The Visit By Whitcoff And Kushner: Why The Change In The Negotiation Format Matters

• Petro Oleshchuk
• 6.09.2026, 18:47

Russia is effectively forced to acknowledge the new reality of the negotiation process.

Some observations regarding Whitcroft and Kushner’s visit to Moscow and Kyiv.

First and foremost, it should be noted that the very fact that the American representatives traveled to two capitals at once indicates a rather significant change in the format of the negotiation process.

Whereas previously the focus was largely on consultations between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin regarding what peace for Ukraine should look like, it now appears that in the United States, have come to the obvious conclusion that peace for Ukraine is impossible without Ukraine’s own participation.
Accordingly, the negotiation process is gradually shifting toward dialogue not only with Putin but also directly with the Ukrainian side. This signifies a shift toward attempts to find certain compromise solutions that, at least in theory, could be acceptable to all participants in the process.

It is still difficult to say to what extent such an approach might prove successful in principle and whether it is capable of yielding practical results. However, the change in the format of the negotiations itself can already be noted as a fait accompli.

Evidently, this was largely a consequence of the failure of the previous approach, which culminated about a year ago in the negotiations in Anchorage. At that time, Trump apparently assumed that it would be enough to meet with Putin in person, discuss key issues with him, and find certain compromise solutions. After that, it was assumed, Ukraine would no longer be able to reject the proposed terms and would be forced to accept them.

In practice, however, everything turned out to be much more complicated.
It was not possible to reach the necessary agreements with Putin. Relying on personal relationships and direct contacts also failed to yield results. At the same time, during this period, Ukraine gained a much greater degree of political autonomy, allowing it to avoid automatically accepting any demands or conditions that others attempt to impose from the outside.

As a result, it became necessary to seek a new format.

After a fairly prolonged lull in the negotiation process—which essentially persisted throughout this past spring—the parties finally resumed more active contacts. Moreover, the new format now bears much more resemblance to classic shuttlecock diplomacy than to an attempt to resolve key issues exclusively in a bilateral format between Washington and Moscow.

Another important point is that Russia, by all appearances, was not interested in such a transformation of the negotiation process and attempted to prevent it.

In this context, the attacks on Ukrainian airports on the eve of Whitcroft and Kushner’s arrival deserve attention. Earlier reports had indicated that the American representatives might arrive in Kyiv by plane rather than by train, as is customary for many foreign delegations during wartime.

It can be assumed that Moscow hoped to demonstrate the insecurity of Ukrainian airports and thereby, if not to derail the visit itself, then at least to cast doubt on the feasibility of such a mission. However, this attempt failed: the U.S. representatives arrived by train, and the visit took place anyway.
In addition, Russia actively disseminated various reports claiming that the Ukrainian capital was extremely unsafe for the American delegation. All of this leads to the conclusion that Moscow clearly disapproves of a format in which the United States conducts negotiations not only with the Russian side but also, in parallel, with Kyiv.

Nevertheless, despite attempts to thwart this course of events, Russia, by all accounts, has already been forced to effectively acknowledge the new reality of the negotiation process.

Of course, none of this yet gives reason to expect that the war will end right now and specifically as a result of the current round of talks.

However, the new format may have another important consequence. It can reduce the likelihood that decisions will be made that are knowingly unacceptable to Ukraine, after which Kyiv would face pressure to comply with terms worked out without its genuine participation.

This is precisely why the change in the negotiation model is significant in and of itself. It does not guarantee a quick peace, but it makes the process somewhat more realistic and potentially more acceptable to Ukraine.

In this sense, the current talks offer a glimmer of hope for the future of the negotiations. Perhaps not right now or at this stage, but in the relatively near future, this format has the potential to create the conditions for a more substantive and productive diplomatic process.

Petro Oleshchuk, exclusively for Charter97.org