Gambling With Putin

• Sergey Shelin
• 18.09.2026, 12:50

Playing against a card shark by the rules he made up means accepting defeat from the very beginning.

On the eve of the “elections,” it’s worth recalling that in the past, opponents and critics of the regime have always managed to score at least some electoral victories against it. And these victories were never followed by greater freedoms, but rather by a tightening of the screws and terror. Such is the logic of this system.

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The lists of Duma candidates for the upcoming “smart voting” — SV — have been approved. Those who take it seriously say that “Smart Voting,” of course, won’t topple the regime, but at least it will upset it. Perhaps it will even scare it, and thus force it to be more cautious.

But the logic behind the behavior of this regime and this ruler is entirely different. I’m not talking about Putin’s supposed annoyance, which interests me little. Only about actions.

The Regime and the Unstructured Crowd

Let’s look at the three previous Duma election cycles. In 2011, following the rigging of the election results, the largest unrest in our memory took place. After the Duma and presidential elections were held, the regime spent two years in a state of security hysteria, and then launched its first invasion of Ukraine.

In 2016, the “elections” went relatively quietly, and Putin was also relatively quiet afterward. Not in the sense that he had become a better person, but simply because there were few reasons to react specifically to those dead-end “elections.”

In the summer of 2018, Putin pushed through a pension reform—a move the ruling party hadn’t even hinted at during the Duma “elections.” People cursed United Russia, of course, but not at all for their “campaign” promises, which no one had the slightest idea about. Just like the party itself, actually.

And then came the fall of 2018—a year that, while not a Duma election year, turned out to be humiliating for the regime on “voting day.” Four governors were defeated in the first rounds. And in the second round, in the Khabarovsk Krai, the unsanctioned Sergey Furgal won triumphantly, with a two-to-one margin.

The term “smart voting” wasn’t used back then, but that’s exactly what it was in its first and last victorious application. Putin’s response was not liberalization, but rather a tightening of the rules for subsequent gubernatorial elections. And then came the crackdown (2020) on Furgal, who refused to become a puppet and acted like a true, elected governor.

The people of Khabarovsk are not to blame for the failure of their democratic experiment. They tried to defend their elected representative. But they lacked the organizational structures on which to rely. The regime is totalitarian and far stronger than any unstructured crowd, even a large one that protests loudly. Furgal is now serving a 25-year sentence, and Khabarovsk is known as a reliable stronghold of the “SVO.”

Obsessed with the ritual

State Duma “elections” The 2021 elections posed no major threat to Putin, but he still managed to turn them into a scandal. On the eve of the vote, “Golos” was crushed to prevent observers from interfering; for the same reasons, they launched the first major wave of account suspensions and designations of journalists as “foreign agents,” and, with the help of the Central Election Commission, rigged the vote in Moscow, since the Opposition Bloc was winning there.

As a result, out of 225 single-mandate Duma seats, only 14 were held by Opposition Bloc candidates—those who would have won anyway. But even by the official count, “United Russia” garnered less than 50% of the vote. So to speak, the dream of the 2011 protesters came true. And this should come as no surprise. Such a dream, such an outcome. And on top of that, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)—which some chose to view as a force critical of the authorities—secured a full 20%.

Did the people give the authorities a mandate in these “elections” for what they proceeded to do afterward? A mandate to crack down, attack a neighboring country, or impose martial law? Of course, the people put up with all of this, but they did not grant a mandate. None of this in any way stemmed from interparty disputes or from voters’ ballots.

But the Duma—elected in part by opposition members—has carried out every order in unison all these years. It never even occurred to the Communists there to speak out on behalf of their constituents. You couldn’t even call this betrayal, since betrayal implies, if not pangs of conscience, then at least some inner hesitation.

In 2024, “Noon Against Putin” was a success for the opposition. In the sense that quite a few people turned out at that time, and there were lines at polling stations, though not everywhere. And even more voters, in one way or another, cast their ballots against the ruler and the war. Did Putin perceive this as a signal from the people that it was time to seek peace? Did this really make him budge even a millimeter?

All these years—or, more precisely, for decades now—the opposition has been eagerly playing along with Putin in his “elections.” It played by his rules, sought—and at times even succeeded in obtaining—permission to participate in them, and after participation was finally banned, it devised ways to play from the sidelines.

It explained its fixation on this ritual by the desirability of taking advantage of every opportunity the leader offered it. His domestic political schedule was its only schedule. She couldn’t come up with any other agenda for herself and believed that she was achieving some kind of success each time.

As of today, some have died, some are behind bars, and the rest are in exile, playing the same game. Although it’s time to stop. The behavior of the dictator and his regime follows a logic quite different from the one people are accustomed to attributing to them.

A Celebration for Oneself

Commentators inclined to identify general patterns will say that, for totalitarian regimes, regular “elections” are a ceremony uniting subjects with the authorities and reaffirming the people’s oath of allegiance to the leader. You can’t argue with that.

