Putin Won't Be Hanged

• Andrei Kokotyukha
• 2.09.2026, 5:33

There are simply three types of Russian lies.

Let me start by saying that I am skeptical of Russian dictator Putin’s stated fear of being hanged if a decision is made to end the war without fully seizing the Donbas

The Economist reports on this, citing certain sources close to the Kremlin. But the Kremlin has been, for just over a century now, the Cheka-GPU-NKVD-KGB-FSB—that is, the secret services.

This is no secret, just as it is no secret that these special services and the Russian-Soviet security apparatus as a whole were formed on the basis of the Russian underworld itself—bank robbers in tsarist Russia, the so-called “expropriators of expropriators,” organizers of criminal schemes (such as the “Iron” Felix Dzerzhinsky), and similar individuals.

It therefore stands to reason that unnamed sources in the Kremlin are merely skilled disinformers, carrying out carefully planned special operations. The purpose of this leak may be an indirect signal from their master, Putin, to the West: “Guarantee our security—then we’ll talk.”

However, this is merely a hypothesis, a theory based on the genetic predisposition toward lying characteristic of Russians—a trait noted, for example, by the Marquis de Custine in his 1839 work *Russia*, Germain de Lagnier in his 1853 study *Knut and the Russians: The Customs and Organization of Russia*, as well as other researchers of Russia and the Russians who visited these lands both before and after them. After all, their pathological dishonesty is repeatedly emphasized in the book *We Have Regained Our Statehood* by Vladimir Kryzhanovsky , the first Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of independent Ukraine to the Russian Federation .

There are simply three types of Russian lies. The first is subconscious, as that is their nature. The second is deliberate and well-thought-out, possessing all the hallmarks of disinformation and propaganda; this is the method of the special services mentioned above. The third is a hybrid: to lie while simultaneously reaping political benefits. This is precisely the basis for my skepticism regarding the reliability of information from unnamed Kremlin sources. However, when it comes to Putin’s own fears, it’s worth keeping in mind that nothing and no one in Russia poses a threat to him. The officially announced further strengthening of his personal security does not indicate fear. It is a demonstrative gesture that a dictator can afford to make: as if to say, “Look, I am out of reach for my enemies—don’t even try.” Incidentally, the size of the security detail is proportional to the length of the motorcade and the grandeur of the head of state’s entourage. That’s “how it’s supposed to be”; the people approve of this and rejoice at how the safety of a true national leader is being safeguarded. And the grandeur of the motorcade is befitting his status.

Therefore, all the speculation by bloggers and ordinary citizens on social media about a frightened Putin, his fear of his own citizens’ wrath, and his fear of dying in a coup—from a blow to the temple with a snuffbox, just as Emperor Paul I was killed in his day—are a form of therapy. But this speculation also has some basis in fact.

It is known from open sources with what horror Putin watched the video of the execution of the Ceaușescus in late 1989. The Romanian dictator paid with his life, formally following a summary trial, but in reality, he was lynched along with his wife, Elena. His distressing reaction to the trial of Serbian dictator Slobodan Milošević is also well-documented. Furthermore, he closely followed the downfall of Muammar Gaddafi. However, Russian history, especially after 1917, knows of no such cases. And if anyone understands this, it is Putin, a former intelligence officer.

Tsars were killed as a result of court conspiracies. There is no reason to believe that a similar fate awaits Putin. He personally built a system that is based on mutual distrust and makes it impossible to carry out a conspiracy using a scarf and a snuffbox as weapons or to employ a poison like “Novichok.” Tsar also used to be killed by nihilists, anarchists, and other “Narodniks” like Alexander Ulyanov, Vladimir Lenin’s older brother. But even that is off the mark: the Russian system is structured in such a way that there isn’t a single militant group ready to launch such a hunt.

The last Russian tsar, Nicholas II, voluntarily abdicated the throne; however, this was preceded not only by World War I, which had drained Russia’s resources, but above all by the mundane bread lines in Petrograd. Russia’s current war economy does not mean empty store shelves—just as it is not identical to the situation of 1990–1991. It was precisely the sugar ration coupons and the scramble for a jar of ordinary mayonnaise that brought the USSR to its knees. As for the murder of Tsar Nicholas and his family in Yekaterinburg, that is not the scenario Putin fears. After all, it was carried out on the orders of the newly created Cheka, the very organization that gave rise to Putin himself. Consequently, he will not shoot himself, much less hang himself.

Ultimately, the conclusion is not at all that the Russian dictator fears his own inner circle. On the contrary, Putin understands perfectly well that in Russia, he has no one and nothing to fear. He wants to live to be 150 years old—information also allegedly gleaned from open sources. But one way or another, when his allotted time is up, he’ll have to die, and he’s aware of that. Of course, he’ll die sooner—in about ten years. A natural death, in his own bed or in an intensive care unit. And until that happens, he has the resources to wage war. After all, backing down would mean violating the “code” of the criminal underworld that raised and shaped him. Everything else is just words, not fears.

Andrey Kokotyukha, New Voice