ships.
“The primary threat posed by the Black Sea Fleet is missile strikes against Ukrainian cities and port infrastructure. The Black Sea Fleet has such capabilities. It has two frigates, submarines, and “Karakurt” and “Buyan” class corvettes. […] In principle, this adds up to a rather dangerous number for us—around 100 ‘Kalibr’ missiles,” Andrei Ryzhenko said in an interview with the BBC.
According to him, what’s even more dangerous is that all “Kalibr” missile carriers could be modernized and begin using “Zircon” missiles, which are even more dangerous for Ukraine.
The second threat, according to Ryzhenko, is Russian coastal missile systems, such as the “Bastion,” as well as the capability to launch strike drones. The third threat is control over shipping. According to the expert, the Black Sea Fleet includes corvettes, patrol ships, and mine-laying vessels that pose a threat to Ukrainian shipping.
The smaller, the better?
Right now, the situation doesn’t look very good for the Black Sea Fleet.
As long as the war continues, Russia is unable to either build large ships for this fleet—due to the lack of major shipyards in the region—or transfer such ships through the straits from other fleets—because the straits are closed.
As a result, the fleet consisted of small patrol ships after the invasion began. The “Sergey Kotov,” for example, was commissioned into the fleet in 2022 (and sunk in 2024). In addition, Russia is building a series of “Karakurt” light missile corvettes armed with “Kalibr” missiles.
This fits into the concept of the so-called “mosquito fleet,” which Ukraine had adopted even before the Russian invasion began. In 2021, Navy Commander Rear Admiral Oleksiy Neizhpapa presented the “Ukraine 30. National Security” forum a concept for the fleet’s development that included precisely these corvettes and missile boats, as well as reconnaissance and strike drones (such as the “Bayraktar”) and coastal missile systems.
This concept has now changed under the influence of the realities of war, but it nevertheless remains relevant in general: instead of missile boats—BEKs; instead of “Bayraktars”—strike drones; and cruise missiles are launched not only from the ground but also from aircraft.
A fleet consisting of small vessels is more difficult to counter. However, it cannot operate effectively far from its bases.
And if Russia continues to commission missile boats instead of frigates, this will allow the Black Sea Fleet to fight against Ukraine, but it is unlikely to enable it to maintain a presence in the Mediterranean Sea, let alone the Atlantic.