Alexei Getman: Lukashenko's Third Attempt Will Be His Last

• 16.09.2026, 14:54

Against the backdrop of Operation "Vivaldi," the Kremlin's ally risks overplaying its hand.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces carried out the first phase of Operation "Vivaldi" in the Liman sector, clearing dozens of square kilometers of territory. The 3rd Army Corps stated that this is only the beginning.

— What has the Ukrainian Armed Forces already achieved through Operation “Vivaldi,” and to what extent has it changed the situation near Lyman? The website Charter97.org spoke with military expert and reserve major of the Ukrainian National Guard Oleksiy Hetman about this:

— First, there was a salient—which many of us saw on the map—that had formed as a result of the Russian troops’ advance. Therefore, this salient had to be eliminated.

The purpose of Operation “Vivaldi” was to prevent the Russians from advancing further and, if possible, to liberate the territory they had temporarily seized. General Andriy Biletsky, who commands the 3rd Army Corps, asked everyone who has any information beyond the official reports to keep it to themselves, because the operation is still ongoing. Therefore, we can only discuss what has already been announced by the General Staff or directly by the leadership of the 3rd Army Corps.

As of today, according to estimates by the Institute for the Study of War and NATO representatives, more than 200 square kilometers have been liberated along the section of the front line for which the 3rd Army Corps is responsible. And this advance continues.

The Russians’ logistics have been disrupted. They are forced to relocate support units—which are responsible for supplying troops with fuel, lubricants, ammunition, and everything else—30 to 50 kilometers behind the front line. In other words, their logistics have become significantly more complicated.

We’ll see how this operation unfolds. For now, it’s still ongoing.

— Even Russian Z-bloggers admit that generals regularly lie to Putin about the situation on the front lines. Why has lying become systemic in the Russian army, and how does it affect the troops’ combat effectiveness?

— As for the claim that generals regularly lie directly to Putin, that’s not entirely true. Within the Russian army, reports on the advance of Russian troops are indeed exaggerated.

When the Ukrainian Armed Forces seized documents from some Russian brigades during counterattacks, we saw that the line of contact was marked 10–15 kilometers farther toward Ukrainian positions than it actually is. In other words, on paper they were farther away than in reality.

This is mainly done for internal army use, because commanders are afraid to provide accurate information about the fact that they failed to hold a position or were unable to carry out a combat order.

It is precisely this fear that compels them to embellish the situation. This creates a cascade effect. One commander exaggerates a little; then this information is passed on to the battalion, regiment, and brigade commanders—and gradually the exaggerations snowball.

At first, they exaggerated by one or two kilometers, but in the end, we end up with what we saw—already 10–15 kilometers. But this is exclusively for internal use within the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

This has nothing to do with a desire to receive some kind of medal or commendation, but rather with the fact that they’re afraid to tell the truth. They’re more afraid to tell the truth about the actual situation. That’s how the Armed Forces system is structured.

As for Putin, in addition to the General Staff and Gerasimov, he receives information through other channels as well. It is duplicated via Patrushev and other agencies that analyze the situation on the front lines.

To suggest that Putin is unaware of something is a narrative tactic employed by Russian propagandists, aimed at preventing him from losing face within his own country.

In Russia, there is a tacit social contract: people allow the authorities, let’s say, to steal a little, and in return, the authorities give them the assurance that they are great and invincible, and that their leader—whether president, general secretary, or tsar—is a man who possesses some kind of superhuman abilities.

If their leader—a “tsar” in the pejorative sense of the word, since there are monarchs in Europe and we can clearly see how they conduct themselves—turns out to be weak and incapable of giving the people a sense of greatness, then such a “tsar” is quickly ousted from office. And riots will break out—senseless and merciless—just as they have in Russia since the days of the palace coups.

That is why we remember this saying: “The tsar is good, but the boyars are bad.” Russian propagandists have launched an active campaign. Naturally, there is censorship there; there is no freedom of speech. If they say anything, it’s all—let’s put it this way—approved by the Kremlin.

They’ve started actively claiming that if Putin knew the real situation, everything would already be fine. Putin is good—the generals are bad.

But Putin knows everything perfectly well. Let me repeat: a man with experience in the KGB, in counterintelligence, and in intelligence—to believe that he gets his information from just one person in the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces would be naive, to say the least. He gets it from various sources.

Moreover, this is exactly what they teach at the KGB school in Moscow: you must never trust a single source of information. It’s just like journalists, who don’t report information based on a single source.

