The Picture So Familiar To The Kremlin Is Beginning To Show Cracks

• Petro Oleshchuk
• 4.09.2026, 13:39

The need to end the war is increasingly being discussed not only by Western countries.

In recent weeks, there have been an increasing number of statements regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war calling for a swift peace, with some of them coming from political figures Moscow would never have expected. However, the rise in peace-seeking rhetoric has not yet been accompanied by any real progress toward ending the war. On the contrary, the situation appears to indicate yet another round of escalation, accompanied by an extremely intense information campaign. Everything that is happening increasingly resembles a separate battle in the information war, unfolding in parallel with the military operations in Ukraine. And it is precisely in this information sphere that it is now particularly evident just how sensitive the very topic of ending the war has become for the Kremlin.

One of the most telling episodes was Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the eve of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek. During a public exchange with the Russian leader Modi unexpectedly spoke of the need to end the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible. Formally, such statements could be attributed to traditional diplomatic rhetoric, which carries no binding obligations. However, what is of fundamental importance in this case is that the words about the need for peace were spoken directly in Putin’s presence. For the Kremlin, which has consistently demonstrated its unwillingness to discuss ending the war without achieving its stated goals, such a signal can hardly be considered welcome.

A similar situation had already arisen during Putin’s conversation with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who also publicly raised the issue of ending the war. At that time, the Russian president made a noticeable effort to explain why hostilities were continuing, and later the Kremlin had to issue additional comments regarding the conversation. Today, such episodes are particularly telling, as the Russian leadership is taking an increasingly hard line against the very idea of a peaceful discussion. Even within Russia, the space for discussions about ending the war is gradually shrinking, and any such initiatives are viewed by the authorities as politically undesirable. Therefore, Modi’s public proposal to seek a path to peace sounds far more unpleasant to the Kremlin than it might seem at first glance.

It is particularly significant that this is not coming from the leader of a country that Moscow officially counts among its adversaries. India remains one of Russia’s key economic partners, purchases Russian oil, and plays a significant role in the trade networks that the Kremlin has come to rely on following the severing of many ties with the West. At the same time, Russian propaganda constantly portrays India as part of a hypothetical “Global South” that, together with Moscow, allegedly opposes Western domination and neocolonialism. When one of the most important players in this narrative tells Putin directly that it is time to end the war, the Kremlin’s familiar narrative of global confrontation begins to crack. This is no longer pressure from the West, which can easily be declared hostile, but a signal from a state that Russia itself seeks to present as its strategic partner.

Putin’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping appears even more interesting in this context. Following the meeting, the Chinese side once again spoke of intensifying diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the Russian-Ukrainian war. The Kremlin, meanwhile, attempted to describe the content of the conversation as cautiously as possible and effectively avoided acknowledging that the issue of Ukraine was discussed in any substantive detail. This verbal tightrope-walking demonstrates just how uncomfortable the mere possibility that Beijing might raise the issue of a ceasefire is becoming for Moscow. The Kremlin’s very reluctance to openly acknowledge that such a conversation took place already attests to the political sensitivity of the issue.

At the same time, new reports are appearing in the Western media about the visit of CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Moscow and his possible contacts with the Russian leadership. According to one account, the American official first met with FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov and conveyed fairly strong messages regarding the need to end the war. The reports claimed that the content of these conversations caused serious irritation in Moscow and allegedly led to Putin’s refusal to meet with Ratcliffe in person. It is virtually impossible to verify the accuracy of such details, as much of the information is based on references to unnamed sources. But what is far more important is this: reports of such contacts are not new, and each time they paint roughly the same picture.

The goal of this information campaign is quite clear. Western media outlets are consistently spreading the notion that Putin has no intention of stopping the war and is instead prepared to escalate it further. This same narrative includes reports of possible new large-scale strikes against Ukraine, threats to turn Kyiv into an uninhabitable city, and other scenarios involving a sharp escalation. The general pattern of such publications boils down to demonstrating the Kremlin’s determination to continue the war despite diplomatic pressure. It is as if Putin is trying to convince an international audience in advance that any attempts to persuade him to halt hostilities are futile.

The main change is that the need to end the war is increasingly being discussed not only by Western countries. The conversation is gradually shifting to include countries that Moscow considers friendly or at least politically neutral toward Russia. India is speaking about this in virtually no uncertain terms, and is doing so at the highest levels and publicly. China is expressing itself much more cautiously; however, Beijing’s diplomatic language also suggests its interest in a certain change to the current situation. This creates a significantly more complex problem for the Kremlin, since statements from such partners cannot simply be dismissed as Western Russophobia or hostile policy.

