How Putin's Rhetoric Has Changed During The War
- 26.08.2026, 12:45
The Kremlin is no longer hiding the most important thing.
For years, Putin has been constructing a carefully crafted system of rhetoric around the war in Ukraine. At first, the talk was of “defending the Russian people,” “demilitarization,” and “denazification”; then the Kremlin’s main adversary ceased to be Kyiv and became the West as a whole. After the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk region, the rhetoric shifted once again: Ukraine went from being a supposedly wayward neighbor to a direct adversary capable of striking Russian territory, writes Newsweek (translation by Charter97.org).
Newsweek tracked how the Russian president’s statements have evolved since 2021 and concluded that, beneath the outward consistency of his remarks, serious contradictions have gradually emerged. Putin can no longer tell the same story, as the reality of the war is constantly changing.
At first, Ukraine was part of “historical Russia”
Even before the full-scale invasion, Putin had articulated his basic view of Ukraine. In an article published in July 2021, he claimed that modern Ukraine is largely the result of Soviet state-building.
“Modern Ukraine is entirely a product of the Soviet era,” Putin wrote.
At the same time, the Kremlin stated that it respects the Ukrainian language and traditions and would like to see Ukraine free and prosperous. “However, in his view, this freedom was effectively supposed to exist within Russia’s sphere of influence,” the authors write.
After the full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the war was given a different name. Putin insisted on the term “special military operation,” portraying the events as a necessary measure to protect Russia and the people of Donbas.
“We simply have no other option to defend Russia and our people,” he said, explaining the decision to launch the operation.
At the same time, Putin continued to convince Ukrainians and the international audience that Russia allegedly did not seek to harm Ukraine.
“Today’s events are not connected with any desire to infringe upon the interests of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people,” he asserted.
The West Gradually Became the Enemy
When Moscow’s initial expectation of a quick campaign failed to materialize, its rhetoric also shifted.
By the fall of 2022, Putin was already speaking much less about Ukraine’s internal problems and increasingly describing the situation as a confrontation between Russia and the entire West. In this narrative, Ukraine was portrayed as a tool allegedly controlled by the U.S. and European countries.
In September 2022, while announcing mobilization, Putin stated: “Our Armed Forces are confronting not only neo-Nazi formations, but in fact the entire military machine of the collective West.”
This narrative became one of the central elements of Kremlin rhetoric: Russia is allegedly not the aggressor, but is forced to defend itself against the Western bloc, which seeks to defeat it.
At the same time, a notable contradiction has emerged. Russian authorities had already banned referring to the events as a war, and using that word in relation to the actions of Russian troops could lead to criminal prosecution. But on December 22, 2022, Putin himself used the word “war” when speaking about Ukraine.
“This episode demonstrated just how gradually the Kremlin’s official rhetoric had diverged from the reality of what was happening,” the Newsweek authors assert.
Kursk Changed the Kremlin’s Rhetoric
On August 6, Ukrainian units crossed the Russian border and seized significant territory. After that, the previous rhetoric about protecting Ukrainians and the historical unity of the two peoples virtually disappeared.
In Putin’s statements, Ukraine became a full-fledged adversary posing a threat to Russian territory and security. The peace process increasingly gave way to the language of military demands and retaliatory strikes.
“The main task facing the Ministry of Defense is, of course, to drive out and dislodge the enemy from our territories,” Putin stated on August 12, 2024.
At the same time, he continued to assert that the West was behind Ukraine’s actions: “The West is waging war against us through the Ukrainians.”
It was precisely after the Kursk operation that a significant portion of the previous attempts to portray the conflict as a special form of relations between two brotherly nations disappeared. Now, the discourse increasingly focused on a confrontation with the enemy.
Under Trump, Putin shifted this emphasis as well
In 2025, another notable shift appeared in Putin’s rhetoric. After Donald Trump returned to the White House, Putin became more cautious in his attacks on the U.S. and attempted to portray Moscow as a party willing to discuss a cessation of hostilities.
In March 2025, speaking about Ukrainian units in the Kursk region, Putin stated that they allegedly had only two options: “surrender or die.”
At the same time, he proposed discussing a possible 30-day ceasefire with the American side and Trump himself. In other words, the previous narrative—in which the U.S. was portrayed solely as the instigator of the war against Russia—gave way for a time to a more pragmatic diplomatic rhetoric.
“However, Putin’s fundamental view of Ukraine has not gone anywhere,” the authors argue.
In June 2025, he stated: “I consider the Russian and Ukrainian peoples to be one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours.”
This statement showed that, despite changes in political rhetoric, the Kremlin’s long-standing view that Ukraine belongs to Russia’s historical sphere remains intact.
Now, Putin’s rhetoric increasingly boils down to revenge
By 2026, Newsweek reports, almost nothing remained of the earlier talk of “brotherhood,” protecting the Ukrainian population, and a peaceful future. Even the term “special military operation” is used primarily in Russian official documents and the media.
Putin is increasingly using the language of war, victory, defeat, and retribution. In May 2026, he explained (the decision not to fully display military equipment at the Victory Day parade in Moscow made it one of the shortest in history—Belarus News — Charter ’97) that it was necessary to concentrate forces on the “final defeat of the enemy.”
And following Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, he was already speaking in terms of direct retaliation.
“The Kyiv regime set out to damage our economy. What did it do? It opened this Pandora’s box itself. Well then, you’ll get a response targeting the most vulnerable sectors of your economy,” Putin stated.
With this statement, Putin effectively acknowledges a significant shift in the situation—Ukraine is capable of inflicting tangible physical and economic damage on Russia. But at the same time, Moscow continues to deny the autonomy of Ukraine’s actions, portraying Kyiv as a tool of the collective West.
The rhetoric changes, but the perception of Ukraine remains the same
Over the course of more than four years of war, Putin has gone through several phases of rhetoric. At first, Ukraine was supposedly part of a single historical space; then, it was an object to be “saved” from nationalists; and subsequently, it became the battlefield for Russia’s conflict with the West. After Kursk, it became a direct military adversary, and in 2026, it increasingly features in the Kremlin’s statements as a source of attacks, threats, and the need for retaliatory actions.
At the same time, the main narrative persists. Moscow still refuses to view Ukraine as a fully independent party to the conflict, and Putin has not abandoned the idea of Russians and Ukrainians as “one people.”
This is the main paradox—Putin’s rhetoric is changing as the war progresses, but his fundamental view of who Ukraine belongs to remains virtually unchanged.