"Let's See How Long Lukashenko's Leash Is"
- 25.09.2026, 12:54
On the state of relations in the Belarus-Poland-Russia triangle.
Mutual accusations and threats are constantly escalating tensions in Russian-Polish relations. At the same time, the thaw emerging between Poland and Belarus is causing the “Polish track” of the alliance between the dictatorships of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus to become increasingly out of sync.
The summer of 2024, when a Polish soldier was killed during an attempt by migrants to storm the border, can be described as the lowest point in relations between Poland and Belarus. Warsaw’s perception of Lukashenko as part of the broader Russian-Belarusian threat reached its peak at that moment.
Against the backdrop of a steadily deteriorating security situation in the fall of 2025, the Poles played their trump card—a complete closure of the borders, including rail transit. At that point, the issue went beyond the scope of Polish-Belarusian relations, because transit is crucial for a major player like China.
Minsk attempted to propose dialogue without meeting the Poles’ conditions: the release of Pochobut, an end to migration pressure, and a resolution to the issue of attacks on Polish border guards.
However, the dialogue did not actually enter the public sphere until after the release of Andrzej Poczobut. It emerged and began to take on a life of its own.
In a very short period of time, we witnessed a meeting between Foreign Minister Sikorski and his Minsk counterpart on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Statements were made that a new Polish embassy building is opening in Minsk. However, when asked about Poland’s recognition of Lukashenko, Sikorski stated that Poland, as a state, recognizes states, not governments, and compared Belarus’s situation to a snowdrop that can bloom under the right conditions.
All these diplomatic moves are backed up by actions and figures.
Pochobut remains free and was able to return and leave (which is no small matter!) Belarus; there has been a noticeable increase in the activities of the Union of Poles in Belarus, which looks quite unusual against the backdrop of a total crackdown on the independent civil society.
The number of attempts to cross the border illegally has dropped to a few percent of the level seen in previous years. Warsaw is actively urging its eastern neighbor to refrain from “aggressive gestures,” as stated by Deputy Foreign Minister Martin Bosacki, as a necessary condition for building further dialogue.
This situation stands in stark contrast to statements from Warsaw and other European capitals regarding a growing military threat from Russia. These statements are not unfounded—constant provocations, acts of sabotage, and airspace violations, primarily in the Baltic states and Poland, are causing increasing tension in the EU’s and NATO’s relations with Russia.
Although the number of incidents is rising, according to Western intelligence agencies, these remain hybrid actions falling short of the threshold for a declaration of war. European intelligence agencies have observed no signs of a direct ground invasion.
Given the integration of the Belarusian army and infrastructure into Russian military plans, as well as the Minsk regime’s critical dependence on Moscow, Minister Sikorski’s statement that “Belarusians are very concerned about the possibility of being dragged into a war.”
In addition, Sikorski also emphasizes that Russia is preparing large-scale operations against NATO countries this year.
It appears that we are witnessing strategic efforts on Poland’s part to weaken the alliance of dictatorships’ unified approach to the “Polish track.” Poland is doing this for its own security, but such efforts also affect Belarusian society. We’ll see how long the Kremlin will tolerate such overtures from its strategic ally toward its strategic adversary—and just how much leeway Minsk has in this situation.
Sergei Kovalchuk, “Solidarnast”