For China, the continuation of the war has, for a long time, objectively brought considerable benefits. The war has destroyed a significant portion of the opportunities for normalizing Russia’s relations with Western countries and has thereby accelerated Moscow’s economic reorientation toward Beijing. As long as the conflict continues, Russia remains far more dependent on the Chinese market, Chinese technology, diplomatic support, and opportunities to circumvent previous trade restrictions. In addition, China gains the opportunity to acquire Russian resources on favorable terms and to sell equipment to Moscow for which alternatives have become significantly more limited. From this perspective, Russia’s prolonged isolation from the West is fully in line with Beijing’s strategic interests.

However, this model has a fundamental limitation that could alter China’s calculations. If the continuation of the war begins to be perceived by Beijing as a real threat to the stability of Putin’s regime, the previous advantages could quickly lose their appeal. China is unlikely to be interested in large-scale internal destabilization of Russia, as this would jeopardize existing economic ties and Moscow’s system of political dependence on Beijing. Therefore, for the Chinese leadership, the war is beneficial only as long as it weakens Russia without posing an immediate threat to the collapse of the existing political structure. It is precisely a change in the assessment of the stability of Putin’s regime that could prompt China to exert more significant pressure on Moscow, demanding an end to hostilities.

Against this backdrop, another important idea is taking shape more and more clearly in international diplomacy—the notion that the war is strategically futile. The argument is gradually shifting away from a moral assessment of Russian aggression toward the assertion that continuing hostilities will not yield results for Moscow that justify the resources expended. The logic is reminiscent of protracted conflicts that, at a certain point, come to an end not because one side has achieved a complete victory, but because the cost of continuing the fight becomes too high. Achieving the maximum possible objectives would require enormous additional resources, time, and human casualties, while there are still no guarantees of success. Judging by diplomatic signals, this view is beginning to spread far beyond the Western political sphere.

For Kazakhstan, continuing the war entails additional risks, including those related to oil exports and the general instability of the region’s transportation infrastructure. For India, the risks of secondary sanctions and possible new restrictions from the United States are becoming increasingly significant. Their reasoning may consequently become extremely pragmatic: if Russia has already secured certain territorial gains, why continue the conflict, creating ever-new problems for its partners? Therefore, the question that is increasingly being tacitly posed to Putin is quite simple: what exactly does he still hope to gain from continuing the war? For the Russian president, such a question is particularly uncomfortable, as the Kremlin has fewer and fewer convincing answers capable of explaining the conflict’s endless nature to its allies.

The Kremlin is responding to these changes with a large-scale information counteroffensive. Stories are being circulated through Russian and foreign channels claiming that Putin is allegedly physically unable to stop the war without achieving certain territorial goals, since otherwise his own power would be threatened. The first key message is that the Russian president is supposedly backed into a corner and therefore simply unable to agree to a compromise. The second idea is that Russia is still capable of winning if given a little more time and if Moscow is not pressured too heavily. This narrative allows Russia to simultaneously justify continuing the war and demand patience from its partners.

A prime example of this dual information strategy is the topic of a possible new mobilization in Russia. For the domestic audience, the narrative consistently conveyed is that no large-scale mobilization will be necessary, since the armed forces allegedly have sufficient resources. At the same time, the opposite scenario is being promoted to an external audience, according to which, following certain political events, the Kremlin will be able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of new military personnel. The explanation that the mobilization has been postponed because the authorities must wait for the elections appears particularly dubious, since Russian electoral procedures have long since ceased to create the kind of political uncertainty for the authorities that elections create in democratic states. Therefore, the real reasons behind the Kremlin’s reluctance to launch a new full-scale mobilization likely lie elsewhere, although the threat itself is used as a means of exerting pressure on a foreign audience.

The second tool of pressure remains the demonstrative threats of large-scale bombings of Ukrainian cities. Reports of allegedly impending devastating strikes are intended to reinforce the perception that the Kremlin retains additional options for a sharp escalation. Their purpose is not only to intimidate Ukraine but also to attempt to prove to external partners that a Russian victory remains within reach. The message in this case is quite clear: do not force Putin to end the war now, because he is supposedly just a few steps away from a decisive victory. The main recipients of this signal are not so much Kyiv, Washington, or Berlin as they are the Russian elites and states with which the Kremlin still considers its relations to be strategically important.

Perhaps such an information campaign will indeed allow Putin to gain a few more months to try to turn the tide on the front lines. However, the promised decisive victory remains just as much a propaganda talking point as it was before, and the need to constantly prove that it is imminent speaks for itself. The intensity of the Kremlin’s information campaigns shows just how seriously Moscow takes the growing irritation even among those countries that have not joined the West’s policy of pressure. The Russian president’s public confidence in the inevitability of his own success stands in ever-greater contrast to the number of excuses, threats, and explanations that the Russian propaganda machine is forced to produce. This is precisely why the Kremlin’s current information campaign appears not so much a display of strength as a sign that the confidence Putin projects is, to a large extent, artificially constructed.

Petr Oleshchuk, exclusively for Charter97.org