Pro-Kremlin Economists Have Set Their Sights On Russians' Savings
- 15.09.2026, 11:42
They found an unexpected "use" for them.
The war has left the Russian economy without Western funds, which it has not been possible to fully replace with domestic sources, according to a think tank close to the Kremlin TsMAKP. It estimates the “lost” volume at 0.5–1% of GDP per year (1.1–2.2 trillion rubles), and to restore funding for the real sector to its previous level—or even increase it—it proposes making more active use of the savings available in the economy.
A significant portion of these savings is “chronically underinvested,” laments the CMACP. In recent years, gross capital formation (investment in fixed capital and inventories) has lagged behind gross national savings by an average of 4–5% of GDP, the center’s experts note. According to their estimates, this is precisely the amount needed to maintain and strengthen the Russian economy’s global competitive position. They refer to this gap as “untapped potential for increasing domestic investment and, consequently, financing technological modernization.”
Over many years, enormous savings have accumulated in the economy. Since the start of the war, Russians have been setting aside at least 7 trillion rubles a year (10.8 trillion in 2024). As of last October, Russians’ savings in deposits and cash totaled 77.8 trillion rubles, according to Rosstat. Funds in Russian banks alone totaled 68.4 trillion rubles as of August 1, and the Central Bank estimates the total financial assets of Russian households, net of debt, at more than 100 trillion rubles.
The government shouldn’t count on this money: Russians keep the bulk of their savings in banks, and the banks have already put that money to use—granting loans, buying government bonds, noted Sergey Aleksashenko, a leading expert at the NEST analytical center and former deputy chairman of the Central Bank —you can’t spend the same money twice.
Businesses have accumulated even more: abroad alone, the net assets (after deducting liabilities) of the non-financial sector exceed 40% of Russia’s GDP, according to the Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasting (CMACP). According to estimates by the CASE analytical center, due to payment issues, large businesses have left at least $200 billion in export proceeds in foreign bank accounts over the years of the war to settle foreign trade transactions. The CMACP estimates capital outflows in 2014–2024 at an average of 3% of GDP.
Savings not invested domestically are “automatically” directed toward financing the “rest of the world,” according to the CMACP. In its view, bridging the gap between savings and investment “essentially means reducing the net capital outflow abroad.”
To this end, it proposes—in addition to the measures already adopted to develop the financial market—to forcibly eliminate “bottlenecks”: establish “systemically important” private equity funds, increase the share of residents’ savings invested directly (without being “funneled” through offshore jurisdictions) within the country, and, most importantly, replace capital outflows with domestic investments. The CMACP proposes considering the issue of tightening tax regulations on foreign investments by domestic companies (similar to the U.S. tax on retained earnings and the “exit tax”).
Businesses are reluctant to invest in Russia; investment has been falling for five consecutive quarters. Their main source of investment is drying up—corporate profits have been declining for the third consecutive year in nominal terms, while uncertainty is mounting. The nearly 10% drop in fixed-asset investment during the first half of the year—the third-largest decline since 1998 (after 2009 and 2015)—notes “T-Investments” Chief Economist Sofia Donets points out that without investment in fixed assets, it is impossible to expand and modernize production—and thus to increase the supply of goods and services.