Hungarian Knot

• Victor Yagun
• 23.09.2026, 12:54

What Lies Behind Péter Mályar's Decisions.

Hungary has effectively refused to join the Carpathian Eight, and Prime Minister Péter Magyar has blocked the prospect of implementing agreements between the Hungarian company MOL and Ukraine’s Naftogaz to create fuel storage facilities for Ukraine on Hungarian territory.

At first glance, this appears to be a manifestation of a unified political course. But if we compare the events in terms of timing and substance, the picture turns out to be more complex.

On September 18, Ukraine launched the Carpathian Integration Initiative—C8. This is a regional cooperation framework in the areas of security, energy, logistics, trade, and cross-border development. The Ukrainian side initially spoke of eight countries: Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Austria, Serbia, and Hungary.

At the same time, representatives from only six countries signed the final declaration—excluding Hungary and the Czech Republic. Hungary was represented at the summit at the diplomatic level but did not sign the political declaration. On September 21, Magyar explicitly stated that Budapest had received an invitation but had not accepted it “for valid reasons.” The next day, he explained at least part of his position: Hungary considers it unacceptable to be declared a participant in an international forum without the government’s prior consent.

In other words, the decision regarding C8 had already been made before the scandal surrounding MOL.

Another issue is the energy sector.

On September 20, Naftogaz officially announced the signing of a memorandum with MOL regarding the potential creation of storage facilities for petroleum products near the Ukrainian-Hungarian border, intended to meet the needs of the Ukrainian market. The logic is clear: locating part of the reserves outside Ukraine could significantly reduce their vulnerability to Russian missile strikes and drone attacks. However, there is an important detail: this was not yet a decision to proceed with construction.

MOL explained that this involves only a preliminary assessment of technical, financial, environmental, and regulatory conditions, as well as security issues. The preparation could take several years. The company also emphasized that it already stores part of other countries’ strategic reserves in Hungary, so it viewed such a memorandum as standard European practice.

Precisely because the project was in its early stages, MOL did not deem it necessary to involve the Hungarian government at this stage. And this is where things get interesting.

On September 21, in parliament, the leader of the KDNP faction Bence Retvari publicly criticized the government on this very issue. His argument boiled down to the fact that if Ukraine wants to move part of its fuel reserves outside its territory due to the threat of Russian strikes, then storing them in Hungary would allegedly transfer that risk to Hungarian territory and could turn the relevant facilities into potential targets.

Mályai responded harshly: under the TISZA government, there will be no such storage facility in Hungary. He also stated that he had sent a warning to the head of MOL Zsolt Hernádi, and reminded him that the Hungarian state owns approximately 25% of the company.

According to Madyar himself, MOL’s negotiations with Naftogaz actually began under the government of Viktor Orbán.

So, what do we see?

First, there is currently no evidence that either of Madyar’s decisions were dictated by Moscow, Orbán, or any other external center of influence. Such theories can and should be investigated, but it would be wrong to present them as established facts.

Second, in the case of MOL, a domestic political factor is clearly evident. Fidesz/KDNP quickly turned the corporate memorandum into a matter of national security, after which Mályi adopted the toughest possible stance.

This does not prove that the opposition determined his decision, but it does show who exerted direct political pressure.

Third, the conflict has another dimension—the issue of control over MOL’s strategic decisions. For the new government, this is not merely a Ukrainian issue, but also a question of the limits of autonomy for a major energy corporation, as well as the political legacy of the Orbán regime.

Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Andriy Sibiga has already called Budapest’s position “unjustifiably confrontational” and stated that, in his opinion, Orbán’s policy of obstructionism and isolationism continues even after his departure.

The Hungarian side has rejected this comparison and insists that international political and energy agreements involving Hungary must be coordinated with its government.

Therefore, I would not rush to the simplistic conclusion that “Magyar has become the new Orbán.” Something else is far more important: the change of power in Budapest did not automatically resolve the political, energy, and bilateral disputes with Ukraine that have accumulated over the years.

Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that Ukrainian-Hungarian relations are entering a new phase, in which cooperation with Kyiv is simultaneously turning into a tool of domestic political struggle within Hungary itself. This means that Ukraine will have to deal not only with the traditional “Hungarian factor,” but also delve deeply into the internal structure of the new Hungarian government, take into account its political constraints, corporate conflicts, and the dynamics of competition with the Fidesz party.

Viktor Yagun, Facebook.