The Citizens And Economy Of The Russian Federation Are Breaking Away From The Kremlin's Control

• Igor Lipits
• 5.09.2026, 13:29

Let's see what happens!

Putin’s decree on critical infrastructure security and the creation of a government subcommittee “to ensure the uninterrupted functioning of certain sectors of the economy” to implement it should not be viewed as an isolated event. In August 2026, Russia’s transition to a new way of life was completed: the country reached a crossroads and chose the path of building a mobilization economy by dismantling the market economy and increasingly restricting its foundation—private property.

The goal is to maximize the strain on all of the country’s remaining resources so as not to lose the war or perish. This is a harsh conclusion, but there are many arguments supporting this logic.

An important step along this path was the refusal to allow “Yabloko” to participate in the State Duma elections. When the party was registered, there was an attempt to pay lip service to the remnants of a civilized society and the remnants of civilized politics—even under wartime conditions.

A Rebellion on One’s Knees

The attempt failed because it immediately became clear just how many people in Russia do not want the war to continue. Support for “Yabloko” is a manifestation of what I would call civil disobedience. A very subtle, very disguised, but very real civil disobedience toward the authorities is beginning to emerge in Russia. Authorities who have been waging a war for five years—with no chance of victory and no clear objectives. This underlying, yet increasingly evident, disobedience is making the authorities nervous, hence the scandalous decision to ban “Yabloko.” But this decision is only part of a series of events that have already taken place.

The first sign of this strange defiance (coming, in fact, from within the state apparatus itself) was likely the statement by Sberbank’s CFO Taras Skvortsov that the bank was not prepared to purchase Ministry of Finance bonds. The situation is intriguing because previously everything was clear: there are state-controlled banks, including Sberbank, and they are, in general, obligated to assist the state in every way possible and allocate whatever funds are needed. It seemed as though the state-controlled part of the banking system was always at the government’s complete disposal. And suddenly, when commercial banks refused to buy Ministry of Finance bonds—and the budget shortfall is enormous—the state-owned Sberbank rears up and says: “We can’t buy them—we don’t have the money.”

This is a rebellion—albeit on its knees—but a rebellion nonetheless. In Russia’s system of government, this is a rebellion. The state-owned bank is saying that its interests as an organization differ from those of the state apparatus, Putin, and the Ministry of Finance, and it has no intention of parting with its money, because doing so could trigger a collapse of Sberbank itself. In other words, the state’s demands have come into conflict with the interests of Sberbank’s top management.

The second sign of a rebellion is, of course, the publication of the sensational report on the Nikitsky Club meeting (a forum once created by the magazine *Expert* as a discussion platform for experts loyal to the government but capable of independent thought). At the meeting, VEB Chief Economist Andrei Klepach presented a report on the poor state of the Russian economy. Many people spoke during the debate, and the speakers generally expressed solidarity with Klepach, asking him mostly clarifying questions. The overall tone of the discussion turned out to be rather unpleasant for the Russian authorities.

The meeting took place in May. For two months (from May to July), this material remained in the Nikitsky Club’s archives, but Alexander Privalov—vice president, chairman of the Nikitsky Club’s Board, and scientific editor of the journal *Expert*—did not publish it. The transcript was, as they say, “closed,” so there were no consequences. And then suddenly Privolov published it—fully aware (as an intelligent and experienced person) that the reaction might be harsh. But apparently, he realized that such statements now resonate quite well with the sentiments of that audience (which is clearly not made up of ordinary working people) that is aware of the very existence of the Nikitsky Club and is willing to read the materials published on its website.

And the articles were published with consequences—as we now understand—for Andrei Klepach, a First-Class State Counselor of the Russian Federation, that were quite unpleasant. Let’s see, by the way, whether this will also lead to trouble for the other experts who expressed “defeatist sentiments” there.

The third fact: by August, a decision had been made to introduce total state control (in effect, regulation) over prices. Initially, this applied only to the food market. But I said right away that the authorities would not limit themselves to the food market. And that’s exactly how it turned out. In August, Deputy Prime Minister Novak already held a meeting on the system for monitoring fuel and regulating motor fuel prices. The model for this regulation will be roughly the same as that used in the food market. The government has begun to shift toward direct price control across entire industries.

Hand Over the Industry

And due to the situation in the gasoline and diesel fuel market, a mechanism for the creeping nationalization of private property has just been set in motion. It’s clear why: a crisis has arisen. And what caused it? Sabotage by the oil companies that own the burned-out refineries and are in no hurry to repair them. In plain language, what does the decree actually say? You’ve suffered attacks and aren’t making repairs. But you must make repairs—otherwise, the crisis will become a national one!

Here is a private company that was supposed to be protected from foreign military attacks by the state and its armed forces. But the state failed to do so; the property was not protected and suffered damage. And now it’s up to its owners—the owners of this private property—to decide what to do: is it in their best interest to repair it without any guarantees of future protection, or not?

“Nothing of the sort!” says the state, which issued Decree No. 604, “You must repair it because you operate within a war economy, and the interests of the nation take precedence over the interests of private property! And you’re sabotaging the refinery’s repairs!” But it was obvious that this is exactly what would happen, because no one in their right mind would spend a fortune on refinery repairs if, two days after the repairs are finished, the next Ukrainian drone flies in and everything goes up in flames again.