But in Putin’s Russia, there is much more to it than that.

For example, the practice of giving the people a bonus before or immediately after the vote—and rewarding the “security forces” twice as much.

In 2011, generous adjustments were made to pensions and the salaries of public sector employees. But the main “pre-election” beneficiaries were the “security forces.” It was announced in advance that their incomes would increase two- to threefold starting in 2012. This move fit perfectly with the circumstances at the time and quickly paid for itself.

In 2016, one month before the “elections,” it was announced that 44 million pensioners of all categories would receive 5,000 rubles each in January 2017 as compensation for the insufficient indexation caused by the financial shortfall at the time. There was indeed a severe shortage of funds due to falling oil prices and financial difficulties caused by the first invasion of Ukraine. But the leader ordered the money to be scraped together, and the pensioners were flattered.

In 2021, Putin ordered that much more be scraped together and distributed nearly 700 billion rubles among 66 million citizens. And the money was handed out before the “elections,” not after. Parents of schoolchildren and retirees of all categories were awarded 10,000 rubles each, while “security forces” of all kinds received 15,000 rubles each. Nearly 3% of annual budget expenditures were spent on this.

Proportional to the 2026 budget, that would amount to 1.3 trillion rubles. But this time, the government didn’t give the people a single kopeck ahead of the “elections”—not even to the “security forces.” Apparently, on the assumption that they’ll find a way to grab their share for themselves anyway.

In 2026, Putin is behaving nothing like a populist leader who seeks to please the general public. He isn’t afraid to offend them. Apparently, he’s confident he can easily handle them. And it seems he doesn’t really need an oath of allegiance right now. After all, they’ll be deceived anyway. The main thing is that they’re afraid and obey.

I think Putin’s “elections” are a ceremony he stages more for himself than for the masses. And the people aren’t so much swearing allegiance to him as they are taking tests under his watch. If they do something wrong during the “elections,” their leader will punish them. That’s why there’s always a crackdown after every “election.”

As for the ten-thousand-ruble handouts, is it really necessary to bribe people if you can just force them to comply? When he was in the mood, he’d give out money. Now that he’s become more militaristic, he no longer does so.

Popular even without the people

The “electoral” scenario for 2026 is entirely under the regime’s control and demonstrates the style Putin is imposing on his country today. Of the top five candidates on the “United Russia” ticket, only one person (Moscow Mayor Sobyanin, listed in second place) is not directly tied to the war. Warlike rhetoric also fills the “platform” of the state-controlled party. Its “pre-election” address to the people takes the bull by the horns from the very first words:

Millennia-old Russia has time and again stood in the way of those who sought world domination. Today, Western elites—who have built their “order” on lies, plunder, and exploitation; on inciting hatred and wars; and on suppressing the right of nations to chart their own path of development, cultural identity, and distinctiveness, are once again trying to break us, plunder us, divide our society, inflict a strategic defeat upon us, and fragment the country in order to take control of our territories and resources…

This is word for word what Putin always repeats to his subjects. That is why the document is called the “People’s Program.” It is “of the people” even without the people.

The participants in the event, who are tasked with displaying the maximum permissible level of opposition and permitted peacefulness, also carry significant symbolic weight. At first, “Yabloko” was promoted for this role. But even it didn’t seem quite puppet-like enough and didn’t pass the filters. “New People” were ordered to play the role of freedom-lovers and humanists.


Their platform documents have the advantage of having been handed down to them by the authorities and revealing the exact terms in which the authorities permit people to desire peace. Here’s an example—please excuse the long quote:


If you ask people what they need today for a normal life, they’ll say more or less the same thing, regardless of region or age. There are three demands: the swiftest possible arrival of lasting peace, greater freedom, and a clear future. Society’s second and third demands are precisely what this entire platform is about. The first one deserves a separate discussion. The timing of peace’s arrival does not depend on the party’s platform. But the program answers two important questions: what brings peace closer and what will make it lasting. Peace is brought closer by a country that is strong not only in military might—but also with a functioning economy, with people who want to fulfill their potential within the country, and with rules that allow for long-term development. And what begins the day after the end of hostilities will make peace lasting. By that day, Russia must be economically and socially stable and looking toward the future. There should be no “unnecessary” people in the country. Everyone who served in the Special Military Operation should receive not just verbal thanks, but a clear path forward: a decent job, affordable healthcare, and respect—instead of having to wait in line for a certificate proving they were there.

Through the voices of the “New People,” Putin’s administration explains that “peace, freedom, and a clear future” mean a veteran of the special military operation who is treated with respect and is content with civilian life.

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Everyone in Russia or in exile is free to participate in this event. After all, making one’s position known is a source of comfort. But it’s better to do so with the understanding that playing by the rules Putin has invented—but has no intention of following—means admitting defeat from the very beginning.

Sergei Shelin, The Moscow Times