Ukrainian Drones Have Breached The $119 Billion Mark
- 21.09.2026, 22:38
Why Ukraine's strikes on oil refineries in Russia mean much more than just long lines at gas stations.
Independent Russian columnist Vyacheslav Shiryaev explained how Moscow is manipulating fuel flows to avoid public discontent, and what is happening behind the scenes of this charade at the level of public finances.
Following Ukraine’s record-breaking strikes on Russian oil refineries in August, Russia is short by one-third to one-half of its monthly gasoline supply, and the fuel crisis is fueling inflation and forcing the government to borrow money.
This assessment of the strikes on oil refineries was provided in an interview with NV to Russian independent economic analyst Vyacheslav Shiryayev.
In his view, if the strikes continue, the Russian economic system will either transform itself as a result of the war or implode from within.
The Russian authorities are covering the fuel crisis out of the budget: payments to oil companies under the reverse excise tax mechanism and the fuel price cap are increasing expenditures. Shiryayev calls this crisis the second-biggest factor—after the war—putting pressure on public debt: instead of 5 trillion rubles ($60 billion) per year, the government is now borrowing about 10 trillion ($119 billion), and bond yields are rising to 15–16% per year.
Moscow has classified data on petroleum product production. According to estimates by the International Energy Agency, Russia refines about 4 million barrels of oil per day, whereas Shiryaev, who bases his calculations on data regarding damaged facilities, believes this figure is 2 million—roughly 2.5 times less than in March–April.
Russia is feeling the gasoline shortage most acutely: non-commercial gasoline (such as straight-run gasoline or naphtha mixed with additives) and imports—particularly from Belarus and Turkmenistan—cover only part of the shortfall. “Every third or every second liter is missing. We can see this in rising prices, in the lines at gas stations, and in the number of cars that aren’t going anywhere but are just sitting in parking lots,” Shiryaev explained to NV.
According to Shiryaev, the authorities are shifting reserves between regions to conceal the full extent of the shortage. For example, KINEF in Kirishi—Russia’s second-largest refinery by design capacity, which supplied fuel to St. Petersburg—halted operations following a strike in late August; On September 11, according to the Russian service “GdeBenz,” less than 40% of St. Petersburg gas stations were selling gasoline without lines, compared to about 90% in August. “At the time of our conversation, gasoline had become available in St. Petersburg. This means it’s no longer available somewhere in Yekaterinburg,” the economist explains.
According to Shiryaev’s estimates, fuel prices in Russia have, on average, at least doubled: when gasoline is desperately needed, Russians buy it from scalpers for 200–300 rubles ($2.4–3.6) per liter. Following fuel prices, the costs of taxi services, transportation, and food—whose prices depend on delivery—are also rising. According to the economist, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation had planned to “project” annual inflation at 6–7%, but now it itself acknowledges a monthly spike exceeding 11% on an annualized basis.
In winter, according to Shiryaev, the situation with diesel fuel will worsen: winter and Arctic diesel (designed for temperatures as low as minus 40 degrees) depend on the same kerosene fractions as jet fuel, and problems with those are already arising. In November, the authorities will have to decide how to use the remaining production capacity: to refuel aircraft with jet fuel or to produce winter diesel, which is necessary for the operation of trucks, diesel locomotives, and ships. This choice will become particularly acute if, in September and October, Russian refineries continue to be taken out of service by Ukrainian drones with the same intensity as in August.