But in this situation, “refraining from repairs” also becomes an act of civil disobedience. And it seems this has become so obvious that the state has decided to crack down on it harshly: if you don’t repair it, you lose control over your assets. Note: this is not nationalization with compensation paid to the owner, nor is it even confiscation by court order for some kind of offense. It is the transfer of private property (including even the securities of the company’s owners) to state control by decision of nothing more than some government subcommittee.

This is particularly telling because oil companies, in particular, have always been very close to the government, very loyal, and very obliging. As you may recall, after the dismantling of Yukos in 2003, the “oil companies” all toe the line, doing whatever the state required. But now even they have been hit by the introduction of monitoring and control of motor fuel prices—and, most importantly, by the threat of transferring refineries to state control.

In my view, this is—in essence—a crackdown on civil disobedience even among the owners of private oil companies. As a result, it’s entirely possible that Rosneft—as a wholly state-owned company—will ultimately bring all the country’s refineries and gas stations under its control and become just as much of a monopoly as Gazprom. Even without buying these assets!

The fairy tale is over

The next source of defiance is citizens who are withdrawing money from banks. And this, of course, is also a very interesting topic, because the government is shouting: keep your money in banks or buy Treasury bonds! “It all depends on your investment horizon. If you’re in it for the long haul, it’s better to invest in government securities. It’s an excellent investment—look at those returns,” said Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov back in 2024, speaking at the “Knowledge. First” educational marathon.

However, according to data from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, more than 2 trillion rubles have flowed out of the Russian banking system into cash since the beginning of the year. The Central Bank recorded a record outflow in July. As evident from bank reports, funds held by individuals in Russia’s largest banks have decreased significantly in recent months. Demand for cash increased in early March and has been growing ever since. Approximately 300–600 billion rubles are being withdrawn from accounts each month.

Moreover, citizens are shifting their savings en masse from traditional deposits to flexible instruments, and as of today, the amount of funds held by the public in savings accounts has already exceeded 20.2 trillion rubles. This is an impressive figure, indicating that people are rethinking their approaches to saving money and want to make it easier to quickly withdraw their savings from the bank. And savings accounts provide this capability far better than traditional deposits.

This is also a clear sign that the public has stopped believing the fairy tales about the Russian economy. It’s a form of civil disobedience: withdrawing money and thereby undermining the banking system.

Incidentally, this is where the roots of the “Sberbank revolt” we mentioned earlier lie: it faced the fact that its borrowers were not repaying their loans (as of April 2026, the share of non-performing consumer loans in Russian banks reached 13.1%—compared to 10.8% a year earlier; according to Bank of Russia data, the share of non-performing loans issued by Russian banks to companies rose to 11.5% over the year), and the public wants to withdraw their deposits and is demanding cash. But where can the bank get the money to pay depositors and prevent a panic?

Banks are currently relying on special loans from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, but in such a situation, it is quite possible that the government will adopt some measure to combat “dangerous defiance” by depositors. Let’s say they impose a limit on cash withdrawals from accounts. After all, limits on gasoline purchases have already been introduced at gas stations almost everywhere; now they could just as easily impose a limit on withdrawing money from banks. The precedent has been set…

A relatively honest way to take money away

The Russian authorities may also choose to convert savings into irrevocable savings certificates. This is a tool that Putin loves, and he constantly says that people need to stop keeping their money in deposits. Everyone should buy non-redeemable savings certificates, from which money cannot be withdrawn until the certificate’s expiration date! Let me remind you that Putin proposed the widespread introduction of irrevocable savings certificates in February 2024 in his latest address to the Federal Assembly (although, according to the Constitution, such addresses are required annually).

Strictly speaking, this option would best align with the program proposed by the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Maxim Oreshkin. This document is a grand program to relaunch the Russian economy, presented by the “Third Rome” think tank (an organization under the Presidential Academy, operating under Oreshkin’s leadership). The report was prepared for a meeting of the Council on Strategic Development and National Projects in August 2026. And at its core is the following thesis:


There is money in the country. We need to establish a mechanism that transforms these savings into long-term investment capital.

These 5- and 10-year non-redeemable savings certificates will be the means of obtaining “long-term capital” for expensive and long-term investment projects. They are very similar to Stalin-era bond loans.

By August 2026, the Russian population—both ordinary citizens and business owners—had apparently come to realize en masse that the Russian-Ukrainian war could be endless, hopeless, and fraught with significant and varied negative consequences for them, including the loss of assets and savings. And everyone is trying to avoid this; everyone is trying to sabotage it in some way.

But then the embittered state is forced to cast aside all pretense of a “socially oriented market economy” and move toward the only model appropriate for wartime—the coercive control of the activities of people and companies through mobilization measures. This decree on infrastructure security is just one of the steps; it merely sets a precedent that can now easily be replicated in other spheres of society.

This past August, Russia finally shifted to building a mobilization economy à la the Soviet Union of the 1930s. In such an economic system, private ownership by big business is not only held in low regard but also directly hinders the command economy. Everything must be transferred to state control. This was the case when the NEP was abolished, and events will likely unfold in the same way now.

We’ll be watching!

Igor Lipits, The Moscow Times