AFU Can 'Collapse' Russian Front And Open Road To Luhansk
- 13.01.2023, 9:32
The Ukrainian army successfully storms Kremenna.
The Ukrainian military reports that fighting for Soledar in Donetsk Oblast continues. The Ukrainian army is facing certain problems in this section of the front, but the chance to hold its position remains. The Kremlin needs small Ukrainian towns - Soledar or Bakhmut as a symbol. Their capture could justify the second wave of mobilization in Russia, which is under preparation.
The opposite process is taking place near Kremenna. The Ukrainian army is successfully storming that city. If Russia loses control of it, the entire front in Luhansk Oblast may collapse. Then the Ukrainian Defense Forces will open a direct road to Luhansk.
Military expert Oleg Zhdanov expresses this opinion in an exclusive interview with obozrevatel.com.
- The major issue now is what happens to Soledar. Will the Ukrainian army be able to defend it?
- The situation with Soledar is fifty-fifty. We have problems in the organization of defense, problems in the management of troops from our side. Many western analysts also note this. In principle, we have enough troops, but there are problems.
As of today (January 12. - Ed.) our troops have withdrawn from the center of Soledar. The fighting has moved to the western part of the settlement. On the whole, we are holding our line. We have a chance to hold Soledar. I wouldn't say things are that bad.
- Why is Soledar so important to us? Why is it important to the enemy?
- Soledar is a symbol. Soledar, Bakhmut... Any settlement today is a symbol for the Russian Federation. They need a victory to motivate society to continue the war.
For example, Putin should announce the second wave of mobilization. He would like to have a general mobilization in general. At least, that's what some Kremlin sources say. But today there are no grounds for this, no victories. What should they say to the Russians? We're losing - go to the military registration and enlistment office? No, no one will do that way.
But if it's like this: "Look, today we have seized Soledar. Tomorrow we will take Kyiv, we have to finish off the nationalists and the B@nderas in their lair. Yes, that's the motive. That's why not Soledar itself matters at the moment. The Russian military commanders believe Soledar is our weakest point in defense. They tried to seize Bakhmut for a long time, but then it was decided to go for a breakthrough in Soledar.
So Soledar or Bakhmut - there is no difference. The symbolism matters.
- What is the role of Kremenna? Russia moved additional forces there so as not to lose the city. Does it also have a symbolic meaning?
- The situation there is just the opposite. We are storming Kremenna, and we are making progress. While for the Russian army, the loss of Kremenna is a chance of collapsing the entire front of Luhansk Oblast. It is an opportunity for our troops to encircle the grouping near Soledar. We can go eastward from Kremenna to Starobelsk. This is a direct road to Luhansk.
Most likely, if we liberate Kremenna, we will head for Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. Then the Bakhmut direction is also in the semicircle. If we retake Kremenna and advance further on Severodonetsk, there is a threat of encirclement of Russian troops.
By the way, the Russian occupation troops have thrown into combat the best they have today - airborne units - in Kremenna area. They are trying to use the counter-fighting tactics there. So we attack and they attack.
- What do you think about the new reshuffles in the Russian General Staff? Gerasimov was appointed commander of the joint group of forces, and Lapin became chief of staff of the Ground Forces. We have observed an increased enemy activity after such reshuffles earlier. Can we expect the same now?
- Yes, we can. Gerasimov will now be preparing some sort of offensive operation.
But there are two components here, the military and political one. The political one is that, in my view, Shoigu has decided to strengthen his position and regain full control over the power bloc called the Ministry of Defense. They decided to take everything into their hands. And today Surovikin is no one. Because he is Deputy. A deputy is a person who works as a backup when the chief can not do it.
Gerasimov is now the boss. He has another chance to prove himself. He's very experienced, by the way. He is worse for us than Surovikin. After all, Gerasimov has already led more than one military campaign of the Russian army in different parts of the world - both in Georgia and Syria.
Anyway, we observe an intra-Kremlin struggle for inner circle of Putin.
- Note: we keep discussing the process of liberation of the "new" occupied territories. In some places, the front line approaches literally right up to the "old" occupied territories, including Donetsk, and yet it does not cross this conditional line. What is the problem here?
- I would not interpret this situation that way. On the contrary, there are places where we have held the line under the Minsk ceasefire agreements; we have not retreated. And there are places where we did retreat under the onslaught of Russian forces. We have not yet conducted offensive in the Donetsk direction. We are conducting a defensive operation there and trying to counterattack only in some areas.
It is to our credit that we are still standing on the line we had on February 24 in some areas. The Russian army has failed to break through our defenses and not advanced a meter deep into our territory.