Therefore, the primary purpose of such narratives is to portray the situation as if Putin is the good guy and the generals are the bad guys.

There is also a second component. At the same time, Peskov, Medvedev, and other high-ranking Russian officials are saying that the “special military operation” has been going on for so long because they are allegedly “acting with surgical precision,” very carefully “trying to defeat the Armed Forces of Ukraine” so as “not to harm the environment or civilians.”

In other words, they’re saying that if they wanted to, they could reach Lviv and Ukraine’s western borders in literally two or three weeks.

This boils down to two components. The first is that Putin would actually have accomplished everything long ago, but he’s simply being deceived. And Putin likes to portray himself as the one being deceived. He’s said about Ukraine and the Minsk Agreements: “‘Well, we were deceived, we were deceived.’” They try to portray themselves as kind, honest, and naive people who are simply constantly being deceived.

The second aspect is the narrative that they are supposedly just “proceeding very carefully.” As if to say, this isn’t really a war, but merely a “special military operation.” If this were a real war, they would have resolved all the issues long ago.

And given that such voices are growing in number and becoming increasingly vocal, this means that the situation on the front lines and within the Russian Federation is actually deteriorating. Thanks to Ukraine’s strikes and the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the front lines, the situation for Russia is worsening. That’s why the public is being fed stories about “surgical strikes” and about a white, fluffy, and naive Putin.

— The Ukrainian Armed Forces’ success near Lyman has triggered a nervous reaction in Russia. Against this backdrop, is there anything for Lukashenko to think about? How realistic is an operation by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Belarusian territory if Minsk proceeds with further escalation?

— Such an operation is quite realistic; the likelihood of it taking place is quite high. Because Lukashenko has been trying to walk a tightrope for many years.

On the one hand, he needs to demonstrate his loyalty to Putin: they are allies, members of the CSTO, which means they must act in concert.

On the other hand, he tries to hold military gatherings and exercises, simulating intense activity. At the same time, he fully understands that any more aggressive actions on his part will lead to the Ukrainian Armed Forces striking military targets if attacks on Ukraine are launched from Belarusian territory or if those attacks are directed from there.

This is in line with UN General Assembly Resolution 3314, which defines what constitutes aggression and what forms it can take. There is also the UN Charter, which specifies what a country is entitled to do in self-defense.

If it is confirmed that the new jet drones are being controlled or guided from Belarus via these relay stations, Ukraine has already warned Lukashenko: if this is clearly confirmed, documented, and recorded, these stations will be targeted.

At first, they shut them down and dismantled some of them. Now there is information that they have apparently resumed operations and continue to guide the flight of Russian “Geran-4” and “Geran-5” missiles. If this is confirmed, Ukraine warns that strikes will be carried out, no matter what anyone says.

Ukraine would not want Belarus to be drawn into the war. But if its leader does not understand this and is dragging himself into the war, then let’s just compare the situations.

If we want to station, for example, peacekeepers on our territory, Moscow immediately goes into a frenzy. Although Ukraine has the right under international law to invite troops from other countries onto its territory, provided it gives its own permission and consent. But in Moscow, they say that the arrival of such forces would be considered tantamount to a declaration of war against the Russian Federation. They are threatening European countries with strikes, even involving the use of nuclear weapons.

But here the situation is different: it’s not that some troops have entered Belarusian territory, but that Belarus is participating in the coordination of attacks on Ukrainian territory. Under international law, this constitutes an act of aggression. And Ukraine has the right to strike back.

And we will strike back. We have warned them once again. We have warned them twice. But the third time will be the last for Lukashenko.

And I believe the strikes may target more than just these power plants. To start with—at the stations, and possibly at other military-industrial facilities as well. Because people are dying in Ukraine, infrastructure is being destroyed, and yet Lukashenko still considers himself innocent and blameless.From his territory, with his consent, strikes are being coordinated from Belarus, while Ukraine is expected to sit back and ponder whether a response complies with any international rules, or whether the Kremlin will approve of it or not.

But they seem to have overlooked one thing: this is no longer 2022 or 2023. It’s 2026. And Ukraine isn’t even going to ask the United States for permission or seek its advice. They may simply be presented with a fait accompli, or simply informed of the situation.

Ukraine will do whatever international law does not prohibit. And the life of a single Ukrainian citizen is worth more than all those power plants and factories on Belarusian territory.