Sanctions Against Wildberries Could Lead To Devaluation In Belarus

• 4.08.2026, 8:13

The crisis in Russia will also affect the Belarusian economy.

On Monday, Ukrainian drones struck yet another Wildberries warehouse. The strike hit a 175,000-square-meter warehouse in the Vladimir Region. The Wildberries empire is holding on for now, but it is already cracking at the seams under Ukrainian attacks. Its collapse threatens more than just consumers’ accustomed comfort.

It could also deal a blow to the Russian banking system, which is already in a pre-crisis state. And if a banking crisis were to occur in Russia, Belarus would not be able to remain unaffected either.

Stability is crumbling

The Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting, headed by the brother of Russia’s defense minister, stated back in mid-June that a banking crisis in Russia is already underway. It’s just not visible yet. But the share of non-performing loans in the banking system has remained above 10 percent for the third consecutive month. According to IMF methodology, that’s the threshold beyond which a systemic banking crisis begins.

Things haven’t improved in the past month and a half. According to Sberbank’s estimates, the outflow of deposits converted to cash in July amounted to 600 billion Russian rubles. Since the beginning of the year, the volume of cash in circulation has grown by two trillion. As a result, Russian banks began to run short of cash. The liquidity deficit in the banking system has grown to 2.5 trillion rubles.

Russian banks could have coped with the deficit, the cash outflow, and non-performing loans. Especially if the Central Bank were to inject some funds. But then problems started piling up with Wildberries.

Wildberries isn’t just Russia’s largest marketplace. It’s also one of the country’s biggest debtors. The company has taken out more than one trillion rubles in loans, mostly short-term. Of that amount, 500–600 billion rubles are loans from VTB, Russia’s second-largest bank.

And Russia’s second-largest bank may well be the country’s leading bank in terms of the volume of non-performing loans. Independent analytical centers estimate their actual volume at 3.5 trillion rubles. If the Wildberries empire collapses, another 500–600 billion rubles will be added to the 3.5 trillion rubles all at once. And VTB’s situation wasn’t exactly rosy to begin with. It’s no surprise that the bank was forced to launch a massive layoff campaign just a week ago.

In other words, Wildberries could become the very domino whose fall would trigger a cascade effect across Russia’s entire financial system. And the Russian authorities lack the resources to prevent this. Russia is already spending 10 percent of its budget on servicing its debts to banks. At the same time, the Russian budget deficit has approached 6 trillion rubles.

So the only source of money is money printing by the Central Bank. But increasing the money supply will lead to rising inflation, a weaker ruble, and will further accelerate the outflow of funds from banks. Therefore, increasing the money supply may delay a banking crisis, but it will not be able to prevent it.

We Won’t Stand Idly By

A banking crisis in Russia does not automatically mean a banking crisis in Belarus. Subsidiaries of Russian banks control 20–25 percent of the resources in the Belarusian banking system. At the same time, the Belarusian subsidiaries are sufficiently autonomous that a crisis at their parent banks would not directly affect them.

The assets of Russian subsidiaries in Belarus are isolated from their parent companies. The banks comply with Belarusian liquidity and capital requirements. And deposits are insured by the Belarusian Deposit Insurance Agency. So, in the event of a hypothetical collapse of the Russian banking system, Belarusian banks would weather the storm. But that does not mean they will remain unaffected.

The subsidiaries of Russian banks in Belarus are primarily focused on servicing joint projects. Therefore, their main borrowers are large enterprises. The share of corporate loans ranges from 60 to 70 percent. A financial crisis in Russia would mean a sharp drop in demand. And a drop in demand will hit borrowers’ profits and their ability to repay their debts. A reduction in lending by Russian banks to their enterprises will also hurt Belarusian exports, two-thirds of which go to Russia.

The deteriorating financial situation at Russian banks will cut off Belarusian banks’ access to loans and interbank financing. Not to mention the prospects for the Belarusian budget, which Russia took under its wing just a few years ago.

Unable to refinance old debts, the Belarusian authorities will have to draw down their accumulated reserves. And this will put additional pressure on the Belarusian foreign exchange market, which will already find itself in a difficult position. This is because the weakening of the Russian ruble will inevitably lead to a weakening of the Belarusian currency. Even if the National Bank has reserves to support the ruble’s exchange rate against the dollar, it will have to accept devaluation in order to maintain the competitiveness of Belarusian goods in the Russian market.

The weakening of the ruble, against the backdrop of news about the Russian banking crisis, will create a negative atmosphere in the Belarusian financial market. Following Russia’s lead, a capital outflow from Belarusian banks may begin, which will further intensify the pressure on the Belarusian ruble.

Therefore, a banking crisis in Belarus will not begin immediately after the Russian one. But its consequences may prove to be more severe than in Russia. As was the case in 1998, when Belarus continued to feel the effects of the Russian default for several more years.

Felix Mirsky, “Belarusians and the Market”