Lukashenko Is Hiding A Secret As Plain As Day

• Sergei Kovalchuk, “Solidarity”
• 1.09.2026, 9:59

All the key players in the process recognize this role.

The Minsk regime’s indirect military assistance—in the spirit of brotherhood and neighborly solidarity—to its counterparts in the Kremlin is by no means a secret to anyone. But from time to time, the parties to the conflict highlight particularly striking examples of such assistance.

Let’s look at two aspects that have been discussed recently. The saga involving the relay stations and the schizophrenic propaganda counter-maneuver—with buzzards on poles and the mad Zelenskyy—ended with the Ukrainians, according to informants, finally took out the Russian equipment on Belarusian territory using strike drones.

The geopolitical situation is such that neither Minsk nor Kyiv chose to blow this story out of proportion. Although the very fact of a strike on a military facility is certainly an event worthy of attention. But it’s over now, so it’s over.

That does not, however, resolve the issue of using Belarus’s telecommunications infrastructure to guide Russian drones.

Zelenskyy’s adviser and drone expert Sergey “Flash” Beskrestnov, drew the public’s attention to an interesting pattern—Russian drones attacking Kyiv are flying toward their targets strictly along the Belarusian border from north to south.

The expert suggested that this tactic is used to maximize the capabilities of Belarusian cellular networks for navigating Russian strike drones. This does not require special military communication systems; linking to cell towers is sufficient.

Essentially, a drone “sees” a cell tower, and the tower “sees” the drone in much the same way that a phone in your pocket interacts with the network.

Once again, proposals have surfaced to somehow restrict the use of Belarusian cellular operators in military operations. But it’s not entirely clear how this could be done without destroying base stations on Belarusian territory.

Technically, the Ukrainians could do this; since their drones can fly beyond the Urals, it would be no problem at all for them to fly across the nearby border into Belarus. But such strikes would risk a serious escalation along Ukraine’s northern border—something Ukraine has absolutely no interest in.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian government needs a steady stream of “victories” to boost morale at the front and in the rear. Therefore, it’s possible that this issue will develop further.

The second aspect is fuel shipments from Belarus to Russia. Belarusian oil refiners are doing quite well amid the fuel shortage in Russia. While the Ukrainian military is methodically taking out Russian oil refineries one by one, Belarusian refineries—which remain safe—are setting record after record for fuel sales to Russia, even though the fuel is produced from Russian raw materials.

In July, Belarus shipped approximately 212,000 metric tons of gasoline and 162,000 metric tons of diesel to Russia. Compared to the same period in 2025, shipments increased by approximately 25 and 7 times, respectively. In August, the pace slowed slightly, but volumes remain very high. Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Belarusian refineries are already supplying fuel to Russia “at maximum capacity.”

At the same time, Russia’s other neighbors are not nearly as keenly interested in maintaining the fuel balance of the war-torn country. Kazakhstan’s largest fuel producers have not yet shown interest in the “Russian oil – Kazakhstani refining – Russian gasoline” scheme. In Kazakhstan, only one relatively small refinery, “Kondensat,” has integrated itself into this production-logistics chain. The deal appears profitable for it because 30 percent of the fuel produced remains in Kazakhstan, while 70 percent goes to Russia. The other refiners appear to be weighing the risks of sanctions and other factors and are in no hurry to get involved in such schemes with the Russians.

As a result, Belarus remains a key ally of Russia, assisting it in its aggressive war against Ukraine through logistical, navigational, and resource support.

All key players in the process recognize this role, and it does not go unnoticed today, while the war is in its active phase; nor will it go unassessed once the war ends and the time comes to determine priorities.

The actual outcome of the war and the position of the parties will determine what those priorities will be. Whether reparations will be required to compensate for damage caused by aggression or annexation, or whether the losing side will be required to pay contributions—only time will tell.

Sergei Kovalchuk, “Solidarity”