A Sign Of The Kremlin's Weakness

• Petro Oleshchuk
• 22.05.2026, 16:48

That's why the Russian top brass is nervous.

Putin is pulling out the nuclear baton again. Again threatening, now trying to intimidate the West, again counting on the fear of a hypothetical escalation to make Ukraine's partners put pressure on Kiev. And it seems that this is what is now becoming one of the main tools of Russian policy.

This time there are special Large-scale joint exercises of strategic and tactical nuclear forces of Russia and Belarus from May 18 to 21, 2026. More than 60 thousand servicemen, aviation, warships and submarines took part in these maneuvers, and the main purpose was "to practice the delivery and use of special munitions in conditions of high readiness". So the buildup was taken to a new level.

For a long time, in 2025, the Russian authorities tried to avoid nuclear blackmail. Now Putin may be returning to this argument again, because the situation for him has not changed for the better. Whereas before he might have thought that he would simply milk Ukraine, now Ukraine is increasingly painful not only on the front, but also on the Russian rear. The strikes on Russia's oil infrastructure have become especially important. Russian oil exports, refining and logistics are increasingly becoming targets of Ukrainian attacks. For the Kremlin, this is no longer a symbolic problem. It is a blow to the resource base of the war.

This is why the Russian top brass is nervous. That's why Russian military commentators are increasingly talking about Ukraine moving some of its production to the West, developing its own drones, increasing its strike capabilities and using them against Russia. Hence the new threats to the Europeans, the Baltic states, Eastern European and Scandinavian states. Moscow is trying to convince them that supporting the Ukrainian military-industrial complex will have dire consequences for them.

This is no longer just rhetoric for domestic consumption. The Kremlin is trying to intimidate Ukraine's partners and force them to limit military and industrial cooperation with Kiev. Especially after the European Union makes sweeping decisions to finance Ukraine, Russia realizes that Ukrainian manufacturing capabilities can grow. And if they grow, the number of strikes on Russian military and economic infrastructure will also increase.

This is where nuclear blackmail comes in. Moscow cannot effectively stop the Ukrainian strikes with its own means, so it is trying to stop them with political pressure through the West. The Kremlin wants Trump or other Western leaders to start telling Europeans that supporting Ukrainian long-range capabilities supposedly leads to nuclear catastrophe.

There is a significant difference from the previous period. The Biden administration had much more leverage over Ukraine's use of Western weapons because it was the U.S. that was providing important offensive resources. When Ukraine received certain systems, Washington could set limits on the targets and methods of use. Now the situation is different. Ukraine increasingly uses its own long-range assets, its own drones, its own technology, and determines its own targets for strikes.

This is what irritates the Kremlin the most. It used to be that you could pressure Washington, and Washington could restrain Kiev. Now this mechanism works worse. If Ukrainian funds are produced in Ukraine or in cooperation with European partners, there are fewer opportunities for American control. That is why the Russians are trying to act through fear. They want the West to start restricting Ukraine itself, fearing Russian threats.

But Putin's nuclear threats are not a sign of strength. On the contrary, they indicate a loss of confidence. If the Kremlin really believed in an inevitable victory, it wouldn't need to pull out that old card again. It would simply keep advancing, pressuring, capturing and dictating terms. But when reliance on conventional military superiority fails, the Kremlin reverts to psychological warfare.

While Putin himself does not appear to be a man ready for suicidal escalation.

He may be brutal, aggressive, and dangerous, but his entire demeanor shows extreme personal cowardice. This is a man who, during a pandemic, hosted guests after days of quarantine at a multi-foot table. This is a man who demonstrated fear for his own physical safety. It is hard to imagine that this is the kind of man who would knowingly go along with a scenario that could mean the end both for him personally and for his regime.

That is why the Kremlin's nuclear blackmail is first and foremost a bluff. Dangerous, cynical, designed for weakness and fear, but a bluff nonetheless. Its purpose is not to actually start a nuclear war. His goal is to make the West limit itself. So that Europeans will be afraid to help Ukraine. So that American politicians can explain behind-the-scenes agreements with Moscow by the alleged need to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. So that any concession to Russia would be presented not as weakness, but as responsibility.

This is exactly how the argumentation regarding possible pressure on Ukraine can work. It is necessary to stop strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, because otherwise Putin will be offended. It is necessary to limit the Ukrainian military-industrial complex, because otherwise the Kremlin will escalate. We need to reduce support for Kiev because otherwise there will be a big war. In reality, this is just shifting responsibility from the aggressor to the victim.

It is possible that such signals are already being sent out through various channels. And it is possible that some European politicians may be influenced by them. There are still many people in Europe who are ready to consider Ukrainian territories, Ukrainian security and Ukrainian ability to resist as material to appease the Kremlin. For them, nuclear blackmail is a convenient excuse. We can talk not about concessions to the aggressor, but about preventing the worst-case scenario.

But the problem is that such logic has already failed repeatedly. Each concession to Putin has not reduced his appetite, but only convinced him that blackmail works. If nuclear threats are allowed to constrain Ukraine, they will be made again. If they can be used to soften sanctions, block Ukrainian strikes, or reduce military aid, the Kremlin will continue to use them.

That is why the current intensification of the nuclear issue should not frighten enough to paralyze political will. It should be alarming in another sense. It is a signal that Putin no longer feels confident. Ukrainian strikes on the Russian rear, the development of Ukrainian production, European support and military capabilities pose a real problem for him. And he is trying to compensate for that problem with what he has always had left, intimidation.

The Kremlin's nuclear scaremongering is not proof of Russia's strength, but a manifestation of its anxiety. It is an attempt to stop Ukraine not on the battlefield but through fear in Western capitals. It is an attempt to force others to do what Russia itself can no longer achieve militarily. And that is why the worst reaction would be to give in to this blackmail.

Petr Oleshchuk, Doctor of Political Science, Professor of Taras Shevchenko National University, specially for Charter97.org.